

# Who else would be first to publish a China atlas?

We sometimes get copies of memos sent from wire service reporters to their bosses. They often contain interesting little tidbits not significant enough to the world to be included in stories.

For example, one of the first American reporters into Red China during the "ping pong diplomacy" stage mentioned that he was finding his way around (and learning facts about the country) from a CIA atlas.

We knew the CIA was into a lot of things (purely military operations, assassinations, etc.) but we never dreamed that the successor to the puristic OSS was competing with Rand McNally.

So just on the off-chance we sent a note to the superintendent of documents in Washington asking for a copy and a bill, just as though we had a right to secret documents.

Then we forgot about it.

It arrived this week, price \$5.25.

As is apparent in the photo of the cover, there's Central Intelligence Agency imprinted as big as can be, and no secret or top secret stamp.

It was compiled and published well prior to the first American visit, and bears a November, 1971, printer's date. There's no reason it should be stamped as secret, but it's obvious that it represents a workmanlike job in a library well-stocked with publications from inside then-closed China.

There's everything in it you've always wanted to know about Red China but didn't know how to ask. It doubtless is the best thing out, and it's worth the \$5.25 several times over. Its maps, artwork, photos and text are magnificently done. Chapters go into forms of government by various levels, languages, dialects and subdialects, climate, metals, industries and the people themselves. There's even a tourist's guide to Peking.

The last item is the only part that gave us a start. The Peking guide is a huge double-spread painting of the scenic city. It apparently is drawn to scale and looks much like an aerial photo. On it are 81 numbered circles -- just like a Strategic Air Command target map. For a closer look we see that all 81 numbers refer to palaces, ancient temples, gar-

dens, sacred gates and other points of historic and sight-seeing interest, unless someone considers the Soviet embassy to be a target. You find out from reading the skinny print hidden in the corner that the painting itself is taken from a 1957 publication of Peking Publishing House, Inc., or whatever the Chinese version of Inc. is.

We have three points to make:

- (1) It's an excellent publication.
- (2) The CIA shouldn't be in the publishing business, using taxpayers' money to put out fancy books (that obviously cost more than \$5.25 to make).
- (3) The CIA, much to our surprise, has the soul of a poet -- or at least one CIA man, the editor of the atlas, has.

Between the terse preface and the introduction is something in the nature of a dedication. It's a Chinese poem, written by a latter-day Communist about the goals of a commune. It urges hustle in harnessing the land and its wealth, and ends with:

An inch of time is an inch of gold,  
That's the value of yesterday.  
Time's worth today  
Is an inch for ten thousand pieces of gold.

Can it be that the anonymous editor is a spy-poet who came in from the Asian cold?



PEOPLE'S  
REPUBLIC  
OF  
CHINA

Atlas



Central Intelligence Agency

**The Washington Merry-Go-Round****Kissinger's Command Is a Hot Spot****By Jack Anderson**

Every day, coded messages flood into Washington from our embassies, military commands and intelligence outposts all over the world. The most urgent telegrams are funneled into Henry Kissinger's command post in the White House. Digests of overnight intelligence reports are delivered each morning to President Nixon.

From sources with access to this intelligence flow, here are some recent highlights:

**New Offensive?**—Privately, Henry Kissinger is optimistic about the prospects of a cease-fire in Vietnam. Yet intercepted messages indicate that North Vietnam is preparing for a renewed offensive. Our military intelligence has found no trace, however, that Russia has replaced the tanks and artillery the North Vietnamese lost in their spring offensive. They were able last spring to sneak heavy hardware into South Vietnam virtually undetected. But the best available intelligence suggests that both Russia and China have cut back military shipments to North Vietnam. Hanoi's military preparations, therefore, may be for a limited attack upon a political target, perhaps even Saigon itself. But no one really knows whether the guns will be silenced or booming when the voters go to the polls on Nov. 7.

**Soft on Thieu**—Hanoi may be softening slightly on its

arch enemy, President Thieu. In the secret truce talks, North Vietnam's Le Duc Tho has emphasized that the Saigon regime must be dismantled and replaced by a tripartite government dominated by neither side. But he has indicated that Saigon can choose anyone it wishes to the new government, that neither side should have a veto over the other's appointments. The implication is that Hanoi would not object if Saigon appointed the hated Thieu as a member of the tripartite government.

**Mao's Vow**—China's supreme ruler, Mao Tse-tung, told visiting Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka fiercely that the Chinese would resist to the death any encroachments by Russia. A CIA report on the secret Mao-Tanaka talks quotes old Mao as saying China would sacrifice its own people to prevent Soviet domination. He cited the fate of his former heir apparent, Lin Biao, who died in a plane crash fleeing to Russia after attempting a pro-Soviet coup against Mao.

**Chou's Opposition**—The Central Intelligence Agency reports that Chinese Premier Chou En-lai is still encountering opposition inside Peking's ruling circle. Chou's opponents are upset over his policy of detente with the United States, Japan and the West. They contend that the detente has hurt China's credibility with revolutionary forces around the world.

**Soviet Shipments**—A classified State Department analysis charges that Israel's forays across her borders against the Palestinian guerrillas have given the Soviets a pretext for strengthening their foothold in Syria and Iraq. Military shipment have been sent not only to Syria and Iraq but to the Palestinian guerrillas directly. Contrary to press reports of a Soviet "airlift" to Syria, however, the airlift consisted of only four transport planes, which have ceased to make regular deliveries. But the shipments, though no more than token military aid, have had the effect of strengthening Soviet bonds with the Arab hotheads. The analysis concludes, nevertheless, that Russia wouldn't likely risk war for Syria, Iraq or any other Arab country.

**African Wildman**—The efforts to placate Uganda's wildman, General Idi Amin, appear to have backfired. He has ordered the Asians, who had become the backbone of Uganda's economy, out of the country. He has made impossible demands upon neighboring Tanzania. He has made and broken promises to visiting mediators. He has imposed harsh martial law upon his country, charging that Tanzania, India and even Britain are planning to invade his small country. For the sake of black African solidarity, a host of black African leaders have made pilgrimages to Uganda to placate General Amin. But

a CIA report suggests all this attention has merely enlarged his ego and made him more difficult than ever.

**Castro "Uncouth"**—Intelligence reports acknowledge a rise in anti-U.S. feeling throughout Latin America. But apparently Cuban Dictator Fidel Castro's attempts to exploit U.S. unpopularity for his own purposes have failed. A typical message from our defense attache in Ecuador, where Castro visited last year, describes the top Ecuadorean military brass as anti-U.S. but also anti-Castro. The message quotes them as calling Castro "uncouth" and "not the great leader that many people consider him to be."

**Cuba-Panama Friendship**—A secret CIA cable, reporting on a conversation with a Cuban intelligence officer known only as "Alfredo" quotes him as saying that "the Cuban government generally supports the PJC (Panama's military junta) and General Omar Torrijos, the head of Panama, but wants to find ways to encourage Torrijos to move further to the left. 'Alfredo' suggested that ... leftists in Panama form a Panama-Cuba Friendship Society, which could promote friendship with Cuba, put pressure on Torrijos from the left and possibly be used as the center for certain unspecified Cuban activities."

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## International Joseph Alsop's hallucinations

By G. RATLANI

MOSCOW

Imperialist circles are using any and every expression of anti-Sovietism in their struggle against socialism. The anti-Soviet policy of Peking directly serves the needs of imperialism; and reactionary Western propaganda is using it to divert the attention of the peoples from the contradictions rending capitalism, to justify imperialist aggression and to slander the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community.

In the United States the Pentagon-reared news analyst Joseph Alsop especially feeds on fabrications about Soviet-Chinese relations. A few days ago he published in the metropolitan newspaper Washington Post a loud article under the heading "Political Hallucinations." Whose and what hallucinations? It turns out that nearly all except the author have them, and they consist in that honest and decent world public opinion is indignant at U.S. aggression in Indochina and the U.S.-protected expansionist policy of Israel in the Middle East; whereas, says Alsop, the main feature of the world landscape is not at all the war in Vietnam and not even the dangerous situation in the Middle East.

No, in the Alsop "landscape" the main feature is a Soviet "red threat" to China. In the CIA and the Pentagon there are very sensible men who have explained everything to him and asked him to give an account in public. And this old hand at provocative things tried his best to calumniate the Soviet Union, accusing it of nothing less than preparing a "preventive attack" on the People's Republic of China.

The hallucination prompted by the "sensible men" so much caught the turbulent imagination of Alsop, the hater of socialism, that he tried to present the imagined picture as a reality, in

front of which he and his friends sat as the "third rejoicing." He even yelped with rapture.

This pathological article of Alsop's is not unique. Back in February this year he tried to frighten the world with his extravagant fancy of the "castration of China." Finally, two days after the above-mentioned article, in the same Washington Post, Alsop made the crazy allegation that Pravda was advocating a "reduction of Soviet support" for the heroic Vietnamese patriots. This goes beyond all measures of falsehood.

But then, apart from Alsop, not so rudely and less noisily, other U.S. journalists and newspapers almost simultaneously spoke out on the Soviet "threat" to China, also, apparently, on the advice of "sensible men" of imperialist reaction.

As we see, there is a certain strategy at the bottom of all this.

It consists, first of all, in an attempt to discredit the actual policy of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis the People's Republic of China. This policy rests on a desire to normalize relations, to restore good-neighborliness and friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples. The reactionary imperialist forces are well aware of the fact that the improvement of relations between the U.S.S.R. and the PRC would accord with the vital, long-term interests of the two countries, the interests of world socialism, the interests of struggle against imperialism. The Soviet Union has placed before the PRC concrete and constructive proposals on non-aggression, non-use of force, settlement of border questions, improvement of relations on the basis of mutual advantage.

These proposals have not been accepted by China as yet. The Peking leaders think it unprofitable for themselves to speak the truth about these proposals of the Soviet Union—that would be their self-exposure as great-power ex-

pansionists and splitters aggravating international tensions and relations between the U.S.S.R. and the PRC. Alsop and his colleagues are also aware of all this, but deliberately pass it over in order to warp the real state of affairs.

The anti-Communists and anti-Soviet propagandists, in publishing their inventions about the Soviet "threat," do not abandon their attempts to discredit Soviet foreign policy as a whole. They are out to question the U.S.S.R.'s consistency in the struggle for stronger world peace, to present the Soviet proposals on European security, collective security in Asia, bilateral declarations on the non-use of force and other measures to ease international tension and to achieve disarmament, put forward by the Soviet Union, as allegedly prompted only by tactical considerations.

There is nothing new in these methods. Imperialist propaganda has long been resorting to slander concerning a "red menace" in its unsuccessful struggle against socialism.

What has been new here in recent years lies elsewhere. It consists in that the Peking leadership willingly echoes slanderous concoctions of all kinds concerning Soviet foreign policy. Peking brazenly draws on and spreads "information" from filthy sources of imperialist propaganda, adding to it its own inventions about the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community.

Therein lies the nutritive medium for the hallucinations of Joseph Alsop and the "sensible men" from the CIA and the Pentagon, who are backing him. That is the way the Peking "propagandists" and the poisoners of public opinion, who are filling the orders from the aggressive imperialist circles, are assiduously assisting each other.

(Pravda)

10 OCT 1972

# Multiple Rule in China Seen After Mao, Chou

By Stanley Karnow  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Chinese Premier Chou En-lai has indicated that a collective leadership will take power in Peking after he and Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung die.

Chou has suggested, however, that a key figure in the future collective is likely to be Yao Wen-yuan, a relatively young Communist official who played an important role in Mao's tumultuous Cultural Revolution. Mao is 75 and Chou is 74.

The Premier discussed Peking's succession question in a wide-ranging conversation this weekend with 22 U.S. editors currently visiting China. Chou, who likes nocturnal sessions, talked to his guests for nearly four hours until past two o'clock on Sunday morning.

According to accounts of the discussion published yesterday by Wall Street Journal Editorial Director Warren H. Phillips, Washington Star-News Associate Editor E. William Hill and other editors present, Chou discussed matters as diverse as the Chinese economy, Peking's relations with the Soviet Union and New York traffic.

The editors reported that Chou though using an interpreter, displayed his renowned wit and charm throughout the meeting. When one editor suggested that they get down to "serious business", for example, Chou replied: "Why get serious?"

With apparent seriousness, though, Chou disclosed that China's grain output this year is expected to exceed 250 million metric tons despite poor weather conditions. Grain output last year was 246 million tons and 240 million in 1970.

## Joint Navy Rejected

Chou also revealed that former Soviet Premier Khrushchev proposed in 1958 that the Soviet Union and China establish a joint navy. But Mao sensed a Soviet desire to con-

trol the Chinese fleet and refused, Chou explained.

Chou said as well that China is not interested in setting up joint industrial development ventures with the United States as a result of its bad experience with such projects established with the Soviet Union.

The Wall Street Journal account cited Chou as saying that "the man who planned the assassination" of President Kennedy has never been captured. According to the Journal's representative, Chou said that Lee Harvey Oswald "couldn't be . . . the one who really killed him".

Speaking in a lighter vein, Chou told the editors that the group most knowledgeable on China's Communist Party organization is the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency unit in Hong Kong. He added that the Soviet Union knew least even though it has the largest embassy in Peking.

Chou joked that he could not visit the United States as long as Chiang Kai-shek's rival Nationalists have diplomats in America, but might resign and "go as a member of the table tennis team".

The premier said that China was in no hurry to replace its bicycles with automobiles, commenting that "Peking would become like New York in terms of pollution, and you wouldn't be able to move on the streets."

## Kissinger Is Glib

Offering his impression of White House foreign policy adviser Henry Kissinger, whom he has seen frequently over the past year, Chou quipped that he "can talk to you for half an hour and not give you one substantive answer".

Focusing on the question of China's future leaders, Chou claimed that the idea of Mao's

replacement by a single successor was "one of the plots" concocted by Marshal Lin Biao, Lin, named Mao's official heir in the Chinese Communist Party constitution promulgated in April 1969, is alleged to have been killed in an airplane crash after an abortive attempt to seize power.

Despite this disclosure by Chou, most China specialists here believe that Mao personally supported Lin's designation as his successor but later changed his mind following an internal power struggle that escalated in the summer of 1971.

Some China experts here also believe that Chou's reference to Yao Wen-yuan as a key figure in the future may also be related to internal tensions still marring China. As these experts see it, Chou may be attempting to placate radical activists who came to the fore during the Cultural Revolution.

Yao, a young Shanghai publicist now about 40 who had earned himself a minor reputation as a radical literary critic, was apparently discovered by Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, in late 1965. She had gone to Shanghai at that time in order to muster support for Mao, who was then opposed by the Communist Party apparatus in Peking.

According to accounts published in China, Chiang Ching delegated Yao to write an attack against the deputy mayor of Peking, Wu Han, who had earlier produced a historical play that obliquely criticized Mao. The real purpose of the attack against Wu Han, however, was to denounce Peng Chen, then the Peking party boss.

After that, Yao appeared frequently as the author of much Maoist propaganda.

Among other things, he wrote the first big attack against Liu Shao-chi, the Chinese chief of state, who was later purged.

Although he mentioned Yao in his weekend talk, Chou told the editors that China has no shortage of leaders. He said that at least 100,000 officials have been in the Party for more than 30 years "and you can place any among them in a position of leadership and he'll get the job done."

9 OCT 1972

# Chou Talks About Possible Successor

STATINTL

## U.S. Editors Get a Fill-In

By I. WILLIAM HILL

Associate Editor of the Star-News

**PEKING**—After being questioned for almost four hours, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai assured 22 American editors he had been even more frank with them than he had with President Nixon, Secretary William P. Rogers and Dr. Henry Kissinger.

The interview, lasting from 10:30 p.m. Saturday 'til 2:10

a.m. yesterday, climaxed the first week of a three-week visit to China by representatives of the American Society of Newspaper Editors.

The premier expressed surprise that some of the editors thought there might be a dearth of possible successors to a Chinese leadership that is no longer young. He traced the entrance into party affairs of numerous Chinese leaders, including some of those present for the editors' interview.

One of those mentioned as a possible successor to Chou, was Yao Wen-yuan. He is editor of the People's Daily, a member of the Central Committee and the Politburo. He is believed to be about 45 years old and is a protégé of Chairman Mao Tse-tung's wife, Chiang Ching.

Chou pointed out that, to have taken part in many of the great events of modern Chinese history, a man would have to be along in years.

"Too many are old," the premier said, "and we keep the young down." He declared, however, that there were men of all ages who were ready and able to do the job.

It was recalled that during the Nixon visit to Peking, Chou expressed envy at the number of members of the Presidential entourage who were in their 30s.

Mao is 78 and Chou is 74.

Alerted for Meeting

First indications that something was about to happen on Saturday when we were alerted to be on call

all afternoon and evening. A little after 9 p.m. word came to report to the lobby of the Peking Hotel at 9:45 p.m. A little after 10 p.m., a cavalcade of cars whisked us to the Great Hall of the People.

The premier greeted us individually with a handshake while a picture was taken. We sat down in a circle of easy chairs in the center of a limitless lounge, a table close to each chair was equipped with a microphone, cups of tea, pads and paper.

Chou sat with ASNE President J. Edward Murray to his right and the official interpreter to his left. Behind the seats of the visiting editors ranged many Chinese officials, including Peking editors who had been our hosts and the head of the Hsinhua News Agency, our official host.

### Jovial Welcome

The premier's welcome was jovial. He told Oklahoma City's Charles Bennett he had expected a cowboy whoop from him the way one had been delivered by Patrick Hurley, another Oklahoman, on his arrival in China three decades ago.

The representative of the Washington Star-News the premier regards as resembling Gen. George C. Marshall and Honolulu editor George Chaplin bore resemblance to Dr. Kissinger.

The atmosphere, at once relaxed and informal, remained so while the premier discussed a score of subjects, emphasizing each with graceful hand motions and a disarming wit. "Why be serious?" he asked at the start.

Discussing Chinese Communist party organization, he declared that the CIA in Hong Kong was probably best informed on the whole matter, with Japan second, and Russia worst, despite having the largest embassy with the most

### Chou Sees Progress

Although some people don't see progress since the new phase of U.S.-China relations began, the premier disagrees. He pointed to admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, recognition of China by 29 nations, and the new rapport between China and Japan.

Chou looked amused as he recalled how neither China nor Dr. Kissinger had expected what actually took place when China was formally accepted

by the U.N. The history of the opening door between the United States and China was recalled. The premier, who likes to put information in narrative form, told how Mao in 1970 told writer Edgar Snow China would welcome a visit by Nixon. Then, before Snow could publish his article, ping-pong diplomacy began.

Chou gives Mao credit for the United States team participating in the table tennis matches. They were about to be refused permission to participate, as the U.S. team would have to come to China as individuals since diplomatic relations were missing. But Mao reminded everyone that "things must be grasped at the right time" and the United States team took part.

### Ping-Pong Diplomacy

Ping-Pong diplomacy was launched and Kissinger moved in not long thereafter to arrange the Nixon visit to China. The Premier was amused that none of the editors in the circle before him knew what Kissinger was doing, then admitted that few officials in China knew.

Chou announced firmly that China has no idea of having the few motor cars in Peking increase and reduce the 1,700,000 bicycles licensed in Peking. He pointed to the pol-

lution potential and said he didn't want Peking to get like New York.

China-U.S. cooperation in health matters was especially cited by the premier, who said a Chinese medical delegation is being sent to the United States to study how to fight cancer, heart and circulation diseases, bronchitis and the common cold. He said both China and the U.S. are testing a contraceptive pill a woman needs take but once month.

More tea and a plate of cakes was served to each editor after two hours and 10 minutes of interview. After an 8-minute break the premier refused to admit that his own work schedule was as punishing as the editors thought.

"I don't serve the people enough," said the man sometimes described as the best No. 2 statesman in the world. "I'm only an implementer and all implementers are bound to be busy."

He described his philosophy as trying to be happy and optimistic, to take time to take a breath and not be tense.

Questioned regarding establishment of better news relations between the United States and China, Chou said he could only urge more frequent contacts by both sides and the making of new contacts, possibly the visit next year of an-

3 SEP 1972

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# Government's Bookstore Full of Tips For Your Health, Education, Welfare

STATINTL

By ISRAEL SIENKER

"Whooping Cranes" and "Puddle Ducks" roost in harmony here. Both brochures are on sale at the United States Government Printing Office bookstore at 26 Federal Plaza.

The store, celebrating its first birthday, is offering neither reduced prices nor a new line. It will go right on selling at list price booklets that tell the citizen how to start a business, read a map, care for a baby, honor the flag, treat a headache, shun a drug, trim a suit, patch up a home.

As a sign of the Government's determination to spread such advice, a new outpost of the Government Printing Office opens about every three months.

Philadelphia got its store last week, and others are scheduled to open in Houston, Seattle, Cleveland, Jacksonville and probably Pittsburgh.

New York's store, which looks more like a business office than a bookstore, has 1,200 of the 20,000 titles available in Washington, and accepts orders for the rest.

## Tries to Fit the City

It tries to adapt its inventory to local needs.

"Our Dallas bookstore would carry items on the breeding of horses," Louis H. Potts, the manager, noted.

"In New York we'd be interested in a directory of companies filing statements to the Securities and Exchange Commission."

There are about 300 customers daily—most of them men.

Some, such as Frank Becz, a lawyer, want to browse. He finally bought a book on Alaska, explaining: "I'm always interested in out-of-the-way places."

Other customers arrive with specific interests, browse a while and wind up purchasing more than they intended.

A number of husbands walk out exclaiming such things as: "My wife will kill me."

Joseph Polacek, a civil engineer, came by this week to find material on the physical characteristics of ships—and didn't find it. But he did spot a manual titled "Survival"

## Just in Case

"Just in case I ever get dropped off in the middle of the desert," he said.

Hard by the entrance to the store in Room 110 are background notes—10 cents each—on foreign countries.

South Vietnam is laid out in eight pages, Leichtenstein spread thin through four. Nation 162—the People's Republic of South Yemen—has a bin, but no notes, and precious little customer demand.

Thanks to the Army, there are pocket guides to France, Greece, Thailand, Germany,

Okinawa, Vietnam, Britain, the Middle East and the Low Countries, 25 cents to \$1.25.

Courtesy of the Navy, there are "Antarctic Highlights" and, with the forthright aid of the Central Intelligence Agency, a "People's Republic of China Atlas." The price is \$5.25.

## Mars Guidebook

For those curious about the universe or ready to give up on the planet, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration suggests "The Book of Mars."

"America the Beautiful," a set of 52 photographs, sells for \$5, or 10 cents a photo. President Nixon, in full color, costs 50 cents. The first volume of his Public Papers (1969) is one of the most expensive items—\$14.50.

Last week the store sold its last copy (10 cents) of the sheet music for the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag, composed by Irving Caesar.

In the vast bureaucracy, who can take chances? "Rats (Let's Get Rid of Them)" advises the title of a brochure from the Fish and Wildlife Service.

The Public Health Service's ambitions are more modest: "Control of Domestic Rats & Mice."

## Must You?

"You Can Quit Smoking," assures a 15-cent tip sheet from the same agency, while another pamphlet offers realism: "If You Must Smoke" (10 cents).

If you must eat, consider these delights à la brochure: "Florida Fish Recipes," "Tan-

cy Catfish," "Seafood Moods," "Seafood Slimness," "Let's Cook Fish"—and series on how to cook tuna, scallops, salmon, oysters, shrimp, ocean perch, crabs and halibut.

The Department of Agriculture offers "Calories and Weight" for three thin dimes.

The Internal Revenue Service has come up with a bewildering array of advice on rendering unto Caesar what is Caesar's. For those who slip through the net, it offers "Firearms Identification for Law Enforcement Officers."

Inexpensive is the word for publications on eminent poets (Carl Sandburg, Walt Whitman), home refuse, electrical currents abroad, growing camellias, ants in the home and garden, moths in the attic, and myths in foreign policy.

Not many authors get credit for their work in this store, but Dean Rusk is listed as the author of "Some Myths About Foreign Policy."

## Advice for the Bride

Women are spoiled with attention, beginning with a "Packet for the Bride," rich with consumer advice, and going on to booklets on prenatal and postnatal care.

"Teach Children Fire Will Burn" advises one brochure, and another tells almost all about "Your Children and Their Gangs" (25 cents).

There is even a "Lazy Eye Coloring Book" intended to persuade parents to have their children's eyes examined early.

A few publications are offered in Spanish also, such as the translation of the one titled "When Your Baby Is on the Way" (Mientras Su Bebé Está En Camino).

Daily receipts run between \$500 and \$600. The store, forbidden by law to advertise, is open Monday through Friday from 8 to 4, phone 264-3826. Personal checks are accepted but credit cards are not.

Annual sales are about \$23-million. About 60 new titles are offered each week.

The record best seller is "Infant Care" (20 cents), which has sold more than 15 million copies.

Then come "Your Federal Income Tax," "Prenatal Care," "Your Child From 1 to 6," "Tax Guide for Small Business," "Strictly for Teenagers," "Your Social Security," "Marijuana—Some Questions and Answers," "LSD—Some Questions and Answers" and "Rescue Breathing" (wallet-sized card).

Current national best sellers include "Tables of Redemption Values for U. S. Savings Bonds," "Sanitation and Home Laundering" and "What to Buy in Child Restraint Systems."

In New York, the best-moving items are the "Standard Industrial Classification Manual 1972" and "The Statistical Abstract."



more warheads, but the Soviets have a 2-to-1 advantage in megatons. The Soviets thus have numerical superiority, while we are left with our technological lead which by the best estimate appears to be 2 years. I think that the treaty and the interim agreement are in the interest of the ultimate security of the United States and of world peace, particularly when you consider the ongoing of the Soviets that would have given the Soviets superiority within the 5-year term of the agreement. We do not have such programs in being.

I agree with the President: No one lost and no one gained in the treaty and in the agreement, but future generations will rule the day, I say, Mr. Chairman, that the administration entered into the agreements and this body ratified the agreements, if we do not maintain our technological superiority. If we do not continue our technological advancement, the interim agreement will be the vehicle through which the Soviet Union will be permitted to attain strategic superiority.

I also agree with Secretary Laird that if we are not determined to maintain our technological lead, the frozen-in supremacy of the Soviets in numbers should call for the scrapping of the agreement and of the treaty.

Mr. Chairman, the United States has been generous in the interim agreement limiting offensive weapons. Now is the time to be strong with this body expressing a determination to maintain our technological lead. The amendment should be defeated.

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

(Mr. PRICE of Illinois asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. At the request of the Department of Defense the committee made reductions totaling \$692.4 million in the authorization bill based on the initial SALT agreements. These reductions are partially offset by an additional \$110 million in research and development.

The net reduction of \$582.4 million is arrived at by reducing Army missiles procurement by \$265 million; by reducing the Army R. & D. effort related to Safeguard by \$34 million; and by reducing military construction for Safeguard by \$393.4 million.

I think it is important that the committee understand the reason that this \$110 million which the gentleman from Massachusetts seeks to strike from the bill is in the bill. It is definitely a result of the negotiations at Moscow in connection with the SALT agreement. Both sides understand the situation. Both sides understand that there are certain defense measures and programs that they are developing, and that they think at the present time, and until further understandings are reached in the future, are necessary to continue. The \$110 million was definitely requested by the administration.

The reason for it: The SALT agreement itself limits the quantity of our strategic missile system. It will be necessary to improve the quality of this sys-

tem, and this is vice versa with both sides. To accomplish this objective, the Secretary of Defense requested add-on totaling the \$110 million in research and development. These add-ons are for this purpose.

Sixty million dollars for Minuteman site defense to improve the radars in the Minuteman field. The objective is to develop a radar which is both reliable and less expensive than the Safeguard radars.

Another add-on was \$20 million for submarine-launched cruise missiles. This is an area where we have no capability whereas the Russians have considerable capability. Also the cruise missiles are not limited under the SALT Agreement.

Another add-on was to improve the accuracy and penetration capability of our reentry vehicles for our ICBM's and Poseidon missiles, \$20 million.

The last increase is for \$10 million to improve the reliability and capability of our Communications Command and Control Network related to our strategic systems.

The SALT agreement is supported by the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the basis that additional effort will be made in research and development on these systems or programs mentioned.

It is a vice versa situation. The other side is doing the same thing in areas comparable to these. I urge the defeat of the amendment.

(Mr. LEGGETT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.

I would like to state that again the question is whether or not we abide by the spirit of the SALT agreements or whether or not we accelerate under the SALT umbrella. I think that is essentially the issue.

There have been some statements made that we are going to exceed the Soviets under the agreement in warheads, but not megatonnage. I asked Dr. Foster about this, and his answer appears on page H6085 in the Record of June 26, 1972.

By the end of this year, the Soviets will have 2,600 warheads as opposed to 5,600 warheads of the United States. In megatonnage we will have 4.6 million versus 4 million megatons for the Soviet Union. So by the end of this year, with the agreement we will still exceed the Soviet Union in megatonnage and will have a two to one warhead capability superiority over them.

I think I can best use the balance of my time in reading some remarks I had inserted in the Record yesterday, by the communist Art Hoppe:

#### THE GREAT ROCK RACE

(By Art Hoppe)

June 25, 1984—As church bells clained and people throughout the world danced in the streets, the United Nations today realized an age-old dream of mankind by ratifying a Universal Disarmament Pact.

Under terms of the widely hailed treaty, all Nations agreed to destroy immediately every single weapon in their arsenals—from missiles to billy clubs, from jet bombers to bows and arrows.

"At last man now enters a golden age of permanent peace," a jubilant President told

the U.S. people in a nationwide telecast. "At last we can divert our \$200 billion defense budget to better the lot of every American. For man will war no more. 'After all,' he said with a smile, 'The only thing man can now hurl at his brother is a handy rock.'"

June 26, 1984—Defense Secretary Melvin Ludd appeared before a joint Congressional committee today to ask for \$1.5 billion research funds to develop a "prototype rock."

Ludd pointed out that rocks, being indigenous to every nation's environment, were not banned by the treaty. "We can be sure," and the Chinese are secretly at work on an advanced rock that could make America a second-rate power."

April 8, 1985—The Army today unveiled its new M-16 anti-personnel rock designed to fragment on impact.

Developed at a cost of \$43.6 billion, it will replace the now-obsolete 125-pound M-15 rock, which failed in extensive tests to get off the ground. Some of the obsolete M-15s will be mothballed for emergencies, the Army said, while the remainder will be sold to "our friendly neighbors in Latin America" for 3 cents on the dollar.

The Army purchased one million of the new H-16 rocks for \$1.39 each. The rest of the \$43.6 billion went for new M-16 mobile rock haulers with white sidewall tires, new individual M-16 rock carriers with chromium handles.

November 3, 1985—Secretary Ludd asked Congress today for \$64.5 million to develop an Anti-Rock Rock, (ARR) plus another \$82.7 billion to construct an Anti-Rock Early Defense Line (ARED).

He cited CIA reports that the Chinese were working on an Inter-Continental Ballistic Rock launched by a giant Chinese firecracker.

He said the proposed ARED, a mile-high net along the Canadian border, would intercept most Chinese ICBMs, while the new ARRs, sent aloft by mile-long rubber bands, would shoot down the rest.

November 7, 1985—A worried President today signed the Universal Draft Law requiring all American over age five to work on the Nation's rockpiles.

"Our freedom will never be secure," he said, "until we have the world's largest rockpile stockpile."

July 4, 1986—The people of the world, fed up with working day and night on their national rockpile stockpiles, revolted today.

Chanting the stirring slogan, "We need rocks like holes in our heads," they marched on the U.N. and demanded an entirely new treaty. This one banned not weapons, but all Generals in general and all Defense Secretaries in particular.

And so church bells are chiming and people throughout the world are dancing in the streets tonight—confident that they have at last found the key to a golden age of permanent peace.

Mr. Chairman, it is obvious that we have completely burlesqued the SALT Agreements out of all proportion by having the Secretary of Defense come to Congress and ask for acceleration of the items the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. HARRINGTON) is now trying to strike out with this amendment. They are totally unwise. The White House apparently concurred, in mildly censuring the Department of Defense, and I hope all here will join those of us who are going to be supporting this amendment.

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, we have been listening now for about 40 minutes to a discussion in regard to the merits of whether we will or whether we will not remove from this authorization \$110 million earmarked for research and development.



27 JUN 1972

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# Chinese Connection Becoming

## Best Seller in Heroin

By JERRY GREENE

Washington, June 26 — What used to be a trickle of heroin from Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle into the U.S. has turned into a torrent, and the "Chinese connection" is now the hottest target in the global war against the illicit drug traffic. Red China has no part in the connection.

John Ingersoll, director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, is slated to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee tomorrow with a somber account of how Chinese aliens, most of them seamen, are gearing up to smuggle into the U.S. an enormous stock of heroin made surplus since the American market in Vietnam faded in 1971.

Intelligence reports received here by the CIA, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Ingersoll's own bureau, and in Canada by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police provide an outline of the Chinese connection operations. It is expected that Ingersoll will draw heavily on this store of information in his Senate testimony.

The connection web has spread from Bangkok, Singapore and Hong Kong in the Far East to New York, Norfolk, Charleston and Miami on the East Coast; New Orleans on the Gulf of Mexico, and Los Angeles, Seattle and Vancouver on the West Coast. One thread leads through the Great Lakes to Chicago.

It is of interest that the combined intelligence services have found no evidence whatever that Communist China has been involved in the "connection"—in the production of opium, its refinement into heroin or the smuggling.

Rather, the reports indicate, the drug traffic has been organized by what they call "apolitical" Chinese. They are narcotics dealers after a fast buck, eager to cash in on any shortage resulting from an international crackdown on illegal supplies from the Middle East.

The Golden Triangle is a relatively small, isolated mountain region covering parts of Burma, Laos and Thailand.



Ingersoll's band began watching the development 18 months ago, and the director, after obtaining congressional approval for more agents, opened seven new district offices across the Far East.

U.S. and Canadian agencies, with help from officials in Thailand and other Southeastern Asian nations, have joined in a drive against the smuggling operations, with notable results already.

### Web Linked to Two Raids in N.Y.

On June 10, Thai and U.S. agents in Bangkok seized 1,500 kilograms (22 pounds per kilo) of opium, and later having some small amount of opium.

tory processing equipment for conversion of the poppy fruit to heroin. This was Chinese connection stuff.

There was a direct link to the web in two raids in New York on April 11, when

seven Chinese were arrested with 11 pounds of heroin. Of the seven, six were ship-jumping seamen. The heroin was part of a 100-pound shipment from Bangkok—brought to this country by a European diplomat.

Six days earlier, a Chinese seaman was arrested in Miami, carrying 10 kilograms of high grade heroin. This particular lot was packed in plastic bags bearing the Double Uoglobe label. That was the brand name used by a refinery in Laos tabbed as a major producer in 1970-71. The refinery has been destroyed.

Chinese seamen have been bringing in small amounts of the narcotics for years, using the dope to pay for assistance when they jumped ship and vanished in the various Chinese communities here and in Canada.

The disappearance act is not difficult; the legal Chinese population in the U.S. has swelled from 237,202 in 1960 to 435,062 in 1970. There were 10,467 new Chinese immigrants in 1971 and during that same year, 39,718 Chinese non-immigrants visited the U.S. More than 14,000 of these came from Hong Kong.

The consumption of heroin in the U.S. is estimated at 6.5 tons annually, an amount that represents from 65 to 100 tons of crude opium.

The intelligence reports put the worldwide production of illicit opium at 1,300 metric tons per year, of which 700 tons come from the Golden Triangle alone. Turkey, long considered as a prime source for opium-heroin for the East Coast of the U.S. was rated at a

relatively modest 50 tons per year for the illicit traffic. India was chalked up at 250 tons, Afghanistan 150 tons and Pakistan 200 tons.

Legal opium production for legitimate medical purposes, coming largely from the Middle East and Asia, was reported to be 1,700 tons annually.

The comparatively sudden development of the Chinese connection called for fast action on the part of all American agencies—and those of other governments—who had been sadly undermanned to meet the threat.

### The Prospects Are Frightening

Until recently, officials calculated that more than 80% of all heroin retailed in the U.S. was produced in the Marseilles area from opium grown in the Middle East. The agencies estimated that 15% of domestic consumption was grown and refined in Mexico, and only 5% was imported from the Far East.

But by the end of 1971, with the rapid withdrawal of American forces

ers in Bangkok, Hong Kong and Singapore had stacked up unsold supplies of No. 4 heroin totaling 2,000 kilograms—90-96% pure and selling there at \$2,000 or \$3,800 per kilo.

What's worrying the heroin hunters now is the possibility they will be hearing of a Chinese-Corsican connection—a linkage between the opium growers of the Golden Triangle and the expert chemists from Marseilles. The prospects are surely frightening.

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HENRY J. TAYLOR

## Report From Portugal's 'Vietnam'

Portugal is our NATO ally. Her Angola Governor General Camilio A. Robeche Vaz, highly respected by U. S. General Andrew Goodpaster, is in Lisbon to report to President Americo R. Tomas on the renewed insurrections in Portugal's Angola, Mozambique and Guinea.



These insurrections are another Red-promoted clash and the Red strategy packs a double punch.

It continues to weaken this NATO ally by forcing Portugal to commit 80,000 troops to far-off Africa, just as we were pinned down in far-off Vietnam. Portugal's troops, in total, have been successfully drawn off from the defense of Western Europe.

AT THE SAME TIME the Red strategy drains away funds that otherwise could improve Portuguese and native living conditions. President Tomas stated that "about 45 per cent of our nation's entire budget now goes for military costs."

Black soldiers, loyal to Portugal, already account for about 40 per cent of the Portuguese Army in Guinea. The force totals 26,000 men. Lisbon is also distributing thousands of weapons to black civilians there to ensure their adequate defense against attacks by the Communist-backed PAIGC attackers.

Behind the scenes, the Red putsch is being directed from Leipzig, East Germany.

OUR OWN Central Intelligence Agency finds, and has reported to Portugal's PIDE counterintelligence, that Red Chinese instructors, as well as Russian, are in the field with the attacking guerrillas. The Portuguese, in turn, have captured several Red Chinese army officers.

The tools the Russian instructors use are African natives. Between 6,000 and 8,000 are constantly undergoing training as guerrilla cadres in Leipzig and Bautzen, East Germany; Prague, Czechoslovakia and in Castro's Cuba. In fact, the CIA reports that the Soviet has now opened an additional training center in Odessa.

Zambia, sometimes called the cockpit of Africa, borders Angola, and the Red strategy uses Zambia as the sanctuary-equivalent of Laos.

Previously the British Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia, Zambia is slightly larger than Texas, and the Soviet has now expanded the former Royal Air Force airdrome at Lusaka, the capital. Russian Ilyushin airliners are off-loading military equipment from the U.S.S.R and satellite countries, chiefly Czechoslovakia.

GOVERNOR GENERAL Vaz's Angola is scattered across an area nearly half the size of Western Europe and he reported to President Tomas that he and the Republic of South Africa have set up a joint frontier patrol.

The epicenter of the Red attack is along the Benuela Railway, vitally linking the central African copper regions and the Atlantic seaboard. And now the Red putsch is performing an expansion which is — typically — the very essence of all that is inhumane.

The great Cunene River, blessed with its marvelous Ruacana Falls, forms part of the Angola-South West Africa border. Called the Cabora-Bassa project, a joint Portuguese-South African undertaking is building a 500-foot dam and a tremendous hydroelectric complex there. In fact, President Tomas stated it could attract perhaps a million foreign settlers and lift living standards immeasurably. I have confirmed this among U. S. experts.

The Reds' Leipzig headquarters is now making the Cabora-Bassa project its prime target. U. S. intelligence in Lisbon quotes the Leipzig brain trust as saying "we shall either destroy the dam or make it completely uneconomical."

The human betterment that the Cabora-Bassa project represents? Oh, to hell with that.

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# Peking Prognosis: Power And People

## Report Says China May Achieve Economic,

By EDWARD NEILAN  
Conley News Service

WASHINGTON — Communist China may in the next decade or two join the United States, Soviet Union, Japan and the west European community in a "pentagon of world powers."

That is the conclusion of a new report, "People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment," recently issued by the Joint Economic Committee of Congress.

Scholars, the committee staff, experts from the departments of State and Commerce, Library of Congress and the Central Intelligence Agency contributed to the 382-page report. It updates an earlier assessment, "Economic Profile of Mainland China," published by the committee in February, 1967.

China, the report summarizes, "has become an economically strong, unified nation. Its capability simultaneously to meet requirements of feeding its population, modernizing its military forces and expanding its civilian economic base must now be assumed from its record to date."

Moreover, the report says, "its expanding economy and military establishment provide a base for projecting increasing power in consonance with its enormous human resources. Chinese influence may also be felt both through direct use of economic and military aid and the indirect example of its model of development."

## Arms Parity In 20 Years

### 10-20 YEARS

These elements could combine within the next 10 or 20 years to place the Peking regime among the top world powers, forming a "pentagon of world powers," the report concludes.

However, the report notes that China's gross national product remains far behind that of the United States and other major nations. China's estimated GNP for 1970 was \$120 billion, compared to \$974 billion for the United States and about \$245 billion for Japan.

On a per-capita basis, the comparison is more striking: China's per-capita income is only 3 per cent of that in the United States and about 6 per cent of Japan's.

The report raises doubts on whether such a relatively weak country economically can pose any serious military danger to the United States.

The report notes that past western projections of Chinese performance have often seriously overstated or understated the actual future performance.

### CAUTION URGED

"In times of disruption and poor performance," the study notes, "the recuperative capabilities of Chinese society have, apparently, often been underestimated. Now, in a period encouraging favorable forecasts it is well to be cautious."

The report lists a number of problems that could arise to disturb the development of

currently favorable economic trends:

— Natural calamities — floods, earthquakes, droughts — may play their roles as they have throughout Chinese history.

— The food vs. population balance may be disrupted, causing short or longer-term economic retardation.

— The military burden on the economy may sharply rise in response to escalating weapons costs in their nuclear programs.

— Leadership struggles to develop a better Maoist state or choose a successor to Chairman Mao Tse-tung may disturb the current relative stability.

— Institutional changes, as China evolves from a traditional to modern society, may strain the national fabric, contributing to periods of instability and disruption. Any assumption that the "search for a true Maoist model" has ended and that stability is at hand would seem premature at this point.

### LESS PESSIMISM

On the question of how badly economic development in mainland China was set back by the great leap forward (1958-60) and the great proletarian cultural revolution

1966-69), the report is less pessimistic than the 1967 volume.

The report states that "it is now clear that fairly important industrial growth occurred in the midst of the great leap confusion and that

remedial measures in the post-leap adjustment period were timely and effective."

The cultural revolution proved to have little effect on agriculture and only short-lived effects on industry, according to the report.

The closing of universities for four years was acknowledged to have some lasting effects on the training of high-level professional manpower, "But the present . . . adjustments will eventually result in an acceptable compromise between ideology and experience," the report says.

As for the scientists, professors and the intellectuals in general who had to absorb the brunt of the cultural revolution abuse, the report minimizes any long-term effects and suggests that "western scientists were probably more pained reading about the cases" than were the Chinese scientists receiving the abuse.

### SINO-SOVIET ROW

How serious was the impact of the Sino-Soviet rupture in relations to Chinese economic development?

Soviet aid was critically important to Chinese industrial progress during the 1950s, the report states, adding that the Soviet Union was the major supplier of complete plants and most industrial machinery.

During the 1950s, the report says, agreements were signed with Russia for the construction of large industrial installations in China. By the end of 1959,

## A Footnote on China

A staff study of economic developments in Communist China, just published by the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, shows some of the strong and weak points of this nation. As the paper says, since Mr. Nixon's visit to China our curiosity about its economy is greater than ever, but we still know far less about China than any other large country.

The study reports that the economy has fully regained the growth momentum of the years preceeding the disruptions of Chairman Mao's cultural revolution. China's chronic problem of feeding its population

has been eased "by a modest but impressive Chinese version of a 'green revolution.'" But population growth will continue to place heavy pressure on subsistence. To date China has been successful in meeting the conflicting claims on its scarce resources, including feeding the population, expanding and modernizing the military forces and improving the industrial base, but this could be disturbed by several possible developments such as poor crop years, rising weapons costs and political instability from Maoist programs or a possible crisis over his successor.

"In spite of economic successes in China," the study adds, "its gross national product remains far behind that of the United States and other major nations. China's estimated gross national product for 1970 was \$120 billion, as compared to \$974 billion for the United States, and approximately \$245 billion for Japan. On a per capita basis, the comparison is much more striking. China's per capita income is only 3 per cent of ours and approximately 6 per cent of Japan's. Its relative economic weakness means that any military threats from China must be low."

and immediately and not wait in any circumstances.

Secretary ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, I was not criticizing you. I am critical of some of the comments that were made immediately at the completion of the President's address.

You comment on your hope that the summit meeting will be a success. All of us do. I think that not only the summit meeting but the future in Vietnam, the possibility of a negotiated settlement, depends, in considerable measure, on the support of the American people, because I think things are going well. I think things are going well generally in foreign affairs. I think that the President's policy toward the People's Republic of China, has sound policy that is going to provide great dividends in the future—I think our policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union is a sound policy, and I think that we do now face a time in our national life where we can get along better with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, and if that is the case, it may help lead to a successful completion of the war in Indochina and result in a negotiated settlement.

To a considerable extent, that depends on the kind of criticism that is made, and I am not talking about constructive, thoughtful criticism, and obviously I think every Senator has to reserve his own position. I am just saying that the type of criticism and the timing of it is important and I would hope very much that responsible Members of the Senate and the House could understand the importance of this moment in their national life and not engage in strife and criticism, and I would hope the Congress will not pass any legislation that will undercut the President's position. I say there is plenty of time for the criticism that you speak about, Senator, in the campaign.

Now we need some support. We need reflection, careful consideration given to the delicate position that we face as a nation. It is a critical time; I think it is going to work out well. I think next year when I come back here, you will find that you will have other things to congratulate me about.

Senator PROXMIRE. Well, I certainly hope so. Mr. Secretary, it would be a surprise if the Secretary of State ever came before the Congress and said things are going badly in foreign affairs. We expect you to say they are going well. You referred to our relations with China; you referred to our relations with Russia. You see, that is the difficulty. This is more than a defensive action and protection of South Vietnam. This is something that goes right to the heart of our relations with two of the other strongest countries in the world.

That is the problem. I don't know how well things are going with the Soviet Union when we engage in this kind of action or how well they are going in China. I hope and pray that they exercise restraint, but I can understand why they might feel that if their ships are sunk, that if a Russian ship is sunk, that they have to engage in counteraction of some kind then things won't be going well at all.

#### JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE PUBLISHES STUDY OF CHINESE ECONOMY

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, as chairman of the Joint Economic Committee, I am proud to announce publication of an excellent staff study of economic developments in Communist China.

Since the President's visit in March, curiosity about the economy of mainland China is greater than ever. We know far less about China than any other large country. The study now makes available some basic insights on the weak

and strong points of Chinese efforts to maintain a huge and growing population and promote growth. The major conclusions are as follows:

The economic losses caused by the cultural revolution of 1966-69 were far more limited than the earlier economic disasters of the great leap forward in 1958 through 1960. Moreover, the Chinese economy has now fully regained the growth momentum of the years preceding the disruptions of Chairman Mao's cultural revolution.

China's chronic problem of feeding its population has been eased by a modest, but impressive Chinese version of a "green revolution." Nevertheless, in spite of an active birth control policy, population growth will continue to place heavy pressure on subsistence.

To date, China has been successful in meeting conflicting claims on scarce resources: Feeding the population, expanding and modernizing their military forces, establishing and improving their industrial base. However, this current economic stability may be disturbed by several possible developments: Poor crop years, escalating weapons costs, and political instability from either Maoist programs or his succession crisis.

In spite of economic successes in China, its gross national product remains far behind that of the United States, and other major nations. China's estimated gross national product for 1970 was \$120 billion, as compared to \$974 billion for the United States, and approximately \$245 billion for Japan. On a per capita basis, the comparison is much more striking. China's per capita income is only 3 percent of ours and approximately 6 percent of Japan's. Its relative economic weakness means that any military threat from China must be low. They are much too weak economically to pose any serious military danger to the United States. And this situation inevitably will continue for some time.

The publication, which is entitled, "People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment," was prepared by several Government departments. Scholars throughout the country had informed us that it would be difficult for them to update the committee's 1967 study, because most of the recent information is in the hands of the Federal Government.

Accordingly, we undertook this publication to make recent Government information available to the public. We have had excellent cooperation from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, and other Government civilian agencies in preparation of this publication, particularly on the subject of current and future defense alternatives facing the Chinese and the burden of defense on limited resources. Regrettably, the Defense Department did not see fit to participate in the study, because of reluctance to reveal secret information. This is another example, in my opinion, of overzealous application of secrecy regulations.

I have scheduled hearings next month to permit outside experts to testify on the newly available information.

A copy of the "People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment" is

available from the committee office, G-133, New Senate Office Building—225-5321.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a summary of this study, made by John P. Hardt, on the economic development in Communist China, which is very revealing and interesting, as it indicates among other things that while China has progressed greatly, she still does not have the economy to represent a military threat to this country.

There being no objection, the summary was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

#### SUMMARY

By John P. Hardt

Five years ago, as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was building up to a peak, the Joint Economic Committee released a pioneering, two-volume assessment, entitled *An Economic Profile of Mainland China: Today*, as the People's Republic of China begins to participate in the United Nations and as relations between China and the United States begin to thaw, it is appropriate to reassess and update the conclusions reached in the earlier study. The present volume, in which 12 U.S. Government specialists analyze China's economic performance, is the result.

Although the authors are faced with formidable data problems—discussed in each of the studies—they are able to support their conclusion that China's economy has shown great resiliency and that recent policies and programs are moving the country into a strong economic position. At the same time, the authors demonstrate that China has many remaining economic problems, the most conspicuous of which are the pressure of population on agricultural resources and the difficulty in keeping up in the world technological race.

The volume starts with two articles on the general economic setting—an overall survey of China's economic performance in the past two decades (Ashbrook), an analysis of economic motivation in China (Jones). The next group of papers are on specific sectors of the economy—industrial development (Field), the electronics industry (Reichers), agriculture (Erisman), and transportation (Vetterling and Wagy). Next, problems of human resources are covered in papers on science and education (Orleans) and on population policy (Aldred). Finally, China's external economic relations are addressed in papers on foreign trade (Usack and Batsavage) and foreign aid (Tansky).

The authors have provided their own summaries, and the readers will want to make up his own mind when there are clashes in individual viewpoints. Some of the major questions suggested by the analysis of these papers are as follows:

1. How badly was economic development in the PRC set back by the Great Leap Forward (1958-60) and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-69)?

In general, the assessment of the present volume is less pessimistic than the assessment of the 1967 JEC study, partly because of the advantage of hindsight. It is now clear that fairly impressive industrial growth occurred in the midst of the Leap Forward confusion (Field, p. 64) and that the remedial measures in the post-Leap adjustment period were timely and effective (Ashbrook, pp. 4-5). Furthermore, the Cultural Revolution—which was just beginning to have adverse effects on the economy when the first JEC study was being published—proved to have no palpable effect on agriculture and only short-lived effects on industry (Ashbrook, pp. 25-30).

The closing of universities for some 4 years will have some lasting effects on the

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Russell Kirk

## Closing Hanoi ports long overdue

What President Johnson dared not attempt, President Nixon has done: He has taken measures to seal the harbors of Haiphong and other North Vietnamese ports. Senator Henry Jackson (D., Wash.) and others say this should have been done six years ago, and so it should: But Richard Nixon was not President then.

If mining those harbors will not suffice, it is quite possible for the American fleet to commence a regular blockade. It is not in the power of Russia to defy such a blockade. How long could the Communists of Hanoi continue their invasion of South Vietnam with such an interruption of military supplies?

An old CIA report, leaked to the press, argues that Hanoi still could obtain heavy weapons and ammunition by the land routes through China. Yet that would be a slower and more costly route, especially since the North Vietnamese now depend more heavily upon Russian artillery and tanks and trucks.

And can Hanoi be confident that China would permit Russian materiel to pass unimpeded through their territory from Soviet Asia? Peking has much to gain from an understanding with the United States, and might rejoice in the humiliation of Moscow. North Vietnam is Russia's client state, really, not China's.

President Nixon would not venture to mine and bomb close to the Chinese frontier, were he not reasonably sure that Peking will refuse to assist Hanoi substantially.

There exists reason to suppose that the masters of Peking now desire some compromise settlement in Vietnam. To put it mildly, Mr. Nixon's action against the ports must mightily distress the Communists of Hanoi.

The North Vietnamese leaders, civilian and military, apparently had assumed that peace sentiment in America would restrain President Nixon from undertaking any new strategy. They misapprehended American public opinion.

For the American public desires orderly withdrawal of American ground forces from Vietnam, but it distinctly does not desire American defeat or the brutal conquest of Saigon by Hanoi. If the Nixon Administration continues to withdraw troops while it blocks the North Vietnamese ports, Mr. Nixon need not dread any general public disapproval of his strategy.

Violent collegiate demonstrators against the Nixon strategy actually achieve just the opposite of what they desire: They cause the general public to rally behind the Nixon administration. Blocking highways, burning automobiles, and smashing windows are tactics politically mad, in this country.



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# China's Population Woes Seen Curbing Armed Threat to U.S.

By Stanley Karnow  
Washington Post Staff Writer  
Official U.S. experts estimate that the People's Republic of China faces a gigantic population explosion in the next two decades that will exert heavy pressure on its scarce economic resources.

As a consequence, these experts predict, the likelihood that the Peking regime will have the strength to pose a "serious military danger" to the United States is improbable within the foreseeable future.

This evaluation is contained in an extensive study of the Chinese economy released yesterday by Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.), chairman of the congressional Joint Economic Committee.

The 382-page study, which brings up to date a similar survey issued by the committee in 1967, was prepared by China specialists in the Central Intelligence Agency, the Library of Congress, and the State and Commerce departments.

Basing his calculations on four different statistical models, John S. Aird forecasts that the Chinese population will be no less than 1,301,260,000 by 1990 and may go as high as 1,333,128,000 making projections from the only official Chinese census, made in 1953, Aird puts the present population of China at more than 875 million.

Aird, a Commerce Department expert, describes in detail the considerable attempts by the Communist Chinese government to curb China's population through various family planning efforts.

But he suggests that these efforts will not lead to any substantial change in China's demographic prospects because the programs designed to cut down births also tend to reduce deaths.

"Circumstances favorable to a general acceptance of family limitation . . . also result in improvement of general health and a lowering of mortality," Aird says, since Chinese family planning campaigns are usually combined with drives for "better medical care and sanitation throughout the countryside."

In Aird's view, the

strophe or spectacular changes in contraceptive technology and in the means of political coercion" can relieve Chinese population pressure. Under present conditions, he estimates, this pressure will confront China with severe longterm problems.

Another contributor to the study, Arthur G. Ashbrook Jr., points out that the Chinese government itself has no exact figures on China's population. Ashbrook quotes Chinese Vice Premier Li Ihsien-nien as telling an Egyptian reporter last November that present population estimates vary from 750 million to 830 million, depending on the requirements of different government departments.

"The Ministry of Commerce insists on the bigger number in order to be able to provide goods in large quantities," Li said. "The planning men reduce the figure in order to strike a balance in the plans of the various state departments."

Despite China's potential population problem, the contributors to the study agree, the Chinese economy has shown remarkable resilience and current policies are guiding the country toward a strong, short-range economic position.

"The image of China as a desperately poor nation with most of its people living in misery and degradation is an image of the past," asserts Ashbrook, noting that the Peking regime has fed and clothed an immense Chinese population, detonated 13 nuclear devices, constructed a sizable military machine and is, among other things, running a foreign aid program.

China has made these achievements with its own resources, Ashbrook adds, and has therefore "skillfully avoided the primrose path of large-scale foreign borrowing which has left India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Egypt with a crushing burden of external debt."

Moreover, Ashbrook says, these attainments have been

undergone serious political and economic disruptions in such episodes as the 1958 Great Leap Forward and

Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung's Cultural Revolution, which began in late 1965.

Ashbrook estimates the Chinese industrial production dropped by 15 per cent to 20 per cent from 1966 to 1967 and remained depressed in 1968 as a result of the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution. But the episode, which mostly hit China's cities, barely affected agricultural output.

Industrial construction also continued "at a high rate" during the Cultural Revolution, Ashbrook says, since new projects "were normally located far away from the most severe of the urban disturbances."

In 1970, however, Chinese industrial production rose 17 per cent. Agricultural output, being increased annually with growing use of fertilizer and equipment, is expected to be adequate for the next three years.

The Chinese also sustained a serious blow when the Soviet Union, irritated by its dispute with Peking, discontinued its aid and withdrew its technicians from China. But the Chinese turned to Western nations and Japan for imports of technology.

According to Philip D. Reichers, another contributor to the study, the Chinese imported more than \$200 million in advanced electronic production equipment from non-Communist countries in the decade prior to 1970.

This selective import program, Reichers says, enabled China to "forego the lengthy and expensive process of prototype development" and thereby expand the number of its major electronic plants from 60 in 1960 to 200 in 1971.

Thus the Chinese recovered quickly from their loss of Soviet help. In addition, they were apparently unaffected by the total U.S. embargo on trade with their country that was only recently revised by

progress in Chinese military modernization, the study anticipates that the Peking leaders "may face a much tighter squeeze on resources needed for growth" as the cost of manufacturing and large-scale deployment of sophisticated weapons rises sharply in the decade ahead.

Returning to China's basic problem, the study adds that "this squeeze would be compounded by the insistent pressure from the population to raise the level of consumption."

For all its economic success, the study says, China's Gross National Product remains far behind that of the United States and other major nations, and is likely to remain at a relatively low level.

The study estimates that China's 1970 Gross National Product was \$120 billion, compared to \$974 billion for the United States and about \$245 billion for Japan. More strikingly, Chinese per capita income was only 3 per cent of that of the United States, and 6 per cent of Japan's.

The relative poverty of the Chinese, says the study, means that "they are much too weak economically to pose any serious military danger to the United States. And this situation inevitably will continue for some time."

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Although the study sees

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MC HUGH - 55171

FOR RELEASE AFTER 6:30 PM  
SATURDAY, MAY 20, 1972

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES  
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

Senator Proxmire Announces Publication of Study of Chinese Economy

Senator William Proxmire (D-Wis.), Chairman of the Joint Economic Committee, today announced publication of a staff study of economic developments in Communist China.

"Since the President's visit in March, curiosity about the economy of Mainland China is greater than ever. We know far less about China than any other large country. The study now makes available some basic insights on the weak and strong points of Chinese efforts to maintain a huge and growing population and promote growth. The major conclusions are as follows:

\* The economic losses caused by the cultural revolution of 1966-69 were far more limited than the earlier economic disasters of the Great Leap Forward in 1958 through 1960. Moreover, the Chinese economy has now fully regained the growth momentum of the years preceding the disruptions of Chairman Mao's cultural revolution.

\* China's chronic problem of feeding its population has been eased by a modest but impressive Chinese version of a "green revolution." Nevertheless, in spite of an active birth control policy population growth will continue to place heavy pressure on subsistence.

\* To date, China has been successful in meeting conflicting claims on scarce resources: feeding the population, expanding and modernizing their military forces, establishing and improving their industrial base.

However, this current economic stability may be disturbed by several possible developments: poor crop years, escalating weapons costs, and political instability from either Maoist programs or his succession crisis.

"In spite of economic successes in China, its Gross National Product remains far behind that of the United States, and other major nations. China's estimated Gross National Product for 1970 was \$120 billion, as compared to \$974 billion for the United States, and approximately \$245 billion for Japan. On a per capita basis, the comparison is much more striking. China's per capita income is only 3 percent of ours and approximately 6 percent of Japan's. Its relative economic weakness means that any military threat from China must be low. They are much too weak economically to pose any serious military danger to the United States. And this situation inevitably will continue for some time.

"The publication, which is entitled, "People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment", was prepared by several government departments. Scholars throughout the country had informed us that it would be difficult for them to up-date the Committee's 1967 study because most of the recent information is in the hands of the Federal Government.

"Accordingly, we undertook this publication to make recent government information available to the public. We have had excellent cooperation from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, and other government civilian agencies in preparation of this publication, particularly on the subject of current and future defense alternatives

- 3 -

facing the Chinese and the burden of defense on limited resources. Regrettably, the Defense Department did not see fit to participate in the study because of reluctance to reveal secret information. This is another example, in my opinion, of over zealous application of secrecy regulations."

The Chairman said that he would hold hearings next month to permit outside experts to testify on the newly available information.

A summary is attached.

A copy of the "People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment" is available from the Committee office, G-133, New Senate Office Building (225-5321).

# # # # #

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## SUMMARY

By JOHN P. HARRIS

Five years ago, as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was building up to a peak, the Joint Economic Committee released a pioneering, two-volume assessment, entitled *An Economic Profile of Mainland China*.<sup>1</sup> Today, as the People's Republic of China begins to participate in the United Nations and as relations between China and the United States begin to thaw, it is appropriate to reassess and update the conclusions reached in the earlier study. The present volume, in which 12 U.S. Government specialists analyze China's economic performance, is the result.

Although the authors are faced with formidable data problems—discussed in each of the studies—they are able to support their conclusion that China's economy has shown great resiliency and that recent policies and programs are moving the country into a strong economic position. At the same time, the authors demonstrate that China has many remaining economic problems, the most conspicuous of which are the pressure of population on agricultural resources and the difficulty in keeping up in the worldwide technological race.

The volume starts with two articles on the general economic setting—an overall survey of China's economic performance in the past two decades (Ashbrook), an analysis of economic motivation in China (Jones). The next group of papers are on specific sectors of the economy—industrial development (Field), the electronics industry (Reichers), agriculture (Erisman), and transportation (Vetterling and Wagy). Next, problems of human resources are covered in papers on science and education (Orleans) and on population policy (Aird). Finally, China's external economic relations are addressed in papers on foreign trade (Usack and Batsavage) and foreign aid (Tansky).

The authors have provided their own summaries, and the readers will want to make up his own mind when there are clashes in individual viewpoints. Some of the major questions suggested by the analysis of these papers are as follows:

1. *How badly was economic development in the PRC set back by the Great Leap Forward (1958-60) and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-69)?*

In general, the assessment of the present volume is less pessimistic than the assessment of the 1967 JEC study, partly because of the advantage of hindsight. It is now clear that fairly impressive industrial growth occurred in the midst of the Leap Forward confusion (Field, p. 64) and that the remedial measures in the post-Leap adjustment period were timely and effective (Ashbrook, pp. 4-5). Furthermore, the Cultural Revolution—which was just beginning to have adverse

<sup>1</sup>Joint Economic Committee, *An Economic Profile of Mainland China*, Government Printing Office, vol. 1 and 2, February 1967, p. 684; commentary on this study is contained in Joint Economic Committee, *Mainland China in the World Economy*, Government Printing Office, Hearings in April 1967, p. 248.



effects on the economy when the first JEC<sup>6</sup> study was being published—proved to have no palpable effect on agriculture and only short-lived effects on industry (Ashbrook, pp. 25-30)

The closing of universities for some 4 years will have some lasting effects on the training of high-level professional manpower, "but the present halting adjustments will, eventually, result in an acceptable compromise between ideology and expedience." (Orleans, p. 205)

As for the scientists, professors and the intellectuals in general, who had to absorb the brunt of the Cultural Revolution:

... the seemingly unrestrained attacks against his Chinese colleagues are likely to be much more painful to the Western scientists ... than to the object of the abuse who probably has become quite immune through exposure and who is pursuing his daily responsibilities, if not with enthusiasm, then at least with discerning acquiescence. (Orleans, p. 197)

*2. How serious were the short and longer term impacts of the Sino-Soviet rupture in relations on Chinese economic development?*

Soviet aid was critically important to Chinese industrial development during the 1950's:

The major impetus to the drive for industrial development was furnished by large-scale imports of machinery and equipment, much of it in the form of complete industrial installations. The Soviet Union was the chief supplier of complete plants. During the decade agreements were signed with the U.S.S.R. for the construction of 291 major industrial installations in China. By the end of 1959, equipment valued at \$1.35 billion had been delivered and about 130 projects were completed. Agreements were also signed with Eastern European countries for the construction of at least 100 major projects and about two-thirds of these were completed by 1959. In addition to supplying equipment for these installations the Soviet Union provided China with valuable technical aid including: (a) blueprints and technical information, (b) some 10,000 Soviet technicians and advisors, and (c) training for 15,000 Chinese technicians and academic students in the U.S.S.R. (Usack and Batsavage, p. 344)

The impact of Soviet aid termination in mid-1960 on Chinese industrial output was soon in coming:

In 1961, industrial production fell sharply to a level slightly above that of 1957 but only two-thirds of the peak reached in 1959. After the withdrawal of the Soviet technicians in mid-1960, the Chinese found that they could not operate many of the heavy industrial plants built as Soviet aid projects, and they were forced to cut production drastically. (Field, p. 64)

However, the shift to non-Communist sources of assistance in the 1960's took away part of the sting, as in the electronics industry:

The withdrawal of Soviet aid in 1960 forced China to turn to the non-Communist countries for assistance. These countries, principally Japan, West Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Switzerland, are currently the source of

more than four-fifths of China's imports of electronic products and production equipment. In 1960-1970 more than \$200 million of technologically advanced electronic production equipment was imported from the non-Communist world. The imports consisted primarily of modern military and industrial electronics which China could have produced domestically only after a long development period. These imports as well as imports from the West of special electronics materials and technological know-how enabled China to forego the lengthy and expensive process of prototype development and to expand its electronics production base from 60 major electronics plants in 1960 to 200 in 1971. Years were saved in establishing the production of advanced electronic products for industrial and military programs. (Reichers, p.p. 87-88)

Ideally, continuation of Soviet aid to 1967, that is, through three 5-year plans would have served Chinese economic interests best. Yet, as Reichers suggests, the forced shift to Western industrial sources had tangible long-run benefits to the Chinese.

*3. In view of its burgeoning population can the Chinese economy sustain its major priorities?*

With the exception of the three disaster years of 1959-61, China has fed its huge and growing population currently estimated to be 865 million. Peking's approach to China's neo-Malthusian problem has been two-pronged—a new investment strategy for agriculture and sporadic birth control programs. The new investment strategy adopted in the wake of the Great Leap Forward involved an increase in chemical fertilizers, pumps for water control, improved transportation, and so forth, and a concentration of these additional resources on potentially high-yield rice land in the south of China:

The response of agricultural production to the new strategy—including the substantial increases in investments in agriculture and the concentration on high-yield acreage—resulted in (a) the restoration of the 1957 level of grain production by 1961, and (b) the growth of grain production at a somewhat faster rate than population in 1961-71.

... as a result of the changed strategy, a new trend line has been established in agriculture, distinctly higher and more steeply pitched than that prevailing under the low-investment policy of the first decade, yet lower than that which could be readily realized given even larger and better-balanced inputs. Output will exceed the trend value when weather is better than normal and fall below the trend value to the extent weather is unfavorable. (Erisman, p.142)

The three birth control campaigns have had no appreciable effect on demographic rates. Moreover—and this is the most striking point in the population paper—a successful attempt at fertility reduction probably would have little effect on the total size of the population over the next two decades. Aird's four population projections for 1990 range only between 1,319 million and 1,330 million:

These models imply that even a major and successful effort at fertility reduction in the PRC is not likely to make much difference either in the size of the total population or in the

size of the younger age groups, hence it cannot afford much relief from population pressure in general or from such specific problems as the need for education, employment, housing and other services for young people. To escape from such limited and rather discouraging prospects, the PRC would have to find a way to alter some of the factors that have thus far determined demographic experience in other developing countries.

The principal reason why these models show so little difference even for successful efforts at family limitation is that they assume a correlation between fertility---and mortality trends. It is, in fact, hard to conceive of circumstances favorable to a general acceptance of family limitation which do not also result in improvement in general health and a lowering of mortality. The dissemination of family planning in the PRC has often been associated and is currently being combined with a general drive for better medical care and sanitation throughout the countryside. (Aird, p. 330.)

In summary, the main line of thinking in these papers is that new investment will keep agriculture up with population but that agriculture will provide no extra margin for stepped-up economic growth.

4. *What burdens do military development and foreign aid---the power oriented programs---place on economic development?*

A reading of the papers suggests that the Chinese have been generally successful both in building up a heavy industrial base and in gradually modernizing their armed forces. Among the major factors contributing to this success are: (a) the control of consumption at relatively, austere, egalitarian levels; (b) the use of foreign trade to get high-technology machinery and materials, which could be produced at home at very high cost and after long delay; and (c) the partial insulation of the nuclear and other high-technology programs from political turmoil. The military programs command roughly one-tenth of China's GNP (Ashbrook, p. 45) and the foreign aid programs approximately \$100 million annually, or about one-third of 1 percent of China's GNP (Tansky, p. 371). During the next decade, when the cost of series manufacture and large-scale deployment of modern weapons will rise sharply upward, the leadership may face a much tighter squeeze on resources needed for growth. This squeeze would be compounded by the insistent pressure from the population to raise the level of consumption.

5. *How successful has Peking been in developing the various economic regions of China?*

The authors agree that Peking can point to substantial successes in building up regional transportation and industrial facilities:

When the Communists came to power, they inherited an undeveloped and badly damaged transportation network. Reconstruction of much of the old network was undertaken during 1950-52, and bold plans were formulated for the extension of the rail, highway, and inland waterway systems. Substantial progress was made during the 1950's and, after a pause during the early 1960's, expansion was again given high priority in the late 1960's. The rail network was extended into the southwestern and northwestern sections of the

country, and additional connecting links were built in the east and northeast. The highway network was expanded and improved especially in western areas such as Tibet where no railroads presently exist. The inland waterway network was restored, improved, and expanded. Inland and coastal ports were modernized and their capacities increased. (Vetterling and Wagy, p 147 )

In summary, the Chinese have persisted in their plan for the regional development of the country through thick and thin. The original plan - which was first to repair the industrial centers damaged during World War II, then to build new industrial bases in North and Central China, and finally to develop the Southwest and the Northwest - has certainly been delayed, but the pattern of development has been retained. Pao-tou and Wu-han, for example, are now well-established industrial bases, and a large number of industrial construction projects are currently under development in Southwest China. (Field, p.71)

#### PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS

The papers in the volume almost certainly will prove of value to anyone interested in the relationship of the United States with the People's Republic of China. The authors have provided a surprising amount of detailed information on the People's Republic of China's economic history, its current economic situation, and its future economic prospects. Although it has not been the purpose of the authors to spell out the implications of their findings for U.S. policy, they have provided us with an informational and analytic basis relevant to that important task. Some future prospects and problems may thus be identified.

Past Western projections of Chinese performance have often seriously overstated or understated the actual future performance. In times of disruption and poor performance the recuperative capabilities of Chinese society have, apparently, often been underestimated. Now, in a period encouraging favorable forecasts it is well to be cautious. A number of problems may arise to disturb an extrapolation of currently favorable economic trends:

- Natural calamities may play their roles as they have throughout Chinese history: for example, floods, droughts, earthquakes, epidemics, and so forth.
- The food/population balance may be disrupted causing short or longer term economic retardation.
- The military burden on the economy may sharply rise in response to escalating weapons costs in their nuclear program, force expansion, and modernization to meet perceived needs on the Soviet border or in the Taiwan Straits, or other policy reasons.
- Leadership struggles either to develop a better Maoist state or choose a successor to Mao may disturb the current stability.
- Institutional changes, as China proceeds on its course of transformation from a traditional to a modern society, may continue to engender periods of instability and disruption. The Soviet experi-

ence has been a mixed blessing as a guide to Chinese institutional accommodation to change. From the rejection of the Soviet model the Chinese turned to a "search for a Maoist model". (Jones p. 58) An assumption that the search has ended and institutional stability will now facilitate Chinese economic development would seem premature at this point.

The People's Republic of China has become an economically strong, unified nation. Its capability simultaneously to meet requirements of feeding its population, modernizing its military forces, and expanding its civilian economic base must now be assumed from its record to date. Moreover, its expanding economy and military establishment provide a base for projecting increasing power in consonance with its enormous human resources. Chinese influence may also be felt both through direct use of economic and military aid and the indirect example of its model of development. Thus China may in the next decade or two join the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and the West European community in a pentagon of world powers.

# U.S. Moves May Reunite Russia, China

By Jack Anderson

There is evidence in the secret U.S. cable traffic that President Nixon's military moves in Vietnam may be driving the two great Communist antagonists, Russia and China, back together.

We have been able to trace the dismaying developments through secret documents, which the White House has carefully withheld from both Congress and the public.

These documents show that the Kremlin reacted to the Chinese-American rapprochement by making its own secret overtures to Peking last August. The Soviets worked through Lin Piao, the acerbic defense minister, who has been designated by Mao Tse-tung to become his successor.

Encouraged by his Soviet contacts, Lin opposed inviting President Nixon to Peking and advocated restoring the Chinese-Russian partnership. This put Lin in direct conflict with Premier Chou En-lai, who had issued the invitation to Nixon.

Lin lost the showdown and mysteriously disappeared. The crafty Chou spread the word to the party faithful that Lin had died in a plane crash after attempting to assassinate Mao.

Chou's version, which was whispered around China and reached CIA ears, had it that Lin attempted to waylay Mao on the way home from South China by train last August.

Knowing Mao's itinerary would take him through Shanghai and Wuhsi, Lin allegedly arranged an assassination party in Shanghai and afterward planned to blow up a bridge in Wuhsi to wreck Mao's train. Both plots failed, according to the story, and Lin attempted to flee to Russia by jet on Sept. 13. The plane supposedly crashed in the Wenteukhan area of Mongolia.

The whispers of the plot to kill Mao, who has deity status in China, apparently was intended to cow Lin Piao's supporters. So monstrous was the thought of assassinating the great Mao, in Chinese minds, that the Lin faction was supposed to be intimidated into silence.

But the opposition to Chou continued to simmer under the surface, and the Russians quietly pressed for better relations. The plenum of the Soviet Central Committee, in an unpublished action last November, sought to restrain the ideological struggle against the Chinese.

Still, other events inflamed Chinese-Russian relations until the State Department reported in a confidential summary last December: "Sino-Soviet international polemics as distinct from domestic propaganda have risen to the highest level since 1969 . . . Peking, however, has so far avoided whipping up a war scare within China, and it appears to be attempt-

ing to restrict increased tension with Moscow to verbal fireworks on international questions."

Significantly, Chou is in charge of China's international affairs and, therefore, was responsible for the rising rhetoric. President Nixon's air attacks upon North Vietnam, however, have made it awkward for Chou.

China and Russia have been competing for Hanoi's favor, as the two titans of communism maneuver for influence in Southeast Asia.

## Rivalry in Hanoi

The Central Intelligence Agency, in a secret report, has declared: "Following Dr. Henry Kissinger's July visit to Peking, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai made a secret visit to Hanoi to reassure the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) of continued Chinese support."

"The Chinese emphasized their support by increasing their assistance to the DRV for the 1971-72 period. This in turn resulted in an increase in Soviet assistance to the DRV for the same period. . . .

"The DRV expressed its apprehension to Chou regarding a U.S.-Chinese detente, and stated that the DRV is still suspicious about President Nixon's visit to Peking."

In view of the Chinese-Russian rivalry in Hanoi, Nixon undermined Chou and just-

fied Lin's position by ordering air strikes against North Vietnam. This has strengthened Lin's survivors inside the Chinese policy councils.

As a result, Lin's idea of repairing Chinese-Russian relations is gaining support. At the United Nations, for example, the relations between Chinese and Russian delegates are warming.

A Soviet delegation, on tour of China, has also been received with unaccustomed cordiality. In return, there was no Soviet denunciation of the Chinese at the Lenin Day celebration on April 21.

There are now hints of Chinese-Russian cooperation to route war supplies overland to North Vietnam. If this develops, the mining of the North Vietnamese harbors will cost the U.S. far more in world strategy than is likely to be gained on the Vietnamese fighting fronts.

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**The Washington Merry-Go-Round****Red Carpet for Nixon Slightly Pale****By Jack Anderson**

Secret intelligence reports declare that President Nixon's high-risk military moves in Vietnam have undermined those in both Moscow and Peking who want to ease tensions with the United States.

Although there had been no visible opposition to the President's trip to Peking and invitation to visit Moscow, the Central Intelligence Agency claims the detente was fiercely resisted inside the policy councils of both governments.

To protect our sources, we cannot quote directly from the CIA documents. The CIA maintains, however, that the decision to invite Nixon was by no means unanimous in Moscow or Peking.

Citing "reliable" sources, the CIA claims the Soviet military hierarchy has opposed doing business with Nixon. Defense Minister Andrei Grechko, apparently, has become the principal spokesman for this faction inside the Kremlin.

The Russian marshals, according to the CIA, are eager to share credit in Hanoi for the North Vietnamese suc-

cesses. For the military equipment, which has smashed the South Vietnamese defenses, was made in Russia.

The Soviets, in the bidding against the Chinese for influence in Hanoi, had offered the North Vietnamese a \$110 million military loan. Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, the North Vietnamese military genius, decided to spend it for tanks, heavy artillery and anti-aircraft missiles.

The Soviet military brass would like to see a setback for U.S. interests not only in Vietnam but the Middle East. The CIA warns that the Russians may counter U.S. moves in Vietnam with new initiatives in the Mediterranean.

The CIA offers fewer specifics about the opposition within the Chinese leadership to the Chinese-American detente. But bitter opposition, says the CIA, is simmering beneath the surface.

**Laird's Good Humor**

Our recent columns on the misuse of the Pentagon auto fleet has drawn a good-humored reaction from Defense Secretary Mel Laird and orders from on high to start obeying the regulations.

But the Pentagon bigshots, as usual, are reading the regulations to suit their expensive tastes, not to save the taxpayers' money. Result: most of the staggering waste continues.

We told, for example, how gon cars, intended for use only on pressing official business, had become a luxury limousine service for military potentates and their congressional friends.

Laird, meanwhile, still has two limousines at his constant call in case one should develop motor trouble. His special assistant, Carl Wallace, is also picked up each morning and delivered home each evening by a military chauffeur.

The men who toil in the Pentagon garage, however, were getting the word to put an end to excursions that violate regulations. This, presumably, meant stopping the practice of routinely chauffeuring members of Congress around Washington.

But when the motor pool tried to follow orders, it found itself in hot water with the Pentagon's congressional liaison office, which is responsible for keeping the military's

popularity rating high on Capitol Hill.

The clash between military regulations and congressional relations was quickly resolved in favor of keeping the Congressmen happy. The soldiers who man the motor pool were ordered to provide whatever the congressional liaison office wanted.

So military vehicles continue, for example, to bring in large quantities of liquor from the Pentagon's Washington supplier so there will be plenty to serve to thirsty Congressmen when they attend a military reception or take a military flight.

The fact that such trips involve an apparently illegal transportation of liquor across the Virginia border from Washington doesn't bother the Pentagon brass.

Apparently, the abuse of military cars is not confined to Washington. At the U.S. naval base in Bermuda, for example, the brass ride around in full-size American sedans despite the fact that such large cars are legally forbidden to other residents of the resort island.

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## CIA SPY KIT: CHINA ATLAS PUT ON SALE

WASHINGTON (UPI)

—For \$5.25, any citizen can have his own Central Intelligence Agency document.

The Government Printing Office in Washington is offering for sale 30,000 copies of the CIA's new 82-page, multicolored atlas of the People's Republic of China.

Officials at the GPO said that except for an annual four-volume series listing the broadcasting stations of the world, the atlas was the only CIA document they had produced for sale to the public.

In addition to maps of modern China, the atlas, with the CIA's seal on the cover, also contains historical maps, a number of charts describing the growth of the Chinese economy and a narrative accompanying the maps and charts.

## Mines Divert More Ships, U.S. Reports

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Pentagon reported yesterday that "several more ships" that were en route to North Vietnam have apparently been "diverted" because of the U.S. mine barrier.

Pentagon spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim announced the changes in the ship movements, but refused to provide any information on their courses.

Other sources said, however, that "it is possible, and it is legitimate speculation" that some Soviet-bloc ships may be headed for Chinese ports near North Vietnam to unload their cargoes for transshipment to their original destination. These sources caution that "it is too early to tell" with certainty.

If the ships do head for China, it could signify a Soviet intent to outflank the U.S. mining operations while avoiding a naval confrontation with the Americans.

Two Soviet warships—a cruiser and a missile-equipped destroyer—were reported yesterday by the Japanese Self-Defense Agency to be steaming southward through the Tsushima Strait between Japan and South Korea, an area more than 1,500 miles north of Hanoi.

The ships, from the Soviet port of Vladivostok, were said to be the first Russian naval vessels seen going south through the strait since the Pakistani-Indian war last December.

But officials here said there was no way to tell where they were headed. They noted that the ships were steaming at 10 knots, far less than their top speed of about 30 knots.

To pose any serious challenge to the mine barrier and the vast U.S. armada in the area the Soviets would have to send scores of ships, planes, submarines and, most importantly, minesweepers.

So far, informed sources say no major Soviet naval movement is underway nor do Soviet or Chinese minesweepers appear to be headed toward the area.

The movement of the two ships, however, could represent the start of a gradual Soviet naval buildup.

Contrary to some reports from Hanoi, Friedheim said the North Vietnamese have made no effort to clear the mines from their harbors and reiterated that Hanoi has no ships actually equipped to get these deadly and hard to remove explosives out of their harbors.

Another sign that Communist ships bringing supplies to the North may go to China instead was reported by The Associated Press from London yesterday.

According to the AP, senior Communist diplomats there—unidentified in the report—named two South China ports that could handle the shipments. They forecast that despite the continuing Sino-Soviet feud, the U.S. mining policy almost certainly will lead to extension of the existing rail-supply agreement among China, Russia and North Vietnam to include use of Chinese ports.

The Soviets for years have made extensive use of two main rail lines through China to North Vietnam.

The two ports named by the Communists are Peihai and Ch'inh sien, both near major road and rail networks about 100 miles north of Hanoi.

Peihai was mentioned along with the larger ports of Canton and Fort Bayard by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in its report to President Nixon's National Security Council in early 1969 on Vietnam.

The CIA estimated then that "all of the war essential imports could be brought into Vietnam over rail lines or roads from China in the event that imports by sea were successfully denied."

The United States is now heavily bombing those overland lines, but defense analysts are far less convinced that the bombing will work as well as the mining to shut off supplies.

The CIA still contends that most of the actual arms—guns and ammunition—continues to arrive overland.

The major fuel, food and truck shipments arrive by sea through Haiphong. The fuel, however, is viewed as particularly crucial to the current

North Vietnamese offensive, which relies heavily on tanks, trucks and mobile artillery and air defenses.

A Soviet end-run around the Haiphong mine fields would get the fuel into the area just north of the border and subject it to bombing—the less effective of the two-pronged U.S. effort to shut off the supplies.

There were about 25 ships heading toward North Vietnam before the mines were laid, about half of them Soviet. About five or six turned back toward the Soviet Far East port of Vladivostok.

Friedheim also disclosed yesterday that two and possibly three more ships got out of Haiphong just before the mines were activated at 7 a.m. (EDT) Thursday. These are in addition to five ships that were previously reported as having left. That means that 28 or 29 ships are trapped by the mines in Haiphong.

At least one and possibly two of the three freighters that also got out are Russian. The other was flying a Somali flag.

Friedheim also revealed that two Chinese vessels were bottled up in Vinh, and two Soviet ships at Campha because of the mines. These are smaller coastal type freighters. The two ports are among six other relatively small harbors that were mined in addition to Haiphong.

CLEVELAND, OHIO  
PLAIN DEALER  
MAY 12 1972  
M - 409,414  
S - 545,032

## CIA Atlas on China Looks Like 'Sellout'

The first Central Intelligence Agency publication ever to be sold by the U.S. Government Printing Office "looks like it might be a sellout," Robert Kling, superintendent of documents, told The Plain Dealer yesterday.

The Government Printing Office already has received more than 6,000 orders for "The People's Republic of China Atlas," an 82-page, six-color book, designed originally as briefing material for President Nixon's trip to Mainland China. It was put on public sale a week ago.

GPO ordered 30,878 copies of the atlas printed, with delivery slated for late May.

Kling, phoned in Washington, said he now believes advance orders could total 25,000, and, if so, "We'll have to go back to press with it."

The atlas, priced at \$5.25, measures 10 1/4 by 17 inches, and contains foldout maps as big as 10 1/4 x 34.

It employs a number of unconventional graphic techniques, in addition to standard regional and thematic maps, charts and photographs, and "is designed as an introduction and general reference aid for those interested in the



People's Republic of China."

The atlas contains comparisons of the United States and mainland (Communist) China to make its statistics more meaningful to the average American.

A CIA spokesman said the agency had never before offered any such publication to the American public.

But, he said, President Nixon showed the atlas to reporters and before live TV cameras before his trip. So the CIA decided to make it public.

Orders for the atlas can be sent to the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

7 MAY 1972

STATINTL

### *A C.I.A. Atlas of China Goes on Sale for \$5.25*

WASHINGTON, May 6 (UPI)

—For \$5.25, any citizen can have his own Central Intelligence Agency document.

The Government Printing Office is offering for sale 30,000 copies of the C.I.A.'s new 82-page, multicolored atlas of the People's Republic of China.

Officials at the printing office said that except for an annual four-volume series listing the broadcasting stations of the world, the atlas was the only C.I.A. document they had produced for sale to the public.

In addition to detailed maps of modern China, the atlas, which has the C.I.A.'s seal on the cover, also contains historical maps, a number of charts depicting the growth of the Chinese economy, and a narrative accompanying the maps and charts.

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STATINTL

## Joe Alsop

The Voice of  
Power  
GloryGod  
Gloom  
and Doom

By Tom Kelly

In Joe Alsop's pleasant garden room four plump caged doves are cooing.

Joe says when asked that he does not like doves—that out of their cages they are dirty, mean, and hard to manage.

Joe sits under the skylight sipping a tisane from a huge blue and white china cup and the doves in two large, elaborate cages pay him no mind.

They're in and Joe's out but nobody's free.

Joe is a blue blooded falcon, a rare and endangered species. He is a falcon by inheritance, a member of the establishment, a natural born leader, a cousin of leaders, a classmate of leaders, a former roommate of leaders, and the chosen voice of the pedigreed "first-rate men" for thirty years.

For generations we've all been run by the East Coast cousins. The first cousins went to Groton and the second cousins to St. Paul's. The Irish Catholic fifth cousins were named Kennedy—but that was later. First they were coachmen and named Pat and Mike. They went to Choate.

It is difficult to tell the cousins without an alumni bulletin. Cousins are not measured by blood alone, but establishment cousins do tend to marry establishment cousins and produce genealogical cousins.

There are several (de facto) Jewish cousins named Lehmann, Ochs, and Morgenthau, but there are no Italian or Polish or Bulgarian cousins. Black people are not ready to be cousins though some can be classmates. It is customary to speak well of the late Frederick Douglass.

Some cousins chuckle a lot and Joe's blood cousin Teddy Roosevelt grinned and shouted "Bully" but most were serious faced and did not laugh out loud. This was partly because many were from New England but also because they were born to assume the awful responsibility of running the world.

Running the world is not easy. Joe took up the burden in 1932. He was a strange youth—fat, an honor graduate of Groton and Harvard, son of a roar-

ing Connecticut reactionary father and a mother who was as well connected as the Connecticut Light & Power Co. He was cousins to everyone important south of Portland and north of Philadelphia. He was literally a cousin to all the Roosevelts—Teddy, Franklin, Eleanor, and Alice Blue Gown.

When Joe was ready for the professional world his grandmother (a cousin of God's) decided that he was not to be a businessman, diplomat, banker, Episcopal bishop, or president of Harvard. It was suggested that he get a job on a newspaper, a startling idea. Cousins and classmates owned newspapers, of course, but they didn't work on them. Joe had a few precedents. Alexander Woollcott, who if not a cousin was at least invited to cousins' homes, was cutting a choleric swath through New York culture, and Bob Benchley, a blithe spirit but a Harvard boy, was working for magazines.

Ogden Reid hired Joe at Joe's grandmother's suggestion and sent him to report to the *Herald Tribune's* city editor, a disenchanted man named Stanley Walker. City editors are all low-born. Stanley had difficulty believing his own eyes since Joe, though only twenty-two, was 245 pounds, dressed in well-cut vest and watch chain, and possessed of an extraordinarily arch accent that suggested simultaneously the Queen Mother, Cardinal Newman, and the fatigue of a gentleman who'd just swum the English Channel backwards.

He also couldn't type.

Still, no one is perfect. Joe was broadly read and he could write a clear, ominous sentence. Alex Woollcott decided that Joe was the only educated youth he'd met since his own college days. Alex was given to extraordinary judgments—he was against sex and he believed Louisa May Alcott was a great writer.

Joe was soon a featured byline writer at the *Herald Tribune* and in less time than it takes to add up the Vietnam election returns he was the co-proprietor of a Washington column—his partner being a gentleman named Robert Kintner, a non-cousin, who would in time become head of NBC and an advisor to



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continued

# THE TALK OF THE TOWN

## Studies

ON a recent Tuesday evening, we spent an hour in the Grand Ballroom of the Waldorf-Astoria listening to graduate students, lecturers, professors, and an assortment of scholars and specialists unwind from a day's work. It was the end of the second day of the twenty-fourth annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies—with headquarters in Ann Arbor—and more than half of the two thousand conferees were relaxing at a reception after spending the day in such seminars as "The Emperor's New Clothes: Symposium on Interpreting the Meiji Restoration," "Continuity and Change in Princely India," "Lu Hsun: The Man, the Artist, and His Ambiguities," "Judicial Conscience in Modern Japan," "Wang Yang-Ming (1472-1529): In Commemoration of the 500th Anniversary of His Birth," and "Yogācāra Buddhism."

When we got there, at about fifty, the ballroom was teeming with white Americans (who were easily in the majority), a handful of black Americans, and a liberal sprinkling of Chinese, Filipinos, Koreans, Japanese, Indians, Burmese, and other Asians. At the center of the large stage that is a fixture of the ballroom was an elfin young Japanese lady—Fusako Yoshida, we learned—plucking classical Japanese music from a long stringed instrument, whose ends were resting on wooden horses covered with red cloth. There was nothing on the stage but Miss Yoshida and her instrument. She had on a sea-green kimono with a broad gold-colored obi; her hair was piled high in what looked like a spiral of buns; and her feet were shod in a pair of wooden clogs. Miss Yoshida was treated as a pleasant background to the evening, her music competing with the babble of chatter, though in her demureness, the delicacy of the sounds she brought from the instrument, and the economy of her physical stature she quite dominated the stage.

So as not to look too much a stranger in all this Far Eastern atmosphere, we went over to a bar, bought a

bourbon-and-water, and, glass in hand, walked around, either listening to what people were saying or talking to them ourself. The first man we went up to was a short, middle-aged American who was sitting at a table in the vicinity of the stage, seemingly engrossed in the music. He was a Bostonian, he told us, who had studied at the University of Wisconsin and was now a professor in East-West relations at Cheyney State College, in Pennsylvania.

"What instrument is that?" we asked.

"A koto," he replied. "It belongs to a large family of traditional Japanese stringed instruments, one of which is the samisen—considerably smaller."

"Good music," we observed.

"Exquisite," he replied. "You know, I adore Orientals, feel very much at home in their company, and am just as fond of their culture. I even took up karate. Not to use it, mind you—or, at least, I hope I'll never have to—but to keep in touch with the Oriental spirit and sensibility."

We told the professor that the meeting seemed remarkably well attended and asked him what had brought so many people out.

"All sorts of things," he said. "There are some people here looking for jobs, some looking to change jobs, some looking for intellectual rejuvenation, some just looking for old friends, and some, like me, hoping to meet scholars whose work we've admired. You might even find people from the federal government here. Take the C.I.A.—they have an interest in what goes on here."

"Scholarly?" we asked.

"Sure, scholarly—why not? Some of my best friends are in the C.I.A."

At this point, seeking to broaden our acquaintance, we turned to a man standing nearby, who may or may not have overheard the conversation. We hadn't broadened things very much, it turned out, for there on the man's lapel badge, along with his name, was the designation "C.I.A." A tall, white-haired man in his early fifties,

he was wearing a black suit and a narrow, red-and-gray striped tie, and under tortoiseshell glasses was the gentlest pair of eyes we had seen that day. We asked him what he did for the C.I.A., and he said he was a China-studies specialist, doing research and analysis in the Agency's geography department. He had been there since the end of the Second World War, after he came back from New Guinea, the Philippines, and Japan, where he had served in the armed forces.

"What is the C.I.A.'s interest in this meeting?" we asked.

"This is where you find the best minds in Asian studies," he replied. "They are my brethren. From time to time, we have to get in touch with them to find out what the new frontiers in research are. In our business, accuracy is the name of the game. We can't afford not to keep up with what's going on."

We said "Fair enough," thanked him, and moved on.

Sauntering in the direction of Miss Yoshida, who, we had noticed, was taking a breather at a table near the stage, we passed two happy-go-lucky-looking young men in crumpled sports jackets, battered old suede boots, and collars open at the neck—a uniform identifying them as graduate students. "Why are all the attractive girls in South Asian studies?" one of the young men said. The other laughed before he answered, and we didn't wait to hear what he said.

Next, we overheard a fragment of another conversation, among a foursome consisting of a Japanese, an Indian, and two white Americans. One of the Americans was saying, "Did you see all those professors running around with their bright graduate students in tow? I hear the job pickings are slim this year. In fact, they seem to be getting slimmer every year. A few years ago, there was a great demand for Asian scholars, but apparently that was in anticipation of the postwar baby boom, and the boom has trailed off now, leaving smaller classes and a surplus of professors."

Miss Yoshida smiled modestly at us when we arrived at her table and introduced herself. She seemed to be in her early thirties, and her mouth and eyes were lovely and expressive. She told us

she was not in Asian Studies but was appearing at the reception under the auspices of the Japan Society. We asked what she had been playing, and she said, "A number of modern and traditional Japanese pieces." She handed us the program of a recital she had given at Carnegie Hall last November, along with Sumiko Murashima, a young Japanese soprano. Most of the pieces she was playing at the reception were on the program, she said.

We chatted next with a tall, bespectacled, clerical-looking man, who, indeed, turned out to be a Presbyterian minister, and also the Southeast Asia specialist at Illinois College, in Jacksonville. He had returned a while ago from Chiang Mai, Thailand, where, he said, he had done community-development work for more than twenty years. We asked him what had brought him back to the States after a lifetime in the East.

"Success," he said. "I worked myself out of a job."

"Is that success?" we asked.

"For me it is," he replied. "As a foreigner in community-development work, you are not doing very well if the local people can't get along without you after a reasonable time. You are expected to train them to the point where they will literally take over your job."

We headed for an exit, slowing down to follow a conversation between a couple walking alongside us—a smiling, open-faced Chinese girl and a short white American with a toothbrush mustache and a pair of granny glasses.

"I've about had it," the man said to the girl. "The first day was great, but around about now I just want to go home. I'm tired of running around talking to people."

"Ah," the girl said, smiling. "You miss your wife, perhaps?"

"No, I don't miss my wife," he replied. "As a matter of fact, my books are what I miss. I'm dying to get back to them."

STATINTL

**The Washington Merry-Go-Round****Chinese Wonder About Envoy Watson****By Jack Anderson**

A confidential Senate memorandum, citing a source inside the Central Intelligence Agency, reports that the Red Chinese are "wondering" about American Ambassador Arthur Watson.

He is the International Business Machine's heir and big Republican contributor whom President Nixon has put in charge of exploring diplomatic relations with the Chinese in Paris. We reported that he had become gloriously drunk on at least two trans-Atlantic flights. On the plane that brought him to Washington to confer with the President about his sensitive new assignment, Watson tried to stuff money down the blouses of stewardesses. And on an earlier flight he petulantly pelted a stewardess with grapes from the fruit basket after she turned down his invitation to become a mistress for his teen-age son.

Such drunken conduct offends the Chinese and could jeopardize the Chinese-American negotiations in Paris. For in the Chinese culture, anyone who becomes drunk in public

would be ashamed to associate again with his former friends.

The confidential memo, written by Senate aide Tom Dine to Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) declares: "From people who know Watson at IBM and those who have dealt with him in France, no one says he can handle the important, sensitive and delicate job that the President has now placed in his less than steady hands."

Dine urges the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to phone foreign policy adviser Henry Kissinger and urge him to encourage the President to "bring Watson home swiftly and send a very top man in his place."

Explains the Senate aide: "A CIA source in contact with the Chinese delegation at the United Nations and with others who are in contact with the Chinese in Paris, talked with me about the charges that Jack Anderson has made against Ambassador Watson."

**'Well-Connected'**

"This source, whom I have checked out and found well-connected and straight, believes the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or you per-

sonally ought to do something Watson relieved from his position. The charges are correct; more important, the Chinese are wondering what this all means.

"Several Chinese diplomats have approached our people in Henry Kissinger and urge him New York and in Paris wanting to know what Watson's behavior means. If Watson is not very smart, if he is a drunkard, and if he is licentious, too, then are the Chinese being used in the negotiations in Paris? ...

"While President Nixon was in China, he found negotiating with Chou En-lai and others a most grueling experience. Each detail is discussed and only the top man discusses them.

"For instance, in Paris, the Chinese will not deal with anyone but the ambassador. Our negotiator, therefore, must be persistent, tough, of sound mind, highly respected and show physical endurance as well."

Instead of removing Watson from the delicate negotiations, however, the Nixon administration has decided to cover up

his inadequacies. CIA Director Richard Helms wrote a hasty, private letter to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee insisting "We can find no information in this agency" to support Dine's claims.

"In fact," added Helms, "there has been no report of any PRC (Chinese Communist) reaction to the publicity on Ambassador Watson's conduct."

Watson himself wrote letters of apology for his "rude" conduct on the PanAm flight to Washington. Finally, Secretary of State Bill Rogers, the nicest guy in Washington, used his amiable relations on Capitol Hill to persuade both the Senate and House to call off their investigations of Watson.

Footnote: Members of the PanAm flight crew, who were questioned privately on Capitol Hill about the Watson incidents, completely confirmed our charges. State Department aides Robert Aylmer and Frank Dempsey, who picked up Watson at the airport, also wrote a confidential report saying he was "heavily intoxicated."

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STATINTL

# Cow ghosts and snake demons

By Russell W. Kane

Well, President Nixon should be back from China by now (we write way ahead, so we are never really sure of anything). It is too bad that he has so little time for reading other than the CIA advisory and the other little condensations that his aides poke toward him, hoping he will be able to at least glance before he finally nods off of an evening after a busy top executivish day.

If he did in fact have lots of time to read he might have read "The Revenge of Heaven" by Ken Ling. Its subtitle is "Journal of a Young Chinese." It contains about 400 pages (lots of them are forewords and notes), it came out in January, Putnam published it and you can buy one for \$8.95 from your friendly neighborhood bookseller or perhaps you can borrow one at the library. Or wait for it to emerge in paperback.

Anyway, it could be worth your while, because it covers that most confusing period of modern Chinese history, the Great Cultural Revolution of 1966-67. That convulsion was reported by the western press, but inadequately, and we never quite knew what was going on, particularly since the Chinese were uncommunicative and as mysterious and inscrutable as always. But even the close-up China watchers, such as those in Hong Kong and Japan, were baffled by developments. The picture agencies moved to show the hordes of Red Guards marching,

being paddled across water on barges, rioting, dragging out landlords and other backward types, painting slogan posters—but never a word about the why of what was really going on there.

Now, and I believe only now, is a comprehensive version available, or at least available to those who do not read Chinese, because there was some source material available to Chinese scholars earlier, and there was even some scholarly work available on a narrow basis to persons who do not read Chinese but who were interested. (We must also assume the State Department and CIA were interested, and perhaps knew what was happening in mainland China at that time.

Ken Ling, author of "Revenge," is a pseudonym. But there is no reason to question the authenticity of the book because it took its U.S. translators and perfecters three years to wade through the 500,000 Chinese characters that made up the journal. They also conducted many interviews with Ken Ling and his brother, both of whom fled Amoy in Fukien province for Taiwan after the Cultural Revolution.

Ken Ling was only 16 when the revolution erupted, instigated, it developed, by Chairman Mao himself. Mao apparently thought revisionism, or the changing and softening of the Marxist-Leninist line, was rampant. He figured the

structure below his level and that in the shakeout the bad elements would be discovered and destroyed or re-educated.

So he closed the schools down and Ken Ling and millions of other kids started raising hell up and down that vast land. It was just what Mao wanted, "continual revolution," but it got out of hand, naturally, and eventually the Red Guard "little generals" themselves had to be repressed and even killed.

From the evidence it would appear that Ken Ling was one of few young defectors, that most of the Red Guards never realized that they had only been used by Mao to rid himself of potential opposition, and they and their younger brothers and sisters are ready to go again whenever they get the word. It is the sort of profligate politics that can be afforded only by a backward nation with 800 million persons.

Here are some passages from the book, which is the expansion of a daily journal Ken Ling kept up during the Cultural Revolution.

When the students began to expose their teachers as revisionists and "capitalist road followers": "Beatings and tortures followed. I had never seen such tortures before: eating nightsoil and insects; being subjected to electrical shocks; forced to kneel on broken glass; being hanged 'airplane' by the legs and arms."

That first chapter, incidentally, is titled "Cow ghosts and snake de-

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Continued

Spring 1972

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# Rockefellers Rule the Roost

*Our new China policy is actually the same  
old Rockefeller policy*

STATINTL

BY JOHN MITCHELL HENSHAW

THE ROLE of the Rockefellers in shaping America's Red China policy reveals an amazing story of behind-the-scenes power. The genesis of Rockefeller interests in China dates to around 1886. And around 1890 the "philanthropist" John D. Rockefeller, Sr. gave the Chinese 300,000 small kerosene lamps to encourage them to use his oil. At the turn of the century, the Chinese were buying over 100 million gallons of kerosene annually, more than 90 percent of which came from Mr. Rockefeller's Standard Oil Co. Rockefeller had already secured a monopoly of the American oil market and was embarking on a campaign of world conquest of the oil market. He had the help of the U.S. Department of State.

"One of our greatest helpers," Mr. Rockefeller, Sr. candidly stated, "has been the State Department in Washington. Our ambassadors, and ministers, and consuls have aided to push our way into new markets to the utmost corners of the world." The State Department-Rockefeller partnership has continued to this very day. The global expansion of Mr. Rockefeller's Standard Oil Co. has resulted in that company becoming the dominant power in the international oil cartel, which controls development, production and prices in the world oil market.

## Access to Markets

At the behest of Mr. Rockefeller the State Department established the "China Open Door Policy" warning European nations against compromising the territorial integrity of China and established the principle of free access to her vast markets. Principal beneficiaries of this policy were John D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil and his brother William Rockefeller's fledgling banking firm now known as the First National City Bank.

President Woodrow Wilson aptly described the arrangement: "Not the open door to the rights of China, but the

open door to the goods of America." The elder Rockefeller and his descendants are primarily responsible for the internationalist policies of the United States, which impels us to constantly meddle into the internal affairs of other countries. While many other American firms entered into China trade field, none became so well ensconced as the two Rockefeller giant financial institutions, First National City Bank and the Chase Manhattan Bank, and the mighty Standard Oil. Historians have failed to adequately portray the Rockefeller scenario in China affairs. Perhaps the deficiency is due to the largesse of the Rockefeller Foundation to the scholarly gentlemen who write the academic textbooks of history. In fact, several widely used textbooks of oil history have been written without even mentioning the word "cartel."

## State Department Coverup

There is a dearth of detailed information about the Rockefellers' manipulation of U.S. China policy due to a deliberate coverup by the State Department. Ironically, Japanese scholars are more conversant with the Rockefeller machinations in China than American students of economics and history. But it can be conclusively established that the Rockefellers and their entourage have definitely shaped and reshaped U.S. China policy over a long period to meet the exigencies of their operations. For the sake of brevity, we will omit a half-century of Rockefeller philanthropy, enervation and aggrandizement in China, and come down to the third generation of the Rockefeller clan, namely, the five sons of John D. Rockefeller, Jr. — David, Winthrop, John D. 3rd, Nelson A. and Laurance S. Each of the five brothers are reputed to be worth over one billion dollars. Their grandfather, John D. Sr., was the world's first billionaire. Collectively, the five brothers control a financial-industrial empire of over \$50 billion. The brothers engage in a wide variety of avoca-

tions like politics, philanthropy and conservation, but their principal occupation is to aggressively expand their private empire.

In late 1949 when Mao Tse-tung seized control of Mainland China, John D. Rockefeller III declared the Cold War against Red China in these words: "On U.S. trade with China, my own reaction is that it should be limited. It seems to me that the fastest way to contain Communism is to discredit it in the eyes of the people of China. It seems to me if the economy worsens, that this will arouse opposition to it, and as I see it, the opposition is essential if new leadership is to develop in China, and I do feel that this new leadership is tremendously important."

Historically, this was the real beginning of the Cold War and the 20-year embargo of Red China. While John D. III modestly said he was speaking for himself, actually he had conferred with his four brothers, whose own funds were invested in the great Rockefeller Trust. The Rockefellers never act impetuously in making momentous decisions. And in their deliberations they always hold protracted consultations with their coterie of specialists. Usually the Rockefeller consensus is accurate, but it is not always infallible as was certainly proved in this instance.

## Policy of "Containment"

It will be noted that John D. III spoke of developing "new leadership" in China, which meant that the Rockefellers were disenchanted with their old friend, Chiang Kai-shek.

It will also be noted that John D. III said: "the fastest way to contain Communism is to discredit it in the eyes of the people of China." This Rockefeller advice quickly became the "policy of containment" of the State Department in the Orient.

NOTE: The foregoing quoted Rockefeller advice was offered in a roundtable discussion in the office of Secretary of State Acheson. (Minutes of the meeting have now been declassified). Others at this meeting included Raymond B. Fosdick, president of the Rockefeller Foundation, Philip C. Jessup, an Ambassador-at-large, who was connected with J. P. Morgan & Co., and Everett N. Case. Both Jessup and Case were tied in with the pro-Red Institute of Pacific Relations, which had done so much for the Red Chinese. Chiang Kai-shek. Also at the roundtable was leftist Prof.

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CONTINUED



STATINTL



**HENRY J. TAYLOR**

## The Sino-Soviet Border Issue

President Nixon knows that his leverage on the Soviet Union by his Peking trip has several unrevealed limitations. The first is the U.S.S.R.'s widely reported fear of China on Russia's 4,150-mile border.

Mr. Nixon regards this as hokey, hokus, hokum.

In only the 31 years, between 1870 and 1901, Great Britain acquired 4.7 million square miles of territory; France, 3.6 million; Germany, one million; Belgium, one million — 77 times Belgium's own size. Most of these were in Africa and Asia. But Russia had been in there carving up China for nearly two centuries.

The result is today's 4,150-mile Russian-Chinese border, the longest in the world. It runs something like the distance from New York to Honolulu.

✓ WHAT PRESIDENT NIXON obtained from Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard M. Helms' final briefing at the White House before he left is that Mao's military position on the Russian border is much weaker than supposed.

War starts with terrain. The Soviet axis for its position opposite China is Khabarovsk, 400 miles north of Vladivostok. The border friction incidents have been concentrated in Heilungkiang Province and along the Ussuri River, which is a part of the border.

MR. HELMS told President Nixon that the Soviet has 22 crack divisions on this border, controlled from Khabarovsk. Nine are mechanized. The terrain, he said, is excellent for their deployment. We hear much about Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles and bombers. But Mr. Helms emphasized that the Soviet has a large and extremely effective tactical air force for troop support as well. Mao has none.

What Mr. Nixon is trying to determine in the border issue is: Who is provoking whom?

China can do the shouting and talking and street demonstrating, as for a long time. But President Nixon believes that if anybody is really picking a fight in this situation the weight of evidence is that the one who would pick a fight as a precaution against the future is the U.S.S.R.



28 FEB 1972

# China reporter's notebook

By John Burns

Special to The Christian Science Monitor  
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The writer is a resident correspondent in the Chinese capital.

## Peking

To somebody seeing him for the first time Mr. Nixon is a surprise. He seems to be taller, slimmer, and better tailored than he looks on television, and altogether more relaxed.

He arrived in Peking with a healthy suntan, which reportedly he has been careful to cultivate since 1960. On arrival in Peking, and at several public functions since, he has appeared to be wearing television makeup.

The President's arrival was an occasion of disappointment for

several hundred Peking diplomats and their families who were refused permission to drive to the airport to watch the arrival. Some of the diplomats have been in Peking for years and could hardly believe that the Chinese would bar them from the most exciting event in all their time here, especially when the whole world would be able to see the arrival on television.

Since Chinese television carried no live coverage, the diplomats had to rely on descriptions from resident correspondents who were allowed to see the arrival.

It was no coincidence that Mr. Nixon referred to the worldwide television audience—"More people are seeing and hearing what we say than on any other such occasion in the whole history of the world"—in his opening remarks at the state banquet the night he arrived.

Throughout the visit he has seemed very conscious of the television cameras, and the banquet speech seemed to have been written as much for consumption by the television audience at home as it was for the Chinese leaders listening to him in the Great Hall of the People. Certainly its delivery was tailored for TV, with Mr. Nixon running straight through the speech in English first, rather than having the Chinese interpreter translate it a paragraph at a time.

According to Ronald L. Ziegler, the President's press secretary, the banquet speech was finalized only hours before it was delivered, with the President sitting down over the draft with Dr. Henry A. Kissinger immediately after returning from his epic meeting with Chairman Mao.

Many observers here were critical of the speech, feeling that its mixture of sentimentality and heroics were ill-suited to the situation. "A mixture of Gettysburg and Checkers" was the way one diplomat described it—referring to the President's borrowing of a phrase from Abraham Lincoln's famed Civil

War speech ("What we say here will not be long remembered") and his television address during the 1952 election campaign when he mentioned his dog Checkers while defending himself against charges of receiving improper financial assistance from friends.

Whatever the Chinese leaders may have thought of the speech it seemed to be a hit with ordinary Chinese, many of whom expressed pleasure at the President's quotation—"seize the day, seize the hour"—from a poem by Chairman Mao. "It's a good thing he should do that," said one educated Chinese. "The Chairman has written many great things, and everybody can learn from him."

It was noticeable that the quotation brought one of only two bursts of applause from Chinese leaders which interrupted the speech. The other came when the President complimented the Army band for its professional handling of old American melodies.

The guest list at the banquet was led by a galaxy of Chinese leaders including Premier Chou and two other high-ranking members of the Chinese Politburo, Yeh Chien-ying and Li Hsien-nien.

Other interesting guests were several former generals in the Nationalist Army of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, including Fu Tso-yi, the military governor who surrendered Peking to the Red Army in October, 1948.

The presence of the generals—all old men now, at least one of them on crutches—was seen as a means of demonstrating to the world and to the Nationalist leaders on Taiwan that the Communists honor their word when they say that Nationalists who repent and give their allegiance to Peking will be treated with honor and respect.

One of the remarkable features of the President's meeting with Chairman Mao was the publication in the People's Daily of a photograph showing Nixon relaxing with Mr. Mao in the library of the Chairman's home. It was

the first time in at least 10 years that the Chinese press has shown the Chairman at home, and it served to break the silence Chinese officials have always maintained on where the Chairman lives.

Chinese officials have been candid and relaxed toward correspondents during the President's visit. Normally the officials are unfailingly courteous but are careful not to encourage any familiarity. While Mr. Nixon has been here, the officials have been markedly more convivial, stopping the press center to chat easily with correspondents and joking with them in a manner that was previously quite rare.

One official startled a correspondent he had known for eight months when he addressed him by his Christian name, the first time it had happened. Another sign of relaxation has been the absence of Mao badges from the tunics of the officials from the Foreign Ministry's information department who are on duty in the center.

All week the U.S. correspondents have been leaving the green looseleaf briefing books lying around the press center. The books contain several hundred pages of information compiled by the White House, the State Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency, including a run-down on the Chinese leadership.

It is intriguing to note that the section omits all mention of Defense Minister Lin Piao, Chairman Mao's nominated successor, and of several high-ranking military officers who disappeared with him last fall.

One correspondent has a pamphlet on the leadership, with the photographs of all the missing men and women crossed out in red ink by the CIA.

STATINTL



HENRY J. TAYLOR

## Nixon's Peking Talks Jolted

The CIA has reported to President Nixon in Peking that, as we withdraw our troops, the Red forces are moving over Southeast Asia like termites on a log. The current alarm concerns Cambodia, Thailand and Burma, all three.

Cambodia is only the size of Oklahoma but it has 6.7 million people. The President's Vietnam pull-out was threatened by 30,000 North Vietnamese in Cambodia. Our incursion into Cambodia was a spoiling action covering our rear guard in Vietnam. But since then the keystone of the Nixon policy — Vietnamization — was tested by the Vietnamese Army's protectionary assault into Cambodia. And, as a demonstration to support the hope of Vietnamization, it was tragically unpromising.

The CIA advised the President that the disintegration heightens. The Cambodian Army has only 35,000 men. Phnom Penh, the capital is cut off, of course, except for a single uncertain road, but the Reds have now finished fortifying even fabulous Angkor Wat and completely control strategic Tonle Sap, the great lake of Cambodia. Premier Lon Nol is pressed toward a cease-fire.

**THAILAND BORDERS** on Cambodia; it stands between Cambodia, Laos and Burma.

The Siamese (34.7 million people) call their country Muang Thai, meaning Land of the Free People.

It has always been fiercely independent. In fact, Thailand is the only nation in the entire area that never has been ruled by a foreign power.

But the CIA has notified Mr. Nixon that Thai Army Commanding Gen. Prapas Charusathien reports that his units have intercepted Red Chinese and North Vietnamese soldiers crossing into Thailand's Sisaket and Surin provinces, 250 miles northeast of Bangkok. General Charusathien has only a 141,500-man force to meet this expansion.

**U. S. AMBASSADOR TO CAMBODIA** Emory C. Swank, in turn, apprised of this, is urging General Charusathien to add an army of ethnic Cambodians to meet Mao Tse-tung and Chou en-lai's expansion.

Burma, about the size of Texas, has a long common border with Thailand on Burma's

Shan states. But Burma (27 million people), fabled in Kipling's verses, is as different from Thailand as day and night. The home country of vacillating, mercurial former United Nations Secretary General U Thant, Burma is one of Southeast Asia's most inaccessible and mysterious countries.

Its actual name is the Pyee-Daung-Su Myanma Nainggan-Daw Union of Burma. The country is utterly provincial, totally fatalistic and unalterable Burmese. Neutralism, which likewise mesmerizes U Thant, is a fixation and isolationism a creed.

**BURMA CHIEF OF STATE** Gen. Ne Win, 60, his lidded eyes as rich as jade in a face as pale as bread and a man as wily and suspicious as U Thant himself, once told me in Mandalay, "Only Buddha can help anyone." And, not surprisingly, Burma's Marxist economy approaches absolute thrombosis.

Burma has a wild, mountainous 1,200-mile frontier — a third as long as our Canadian border — with Red China. Its armed forces total 137,500 men — 6,500 of them in a completely meaningless Air Force.

The CIA reported to President Nixon in Peking that 20,000 China-armed insurgents are now battling these forces. They are in a major engagement near Lashio, close to Red China's border. And, reported the CIA, 3,000 North Vietnamese are heading into Burma Shan state.

Ne Win incessantly travels abroad — always flamboyantly — plays golf and hobnobs with world dignitaries whenever possible and prefers the city of Mandalay where "the dawn comes up like thunder" to his capital of Rangoon. And until now Red China has adopted a restrained role toward Burma. The CIA opinion is that Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai felt that they can wait until Ne Win dies or is booted out, as he booted out predecessor U Nu, and then Red China will be sucked into Burma as in a vacuum.

The CIA message to the President changes this. Unrevealed, Cambodia, Thailand and Burma alike suddenly jolt Mr. Nixon's Peking talks and further complicate his success over there.

Bob Wiedrich

# Tower Ticker

Richard M. Nixon is on Red Chinese soil this morning, preparing to walk a tight rope mankind hopes can lead to convincing the leaders of some 800 million people that capitalism and Communism can live together in peace on the same globe.

Understandably, the President is perhaps tense. But en route to Peking, Nixon carefully guarded his thoughts, whatever they may have been. His facade, if it was that, was one of good humor.

While still in flight, someone showed the President a map of mainland China whose cover bore a legend indicating it had been prepared by the CIA.

"I wonder if they'll let that map into Red China," quipped an observer.

Nixon laughed and then exclaimed: "That map probably will show how much we don't know about China!"

# Newsmen Bone Up for 'China Exam'

Washington Post Foreign Service

HONOLULU, Feb. 18 — Most press airplanes accompanying the President on his trips look like holiday excursions, with newsmen drinking, playing cards or joking with the stewardesses. But the reporters currently going with Mr. Nixon to Peking strangely resemble a classroom of China students cramming for their final exams.

Instead of trading old anecdotes about previous presidential voyages, as reporters usually do on such journeys, the journalists on this flight are talking about such esoteric subjects as Mao Tse-Tung's relations with Chou En-Lai, Sino-Japanese trade and the composition of the Chekiang Province Communist Party committee, whose leaders the President will meet when he visits the resort city of Hangchow.

The newsmen on this trip are also voraciously reading books and articles on China. The most popular book on the aircraft, a Pan American Boeing-707 converted to contain only first-class seats, is "the United States and China" by Prof. John Fairbank, head of Harvard's East Asia Research Center and dean of American China scholars.

Another reading matter being absorbed include the recent articles in the Atlantic Monthly by Rose Terrill, also a Harvard China scholar, who spent 40 days traveling around China last summer.

In addition to these obvious works, more exotic books are being studied by a few ambitious newsmen. John Chancellor of the National Broadcasting Company, for example, is buried in the "I Ching," the classic Chinese book of changes, searching for parallels be-

tween ancient and contemporary China.

A select number of reporters are also armed with a new atlas of China prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency. A pool of newsmen aboard the President's airplane, the Spirit of '76, asked Mr. Nixon if he thought the Chinese would tolerate such material in their country.

The President, who apparently had not seen the atlas before, examined it, then laughed loudly and quipped: "This will probably show how much we don't know about China."

The main collection of research matter provided reporters by the administration is a handsome, loose-leaf volume containing information about China ranging from its literacy rate and Gross National Product to the line-up of its leaders.

The roster of leaders has been carefully brought up to date, since it does not include Defense Minister Lin Piao and 10 other full and alternate members of the ruling politburo who have been purged. This also suggests that the administration officially considers them to have been eliminated—though the subject of domestic Chinese politics is rarely mentioned by White House spokesmen.

The research material provided by the administration also offers some political details. Among other things, it says that high-heeled shoes "are extremely dangerous" at the Great Wall, which the President and Mrs. Nixon will visit.

Most of the newsmen en route to Peking candidly concede to their ignorance about China. But a handful on the press airplane can claim to varying degrees of expertise or at least familiarity with China.

Aboard the aircraft, for instance, is Theodore H.

White, who was a correspondent for Time Magazine in China during World War II and afterward wrote the bestselling "Thunder Out of China." Henry Hartzenbusch of the Associated Press was born in Shanghai and lived there for years, and the Wall Street Journal's Robert L. Keatley spent a month in China in May.

The language capability of the reporters is virtually zero, however. To improve this gap somewhat, newsmen have been issued manuals featuring such phrases as "Wo Yau Yi Tau Mao Jrfu," or "I would like a Mao suit."

The manual also advises reporters how to order bacon and eggs in Mandarin Chinese. But it does not contain the phrase "Long Live President Nixon."



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## **Briefly Peking . . .**

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The President brought along an atlas of China prepared by the CIA. On the plane he wondered whether he would be allowed into a communist country with a book bearing the CIA legend. ✓

## THE ROAD TO PEKING

STATINTL

# Nixon's role in the triumph of Chou

By STAN CARTER

NEWS Diplomatic Correspondent

Fifth of a series

ONE of the eight black-bound loose-leaf volumes that President Nixon studied in preparation for his journey to Peking contained a top secret analysis by the Central Intelligence Agency of the strange and still only partially explained events in China last fall—and the effect that the internal power struggle they revealed may have on his summit talks with the surviving Communist leaders.

What went on in China in mid-September is still shrouded in mystery. Communist cadres in the provinces have been told that Defense Minister Lin Piao—until then the regime's no. 2 man—was involved in a conspiracy to assassinate party Chairman Mao Tse-tung and that when the plot failed, Lin and his cohorts were killed in a plane crash in Mongolia while trying to flee to the Soviet Union.

A British-built Trident jetliner, one of four purchased by China from Pakistan and used exclusively by high-ranking Chinese officers, did indeed crash in Mongolia, 100 miles beyond the Chinese border, on the night of Sept. 12. But American analysts doubt that Lin was among the seven men and two women whose bodies were recovered from the airplane, burned beyond recognition.

But it is clear that the power struggle has ended—at least for the time being—and that a moderate faction led by Premier Chou En-lai triumphed over a radical faction led by Lin Piao. Lin and hundreds of his followers have been purged, but are thought to be still alive.

Whatever the reasons for the purge, the timing for it seems to have been sparked by Chou's invitation to Nixon to visit the People's Republic of China.

### Quarrel over resources

Despite the official conclusions are probably similar to those of analysts from other government agencies and from experts outside the government.

For example, Rand Corp. Sinologist William W. Whitson has come up with a theory fitting the known facts. It suggests that the power struggle was the culmination of a debate within the Chinese hierarchy over allocation of resources to China's nuclear weapons program—and that Chou's victory over Lin will make China less of a threat to U.S. allies in Asia in the immediate future than it has been considered in the past.

Whitson, a military specialist, is one of those China experts who does research for the government and also maintains ties with the academic community. His new book, "The Chinese High Command, 1927-1971—a History of Communist Military Politics," will be published this spring.

According to Whitson, Lin Piao vigorously opposed last year's decision by Chou—with Mao's concurrence—to reduce tensions with the United States.

The reason was that Lin and his supporters in the Air Force and Navy needed the supposed American threat to justify development of bigger and bigger nuclear weapons and long-range missiles to deliver them.

The cost of China's nuclear and missile programs are 2% of the still underdeveloped country's total national product—so high that Whitson argues that "some people across the river (a euphemism in Washington for CIA headquarters in Langley, Va.) say that we ought to encourage them to keep at it, because it will make them go bankrupt."

### Challenge to Lin

Whitson's contention is that Chou En-lai, in contrast to Lin, recognized that the real threat to China was from Russia—which had massed one million troops on China's northern border and threatened a "surgical strike" against Chinese nuclear installations—instead of from the United States, which the premier could see was in fact withdrawing from Southeast Asia.

To cope with the Soviet threat, China needed tactical nuclear weapons as well as more modern conventional armament—not necessarily long-range ICBMs. Therefore, it is Whitson's belief that Chou wanted to slow down the costly advanced weapons program and thus welcomed Nixon's overtures to end the 23-year-old confrontation between the United States and China.

But the invitation to Nixon presented a challenge to Lin and the generals associated with past strategic planning. Whitson puts it this way:

"To many of the senior officers of the second military generation, probably including Lin Piao, Wu Fa-hsien, Li Tso-p'eng and Huang Yung-sheng, the historical image of the United States as the principal adversary most heavily armed with nuclear weapons targeted against China must have been the cornerstone of their premises for strategic planning and weapons development.

"President Nixon's visit to China could not have been a welcome shift in the image that had presumably guided their strategic thinking for 20 years."

### Smaller bangs

Since the mid-1960s, China has exploded 13 nuclear devices, including three hydrogen bombs with yields of three megatons each, in 1968, 1969 and 1970. But the last two tests, in November, 1971 and January of this year, were of smaller devices with yields of 20 kilotons or less—the size of the Hiroshima A-bomb.

According to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, the latest two tests could either have been of triggers for larger thermonuclear weapons or of prototypes of comparatively small, tactical nuclear warheads. If they were the latter, it would tend to confirm Whitson's theory that Chou, after defeating Lin, has shifted priorities to concentrate on medium and intermediate range missiles instead of a costly intercontinental missile arsenal.

"Such an emphasis would provide an immediate deterrent against the Soviet Union," Whitson says. "It would also promise the greatest intercontinental utility once an appropriate submarine or two had been built."

If Whitson is right, this will be disconcerting to U.S. military planners, who have advocated construction of an antiballistic missile defense system for protection of the United States against Chinese ICBM's expected to be operational as early as 1975, as much as against the nuclear-tipped Soviet intercontinental rockets already in their underground silos.

Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird acknowledged to Congress this week that "it is difficult to assess either the strategic threat to the United States from China, or how that threat will evolve through the 1970s." But Laird said the

continued

STATINTL

# The China Scholars and U.S. Intelligence

by David Horowitz

**B**EFORE ACTUALLY BOARDING AIR FORCE ONE for his February meeting with Chairman Mao, Richard Nixon will be forced to run a gauntlet of intelligence briefing sessions designed to bring him up to date on the latest Chinese developments. The cram course on contemporary China, programmed by CIA director Richard C. Helms, will range from an elementary Who's Who in the Chinese government and questions of unfamiliar proletarian protocol—e.g., What should Pat Nixon say to Mme. Mao, the militant leader of the Peking Red Guards?—to more esoteric information not generally found in either the *New York Times* or the *Peking People's Daily* Sunday Supplement. More or less hard answers to questions like "Whatever happened to Lin Biao, Chairman Mao's ex-close-comrade-in-arms?" "What progress are Chinese rocket experts making with their long range missile systems?" "How do the factions within the People's Army and Communist Party line up in the present leadership struggle?"

In order to provide Nixon with the data he needs on this trip, Helms is able to cull the output of hundreds of military and civilian radio intercept operators, who listen-in on a rotating shift, round-the-clock basis to Chinese radio transmissions. Also mobilized are the battalions of cryptographers at Fort Meade, Md., trying to break Chinese military, diplomatic and commercial codes; the covert operators in such places as Hong Kong and Singapore, busily suborning Asian journalists; and, more prosaically, the dozens of linguistically trained Ph.D.'s hard at work in Langley, Va., translating Chinese telephone books. But there is another intelligence network on which Nixon will rely which is just as vital, if somewhat smaller and more loosely articulated. This is the academic phalanx of American China scholars: the once scorned and now twice-rewarded denizens of a startling variety of scholarly and semi-scholarly institutions. These range from conglomerate think tanks like the RAND Corporation, and elite centers of corporate-academic cross-fertilization like the Council on Foreign Relations to seemingly more chaste academic set-ups like the East Asian Institutes at Harvard and Columbia. But the distinctions are more apparent than real, for what we have in China studies is the clearest case yet in which the big foundations and the State Department founded, funded, nurtured and directed an entire academic field, providing at last a definitive answer to the age-old question: "Who shall educate the educators?"

## [AN INTELLIGENCE WHO'S WHO]

**F**OLLOWING THE MC CARTHY FREEZEOUT China scholars began to come in from the cold in the early Kennedy years. Something of the origins of the American China scholar intelligence network that subsequently developed can be gleaned from a private letter written in 1962 by the head of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (BIR), Dr. Allen Whiting. This letter, made available by its recipient, who at that time was the head of Berkeley's Center for China Studies, aimed to recruit him to the BIR's "elite project." Who was going to take over after Chairman Mao?, the BIR wanted to know. "Experience with post-Stalin Russia," Whiting wrote, "has shown the importance of anticipating succession crises in communist countries and especially of understanding the significance of their outcome in terms of changes in communist policy." American intelligence had already sifted *prima facie* evidence suggesting conflicts within the Chinese leadership. Whiting complained, however, that inadequate attention to the make-up of the factions "has left us with no firm picture of attitudes held by competing groups on such

itary and civilian radio intercept operators, who listen-in on a rotating shift, round-the-clock basis to Chinese radio transmissions. Also mobilized are the battalions of cryptographers at Fort Meade, Md., trying to break Chinese military, diplomatic and commercial codes; the covert operators in such places as Hong Kong and Singapore, busily suborning Asian journalists; and, more prosaically, the dozens of linguistically trained Ph.D.'s hard at work in Langley, Va., translating Chinese telephone books. But there is another intelligence network on which Nixon will rely which is just as vital, if somewhat smaller and more loosely articulated. This is the academic phalanx of American China scholars: the once scorned and now twice-rewarded denizens of a startling variety of scholarly and semi-scholarly institutions. These range from conglomerate think tanks like the RAND Corporation, and elite centers of corporate-academic cross-fertilization like the Council on Foreign Relations to seemingly more chaste academic set-ups like the East Asian Institutes at Harvard and Columbia. But the distinctions are more apparent than real, for what we have in China studies is the clearest case yet in which the big foundations and the State Department founded, funded, nurtured and directed an entire academic field, providing at last a definitive answer to the age-old question: "Who shall educate the educators?"



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# Did leak make CIA look good?

By DARRELL HANCOCK  
Post Reporter

"Although it probably did not cross (Daniel) Ellsberg's mind when he released the Pentagon papers to the New York Times, he succeeded in doing what the (Central Intelligence) Agency, on its own, has rarely been able to do for more than 20 years: He made the CIA look good," writes Chester L. Cooper of the Institute for Defense Analysis in the January "Foreign Affairs."

In his article, "The CIA and Decision-making," Cooper describes the elite Office of National Estimates organized within the CIA in 1950. The small group of intelligence analysts prepares about 50 "estimates" annually on foreign policy problems, such as "Chinese communist nuclear capabilities as they may develop over the next several years..." An estimate is a projection, an opinion or a judgment, Cooper says, "but it is likely to be the best-informed and most objective view the decision-maker can get."

Citing 13 items from the Pentagon papers, Cooper shows that the policy-makers were apparently warned again and again against the hope of easy U.S. military victory in Vietnam. The reservation "apparently" is necessary because, as Cooper admits, the selection of estimates by the writers and reporters of the Pentagon papers may have been highly selective. But the evidence at hand includes:

*The Pentagon papers revealed that the government went on to support Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam ... but the CIA ... showed willingness to make (intelligence) estimates very much at variance with the current policy line.*

● A 1954 report to the Eisenhower administration that "even with American support it was unlikely that the French or Vietnamese would be able to establish a strong government and that the situation would probably continue to deteriorate."

The government went on to support Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam, but Cooper says the CIA then and afterwards showed a willingness to make estimates "very much at variance with the current policy line."

● A 1961 warning to the fledgling Kennedy administration: Diem tolerated corruption and relied on one-man rule, casting doubt on his ability to lead the government.

● A later 1961 report that American military escalation in South Vietnam would be matched by similar escalation by Hanoi.

● A joint intelligence panel dissent in 1964 to the view that bombing would break Hanoi's will to continue the costly war.

● Repeated reports during the bombing that the North Vietnamese were continuing the war with "resolute stoicism" and with relatively unchanged strategy and material resources.

Events, to one degree or another, confirmed the "bearish" intelligence estimates, Cooper notes, wondering aloud how the "yawning gap" between the intelligence structure and the foreign policymakers could be closed.

Basically, he proposes face-to-face meetings between the two groups, possibly by putting the estimators within the National Security Council, which may have a stronger voice with the President. "Clearly if they are to play a more direct and useful role, the estimators must be brought out of their cloister into the real world."

But would the professorial estimators lose their prized objectivity in the quest for greater influence? Possibly, Cooper concedes. But if that issue can be resolved, a new intelligence arrangement "would make available what every President since Truman has said he wanted, but what none of them has been able to obtain on a routine basis — the best possible first-hand intelligence judgments on critical international problems."



# 7th Fleet Task Force Ends Patrol in the Indian Ocean

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 10 — That statement was seen as The United States Navy task an assertion of principle that force led by the nuclear-powered carrier Enterprise sailed to leave the Indian Ocean today out of the Indian Ocean today the Russians, who normally after a month of patrol duty have a squadron of 10 to 12 begun during the Indian Pakistani war, the Defense Department announced.

The return of the nine-ship squadron to regular service with the Seventh Fleet in Southeast Asian waters ended a controversial aspect of United States actions during the war on the subcontinent.

The presence of the task force in the Indian Ocean was never fully explained by the Nixon Administration. Because of Washington's condemnation of Indian actions during the war, many Indians looked upon the task force as a provocation, a view that set off anti-American demonstrations, an official Indian protest and a worsening of Indian-American relations.

Pentagon sources and secret cablegrams made public by the syndicated columnist Jack Anderson indicated that the carrier force had at least three objectives; possible evacuation of Americans, showing the flag in view of the presence of Soviet naval forces in the area and deterring India from any thought of extending the war to West Pakistan once East Pakistan fell.

## Course Changed After Truce

The task force entered the Indian Ocean on Dec. 14 in the direction of East Pakistan, but after the cease-fire on Dec. 17, the ships changed course and patrolled at a distance.

Last Friday, when asked how long the task force would remain in the Indian Ocean, Jerry W. Friedheim, the Defense Department spokesman, declined to give an exact time, stressing that the United States intended to send units of the Seventh Fleet into the Indian Ocean from time to time, now that Britain was withdrawing from

Today, Mr. Friedheim said that at 6:30 A.M. Eastern standard time, the task force had cleared the Malacca Strait and had entered the South China Sea, returning "to normal operating control of the Commander, Seventh Fleet."


The Enterprise is due to arrive Wednesday at Subic Bay in the Philippines, where the crew is to receive five days of liberty.

For a month before going to the Indian Ocean the Enterprise had been in the Gulf of Tonkin in the position known as Yankee Station near North Vietnam.

Mr. Friedheim said that there were no immediate plans to send in another task force, but added: "I have every confidence U. S. Navy vessels will operate in the Indian Ocean during the next year to 18 months."

"We will do that from time to time; on no fixed schedule, no fixed force level," he said.

Mr. Friedheim said that 15 to 20 Soviet vessels remained in the Indian Ocean, including 5 or 6 combat vessels—2 light cruisers and 3 or 4 destroyers. In ad-



The New York Times/Jan. 11, 1972

dition, he said, there are submarines and support ships.

Pentagon officials have said privately that the United States had plans as long ago as 1965 to send ships from the Seventh Fleet to the Indian Ocean to meet that requirements of the Viet-

nam war had blocked its program. In the last year, however, report, attributed to "reliable" relatively unpublicized exercises were carried out by vessels of the Seventh Fleet included on Dec. 13 told the Indian government that the Soviet Union "would open a diversionary action" against the Chinese and "will not allow the Seventh Fleet to intervene," Mr. Anderson said.

The Nixon Administration has never publicly stated why it was necessary for the Enterprise to enter the Indian Ocean, but Administration officials, who declined to be identified said the United States had reliable information that India, with Soviet backing, had planned to attack West Pakistan.

They contended that the presence of the task force, as well as a series of messages from President Nixon to Soviet leaders, succeeded in restraining India. The Indian Government has denied it had planned an all-out attack on West Pakistan.

Mr. Anderson, in a column published Dec. 31, disclosed what he said were the top-secret orders to the Enterprise's task force. The alleged orders said:

"Situation U.S. citizens may have to be evacuated from the area affected by the present Indian-Pakistan conflict. The situation may also arise which will require the presence and utilization of a CVA [the Navy's designation for an attack aircraft carrier] to insure the protection of U.S. interests in the area.

"Mission: To form a contingency evacuation force capable of [helo] evacuation of civilians, of self-protection, and of conducting naval air and surface operations as directed by higher authority in order to support U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean area."

In his column today, Mr. Anderson published what he said were Central Intelligence Agency reports about signs that during the war the Chinese might intervene on behalf of the Pakistanis.

"The Chinese have been passing weather data for locations in Tibet and along the Sino-Indian border since 8 December," the C.I.A. was said to have reported. "The continued passing of weather data for these locations is considered unusual and may indicate some form of alert posture."

STATINTL

# Is everyone in the CIA?

By Dan Pinck

What do John Gardner, head of Common Cause; Richard Ellman, literary critic; Hugh Gregg, former governor of New Hampshire; Dong Kingman, artist; Leroy Anderson, composer; Eugene McCarthy, presidential candidate in 1968; George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO and Everett E. Hagan, head of MIT's Center for International Studies and Daniel Ellsberg's boss — have in common?

Well, they're all loyal Americans and they all share space in a remarkable reference work called "Who's Who in CIA."

For at least a decade, broad areas of American intelligence operations have been known intimately by members of the press and by leading newspaper, magazine and broadcasting executives. Some of these people were in the service of the CIA themselves. Others presumably allowed members of their staffs to cooperate with and report to the CIA.

This information does not come from The New York Times or the Columbia Broadcasting System. It does not come directly from classified documents within the CIA. It does not come from a gossip column or a late-night news show. It does not come from the Rand Corporation.

It comes from a 605-page book titled *Who's Who In CIA* and subtitled *A Biographical Reference Work of the Officers of the Civil and Military Branches of the Secret Services of the USA in 120 Countries*.

Dan Pinck is a freelance writer, teacher and education consultant who lives in Belmont. Graphic art is by Herbert Rogalski.

*Who's Who's In CIA* was published in English, in 1968, by Julius Mader, 1066 Berlin W66, Mauerstrasse 69.

In his introduction publisher Mader refers to the United States' "disposal-subversionist war" and he writes that "the intelligence service in the USA is the largest and most influential in the imperialist world" and further observes that "the intelligence service of the USA has always been the domain of the fanatical enemies of democracy and a stronghold of the anti-communists." There's no doubt where Mader's sympathies lie. In his introduction he also notes those who helped him compile the book. These include Mohamed Abdelnabi, of Beirut, Lebanon; Ambalal Bhatt, of Bombay; Fernando Gamarro of Mexico City, and Shozo Ohashi, of Yokohama. There are 3000 entries in the reference work and they range from US ambassadors, artists and museum curators to the directors of Asian and Russian research centers at leading American universities to political affairs officers, cultural affairs officers and AID controllers at various US embassies overseas to employees of The New York Times and CBS. The listing is an impressive one and even allowing for errors that even intelligence services can make, it is likely a reasonably accurate accounting of certain leading operatives and associates of the CIA.

I bought my copy of *Who's Who in CIA* in a book shop in Georgetown, in Washington, D.C. for \$4.95. The bookshop is not a subversive one; its main fare is academia, fiction and literary biographies. It was bought because of my curiosity about intelligence services in general, an interest that began when I was in the OSS in China, as the nearest American to Hong Kong. A cursory sampling of names were recognizable to me, bearing out my own personal knowledge of selected CIA operatives.

In the intervening months I read the book through, and with the publication of the Pentagon Papers, it became a lively and fascinating resource and complement to the published secret documents.

In one embassy with approximately 55 staff members, for example, the book picked out one person as the CIA operative. Since that particular name was known to me it began to give a ring of authenticity to the entire listing. When it noted certain US officials that I had met on several tours in 16 African nations as being CIA-associated, the sense of authenticity grew firmer; when it listed the name of Dan A. Mitrione, who was kidnaped and killed in Brazil several years ago and who was identified at that time as an AID official, as an operative of the CIA, it's additional evidence that the work is as legitimate (and as nefarious) as it can reasonably be.

The book lists the operatives who have served throughout the world. The German Federal Republic leads the roster with 264 operatives. Monaco and Antarctica bring up the end of the list, with one each. In between: Ghana (14); the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (99); Mexico (90); Barbados (22); Ireland (17); Nigeria (32); France (141); Uganda (8); Vietnam (133); Ethiopia (24); Chile (42); and Hong Kong (71).

The book lists operatives in newspapers and magazines, including Time, Life, Fortune, Newsweek, Sports Illustrated, US News and World Report; in a number of industrial firms, including Bankers Trust, First National City Bank, Westinghouse, RCA, NBC, CBS, Gulf Oil Corp., Standard Oil Company, Bank of America, Litton Industries, Kimberley-Clark Corporation of Canada,

# How Times Change

## (Or did the CIA shadow Dr. Kissinger, too?)

By William Worthy

*William Worthy, correspondent of The Baltimore Afro-American, was the first US newsman (1956-57) to defy the US travel ban on China. The resulting legal hassle over his passport, which was not renewed for 11 years, is recounted in "The Ballad of William Worthy" by folksinger Phil Ochs.*

A year or two after returning from China, while I was lecturing for a day at Texas Southern University, a Negro faculty member came up at the end of a seminar and identified himself to me as an economics professor.

In a voice audible to everyone, and with a broad "I know all about you" grin on his face, he said:

"You know, Mr. Worthy, when you were in China, I was working on the CIA's China desk in Washington. Every morning, we used to receive a top-secret report of your movements in China the day before."

Presumably, CIA operatives still function inside China—possibly in the two-payrolls role that Khrushchev once joked about with CIA Director Allan Dulles.

"Oh, I know you," Khrushchev kidded when they were introduced at a Washington reception.

"We read the same reports from the same agents. Why don't we get together and pay those fellows just one combined salary?"

So I can't help but wonder if the more proficient of them got wind of Dr. Kissinger's presence in Peking

and filed hourly reports to the top-level computers in Washington. The speculation isn't entirely far-fetched. After all, however politically primitive, US spies are efficient in fact-finding, and Lyndon Johnson did suspect that the CIA tapped his White House phones.

The day after Mr. Nixon announced his Peking travel plans, NBC News contacted Chinese authorities about the possibility of satellite television coverage. How different this journalistic initiative from the time when I was there. In the 1950s, the mass media consistently played footsie with the Washington myth-makers about the non-existence or the "imminent collapse" of the People's Republic of China. (Ditto revolutionary Cuba not long afterwards.) The gospel according to Secretary Dulles was that any journalistic visits would "lend respectability" to what he decreed to be a tottering, outlawed regime.

Under this stern edict, CBS News, which in its 1955 "Report to Stockholders" had cited me for having made the first broadcast from Moscow in eight cold-war years, adamantly refused to let me take along to China any of their cameras or tape recorders. This was to protect the network from any official charge of "collusion" in my going. But the understanding was that, if I could borrow someone else's equipment and ship back film and tapes, they would be used on the air. They were, despite some crushing pressures from Foster

Dulles.

Twice from Peking and once from Shanghai I was also able to broadcast for CBS. The first voicecast was, of course, a journalistic scoop, and the cablegram from the New York news desk several hours later expressed professional delight. The signal to Oakland had been clear, the content satisfactory. But there was one problem. Not being attuned to the State Department "non-recognition" nonsense, I had used "Peking" in the broadcast, instead of the old Kuomintang name for China's capital.

Thus the punch-line suggestion. In future voicecasts the news desk would prefer "Peiping—pronounced B-A-Y-P-I-N-G".

If acted upon, the suggestion would have been totally self-defeating, and I hadn't the slightest intention of heeding it. Justifiably, the Chinese would have been offended, and studios for future broadcasts would not have been made available. Knowing that David Chipp, the Reuters correspondent in Peking, would be both amused by and scornful of this typical American childishness, I let him read the cable.

"I'll tell you what you should do, Bill," he said. "On your next broadcast, when you reach the return cue, just say: 'This is Bill Worthy in Peiping. Now back to CBS News in New Amsterdam.'"

To be fair, the bad case of media jitters was not wholly self-induced. From Foggy Bottom, Mr. Dulles was behaving like the nation's foreign as-

19 DEC 1971

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# Secret Service Problem— How To Protect Nixon in China

by Fred Blumenthal

WASHINGTON, D.C.

The most elaborate security precautions ever devised for a Chief of State will surround President Nixon when he arrives in Peking for his historic meeting with the mainland Chinese leaders.

And this may come as something of a surprise to many Americans: the United States Secret Service, traditional guardian of the President's safety, is leaning heavily on its Communist Chinese counterpart to make certain that Mr. Nixon's visit, however sensational its diplomatic implications may be, is absolutely uneventful from the standpoint of his personal security.

"No matter how you slice it," a top U.S. security official told PARADE, "we must depend on the host country to assume the major burden of protecting our President. And the Chinese have been cooperating magnificently."

Many of the details of the protective measures arranged between the Secret Service and Peking's security forces are wrapped in secrecy, but this much can be told:

The advance security preparations are not confined to the streets along which Mr. Nixon's party will travel through the Chinese capital or the quarters in which he will stay—they extend around the world.

Ever since the dramatic announcement of the American President's forthcoming journey burst upon the world last August, U.S. and Chinese security experts behind the scenes have been checking and cross-checking everything and everyone he is likely to come in contact with, from his drinking water to the elevator operator in his Peking guest house.

These are the key areas of security concern:

**TRANSPORTATION**—Mr. Nixon will fly from Washington to Guam aboard "The Spirit of 76" (formerly the Freedom One), piloted by Air Force veteran Col. Ralph D. Albertazzie, who already has

one Peking landing under his belt, having flown Presidential adviser Henry Kissinger to the Chinese capital last Oct. 20th. The President's 707, which has a range of 7000 miles, an 11-man crew, and room for 59 passengers, will fly from Guam to Shanghai, where it will pick up an English-speaking Chinese navigator for the final leg.

## Navigator knows

Col. Albertazzie has no qualms about the professional ability of the navigator, the same officer who guided him into Peking on the Kissinger flight.

"I was delighted with him; he's an excellent navigator," the American pilot told PARADE. "And the Peking International Airport has all the necessary facilities, including electronic equipment. They have been handling Air France and Pakistani 707's on a regular basis, and they know what they're doing."

Other American aircraft will precede and follow "The Spirit of '76" into the Peking Airport, including a still-unknown number of press planes and a cargo jet carrying four White House automobiles—one of them the armored Lincoln limousine in which the President rides wherever he goes, at home or abroad.

## Gasoline tested

On the ground, the Presidential plane will be guarded around the clock by U.S. Air Force police and Chinese military detachments, as will the jet fuel for all the U.S. aircraft and the gasoline for the White House cars. The Chinese will supply a full load of 24,000 gallons of fuel for the return flight, but every drop will be tested and filtered before it goes—under guard—into the tanks. This is crucial to the President's safety in the air, but it is no slap at his Chinese hosts: the same precautions are taken every time "The Spirit of 76" takes off from Air Force bases in the United States.

**PEKING PROBLEMS**—The routes over which President Nixon will travel from the airport and to and from his various official meetings and receptions in the Chinese capital are still secret and may not be divulged until the last minute—if at all. But Secret Service agents, in cooperation with their Chinese opposite numbers, will go over the ground many, many times before his arrival to familiarize themselves with every inch of the way. Every manhole the Presidential party will pass over while driving through the streets of Peking will be inspected and the cover sealed to make sure that no one has planted an explosive device in his path (a routine Secret Service precaution taken on Presidential trips in the United States), and even the utility poles lining the streets will be examined at the very last moment, just in case someone might decide to saw three-quarters of the way through a pole with a view to toppling it into the street, thus blocking the cavalcade and "setting up" a dangerous opportunity for an attack. More routinely, Chinese security agents will keep an eye on rooftops and windows along the way.

## Elevator feared

If plans call for Mr. Nixon to enter an elevator at any time, the Secret Service wants the Chinese to check not only the mechanical equipment, but the operator, too.

"There can be nothing more hair-raising," says one veteran security agent, "than to have the President of the United States stalled in the narrow confines of an elevator, especially if the operator might turn out to be unfriendly."

During its stay in Peking, the entire American delegation, including the President, will have its own drinking water supply, not because they have reason to suspect the quality of the water, but because of the reason that all experienced travelers are wary of unfamiliar water.

STATINTL

HONOLULU, H.I. 7  
STAR-BULLETIN

DEC 15 1971  
E - 115,688  
S - 166,171

## Diplomats as Spies

Washington, with the welcome mat out for the Peking Chinese, now on American soil for the first time in over 20 years, has been somewhat taken aback to learn that the leader of the advance party is one of China's top spies.

He is Kao Liang, who with five other officials arrived in New York last Monday and paid his first visit to the United Nations Tuesday. Now our own intelligence people, presumably the CIA, have caused surprise and concern by letting it be known that Kao has had the following assignments:

Under the "cover" of being chief African correspondent for the New China News Agency, he traveled extensively through Africa in the early 1960s as Peking established itself on the continent.

He was the prime mover in the pro-Peking uprising in Zanzibar in 1964, passing out arms and money to the insurgents. When it was over, the local agent for Kao's news agency emerged as foreign minister of the new government.

Nobody should be surprised. The Russians regularly use members of their diplomatic missions as spies. One such, recently revealed by the CIA, was Vladimir Pavlichenko, director of external information of the United Nations Public Information Office. Pavlichenko, said the CIA, is a "veteran officer" of the KGB, the Soviet intelligence agency.

Furthermore, it must be presumed that our own intelligence agencies take advantage of the cloak of diplomatic immunity in foreign countries. Just about everybody else does it, so why shouldn't we?

On the other hand, there is no United Nations headquarters in China to which we could send a mission including spies. It is one more reason for establishing diplomatic relations, so we can get our intelligence people in Peking.

MIAMI, FLA.

HERALD DEC 13 1971

M - 380,828

S - 479,025

STATINT



**Jack Kofoed Says**

## *Is the Secretive CIA Worth the Expense?*

The Central Intelligence Agency has laid off 5,000 spies, and only 134,000 employees are left on the payroll. Nobody knows how much the CIA costs us, because it doesn't have to account publicly for its spending. The expenditures run into billions.

The spies, who managed to keep their methods secret for years, haven't been successful at that recently. It has been disclosed in Vietnam that torture is one of their gimmicks for obtaining information from close-mouthed people. They've ordered murder, as in the case of a double-crossing agent in Vietnam. The CIA apparently is answerable to no one, which makes it the most dangerous government agency the United States has ever known.

The intelligence beagles haven't been as successful as they'd have us believe. Pearl Harbor should have been anticipated. Douglas MacArthur scoffed at Chinese intervention in Korea two days before the Reds moved in. His G2 should not be saddled with all the blame, for the male Mata Haris of the CIA

were supposed to know.

And, what about the Bay of Pigs? There was a perfectly fouled up job, based on completely unreliable intelligence. We don't seem to be getting adequate information for the billions we're spending.



Newsweek

22 November 1971

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November 22 1971 / 50 CENTS

# Newsweek

STATINTL

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## CHINA SAID TO TELL OF LIN'S DOWNFALL

Officials Reported Informing  
Party Units Across Nation

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 16 — The United States intelligence community is receiving a growing volume of reports on special meetings throughout mainland China in which leading Communist party groups are said to be advised by top party delegates that Lin Biao "no longer holds power."

The White House has imposed a ban on public comment by American officials on political events in China. However, reliable intelligence sources in Washington privately say the reports of the Communist party briefings are the most convincing evidence so that Mr. Lin has fallen into political disfavor. It is believed that Mr. Lin has been removed as successor to Chairman Mao Tse-tung, as the second-ranking member of the party's Politburo and as Defense Minister.

The Administration is known to take the view that any public comment on Chinese internal problems may complicate President Nixon's plans to visit Peking.

**Mao and Chou Are Winners**

But intelligence specialists believe that the crisis around Mr. Lin reached its climactic point between Sept. 11 and 13. The Administration is reported to assume that Chairman Mao

and Premier Chou En-lai have won the battle against Mr. Lin and his civilian and military allies.

The judgment in Washington is that Mr. Mao and Mr. Chou are in the process of consolidating their power through a reshuffling of key army and party posts.

American specialists said, however, that wide gaps remained "in the knowledge on what has happened and may still be happening."

These specialists said that further evidence of Mr. Lin's downfall came on Monday at the United Nations when the Peking delegation made its debut. They pointed out that chief delegates for Communist countries and some of the so-called "third world" nations close to Peking pointedly omitted any mention of Mr. Lin in speeches welcoming the Chinese, although greetings were expressed to Mr. Mao and Mr. Chou. Communist diplomats said later that "word had been deceived" from the Chinese delegation that Mr. Lin's name should not be mentioned.

**Little Red Books Vanish**

American officials said that Mr. Lin's apparent elimination was being indirectly communicated to the populace in China through what diplomatic and intelligence sources described as the sudden disappearance of the little red books of Chairman Mao's thoughts from the places where they were usually kept or distributed. The booklet carries a preface by Mr. Lin.

The specialists said that it was impossible to determine whether the 64-year-old Mr. Lin, who had been ill for at least a year, was dead or alive.

"We incline to think that he is physically alive but politically dead," an expert here said.

have so far not mentioned Mr. Lin, but the experts believe that the Chinese people are being prepared for a public accusation through a series of obliquely worded articles and broadcasts.

The version of Chinese events most generally accepted by American intelligence specialists—although they admit it is highly speculative—is that Mr. Mao and Mr. Chou deliberately brought about the crisis on Sept. 11 to "smoke out" Mr. Lin and his associates.

The officials say there are unconfirmed reports that Mr. Lin's group had planned to assassinate Chairman Mao and probably Premier Chou. They then speculate that the Chairman and the Premier, on learning of the conspiracies, moved to force the military men to panic.

They note, however, that political assassination is "out of character" in China.

The view in the American intelligence community is that the September crisis was, in part, an attempt by "leftists" to regain positions they lost to Mr. Mao, the advocate of more pragmatic policies, during the Cultural Revolution.



Associated Press

INCORRECTLY PRINTED



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## Africa assassination

# Peking delegate tied to plot

By Thomas B. Ross

Sun-Times Bureau

WASHINGTON — Central Intelligence Agency documents describe a key-Chinese delegate to the United Nations as a "master

subversive" who was involved in maneuvers that led to the assassination of an African prime minister in 1963.

The documents indicate that Kao Liang, head of Peking's advance party at the UN, may have secretly outranked all Chinese offi-

cials in Africa during his service there, ostensibly as a correspondent for the New China News Agency, in the early 1960s.

The documents carry the implication that Kao may be one of the most important members of China's UN delegation even though he is listed as only a routine functionary.

"Kao Liang," one of the documents declares, "deals in disruption and chaos. . . . The tough NCNA reporter has planted the seeds of subversion on three continents and has achieved some success in dealing with both recognized diplomats and furtive malcontents."

Prior to these new disclosures, Kao was asked by NBC News in New York to comment on the original story in The Sun-Times Wednesday identifying him as "a leading Chinese intelligence agent." He replied that the report was "entirely slanderous."

The thick CIA intelligence file on Kao contains this chronology of his activities:

He took up his first foreign assignment in India in 1956.

"He did a little reporting on India but his main task was to cultivate India's Communist and left-wing journalists, to find suitable outlets for propaganda and subversive literature, and to channel funds to dissident groups (especially in sensitive border areas)."

In the spring of 1960, Kao accompanied Premier Chou En-lai on his visit to Nepal and "paid certain sums to leftist editors of Nepali publications."

In July of 1960, shortly after his return from

Nepal, the Indian government refused to extend Kao's visa, demanded the closing of the NCNA office and ordered him out of the country.

"Although the spokesman of India's Ministry of Foreign Affairs publicly accused Kao Liang only of 'tendentious and malicious' reporting, the newsman's activities were known to be regarded as serious interference in the internal affairs of the country," according to the CIA file.

Following a brief stay in China, Kao went to Geneva, Switzerland, in the spring of 1961 to represent the Peking People's Daily at the international conference on Laos.

"During the Geneva sojourn, Kao Liang entertained generously and reportedly passed along substantial funds (in Swiss francs) to friendly African contacts."

### Short stay in Mauritius

In July of 1961, Kao was assigned as NCNA's chief African correspondent with a base in Dar es Salaam, capital of Tanzania. En route he tried to enter Mauritius to make contact with its "large overseas Chinese population." Refused entry, he flew to the nearby island of Reunion and then returned to Mauritius on the next flight. This time he managed to stay overnight before being expelled a second time.

During his five-year stay in Africa, Kao was involved in coups, countercoups, mutinies, gun-running and straight-forward diplomacy in Angola, Burundi, the two Congos,

Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda and Uganda.

"He is known to have passed large sums of money to antigovernment dissidents even while attending independence day celebrations in new African capitals."

In 1964 he was judged the prime mover in the pro-Peking coup in Zanzibar, passing out money and arms to the insurgents, including Sheik Abdul Rahman Muhammed (Sheik Babu), a former NCNA stringer who emerged as foreign minister.

### Implicated as plotter

Later that year, Kao served as head of an advance party that prepared the way for the establishment of a Chinese embassy in Burundi. In 1965, Prime Minister Pierre Ngendandumwe was assassinated and Tung Chip'eng, a young defector from the Chinese embassy, implicated Kao in the maneuvering that led up to the assassination.

Burundi severed diplomatic relations with Peking and ordered the Chinese mission out of the country.

By then, Kao was established in Brazzaville in the former French Congo, teaching at an ideological training school and providing aid for the insurgency in the neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Kao returned to China at the time of the 1966 Cultural Revolution and dropped from view until his appearance Monday in New York at the head of Peking's advance party to the UN.

# RED CHINA ENVOY TABBED AS SPY

continued

# China Advance Man Called an Expert Spy

Washington, Nov. 10 (NEWS Bureau)—Kao Liang, head of Red China's advance party at the United Nations, is an espionage expert who once selected African recruits for guerrilla training at Chinese camps in Cuba, United States officials disclosed today.

These officials, revealing Kao's role as a top Chinese intelligence agent, told THE NEWS that he was active in East Africa between 1961 and 1967.

While ostensibly serving as a journalist for Peking's New China news agency, they said, Kao was a major figure in a pro-Peking coup in Zanzibar in 1964, then moved to the French Congo (Brazzaville), when he advised the government's counterespionage police and served as China's chief guerrilla recruiter for East Africa.

Kao arrived in New York Monday as head of a six-man advance party for the official Peking UN delegation scheduled to arrive tomorrow. He paid his first visit to UN headquarters yesterday.

U.S. intelligence maintains a fat file on the Chinese diplomat-journalist, who was kicked out of India in 1960 for "tendentious reporting."

Kao had arrived in New Delhi as a New China news agency correspondent four years earlier. About a year after his expulsion, he surfaced as a roving correspondent in Africa.

Soon after, Western intelligence identified him as the principal Chinese Communist espionage agent in East Africa. He was expelled from Mauritius, an island nation in the Indian Ocean off the African mainland, in 1964.

He was reportedly active in Nepal and in Switzerland, where he attended the 1961 Geneva conference in Laos. His most recent public appearance was last spring, when he accompanied the Chinese Ping-Pong team to Japan



Chiao Kuan-hua  
Used to be newsmen himself

for a tournament that led to the historic invitation for a U.S. team to visit Red China.

Sources said that Kao passed out money and arms to pro-Chinese insurgents in Zanzibar in 1964. One of them was Shick Abdul Rahman Muhammed, a New China news agency stringer who emerged as foreign minister after the coup.

While in Africa, Kao lived lavishly, maintaining a large house and car and throwing expensive parties. He left Africa in March 1967.

#### Began With New China

The Chinese news agency, like the Tass news agency, its Soviet counterpart, is considered by United States intelligence as a front for espionage activities in some countries. Red China's deputy foreign minister, Chiao Kuan-hua, who heads the official delegation to the UN, began his career as a correspondent for the agency before entering the diplomatic service.

Using the UN as a cover for espionage is not new, according to U.S. sources. Last month, American intelligence sources leaked a charge that Vladimir Pavlichenko, a director of the UN public information office, is an officer of the Soviet intelligence agency, the KGB.

American intelligence estimated that at least half the Soviet officials at the UN are KGB agents.

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# CAPITOL STUFF

By JERRY GREENE

Washington, Nov. 10—The gall of Chinese Premier Chou En-lai in shipping over a No. 1 spy as chief of Peking's UN arrangements committee has shaken American officials and could raise a sticky issue for President Nixon.

It was impossible, with the record he has established publicly around the world that the profession of Kao Liang would remain concealed very long. It was incredible to the U.S. China-watchers that Chou En-lai should pick out a well-known counterintelligence agent with better than a speaking acquaintance with guerrilla warfare to be not only the leader of the advance party but also the man designated for the important post of secretary to the first Chinese Communist UN delegation.

The Chinese Communists, as Premier Chou demonstrated for presidential adviser Henry Kissinger in his initial journey to Peking, are extremely well informed about American affairs. They follow current events in this country closely; they were able to raise a question about one erroneous figure in a speech by Nixon—and have it corrected by Kissinger.

Thus, with such an eye for the manners and customs of the U.S., Chou had to know that Americans are extremely sensitive to the business of espionage and could not be expected to react too kindly to the affair of Kao Liang.

In turn, a stiff welcome for the newly arriving Peking UN delegation would do nothing to smooth the way for the President in his planned journey to Peking in search of a beginning to "normalized" relations with the People's Republic of China. Officials here were most reluctant to discuss the case.

Of course, so far as is known, Kao Liang hasn't been engaged in any sort of wrongdoing in the couple of days he has been in New York. It is entirely possible that he has changed his trade, dropped cloak and dagger, and is these days occupied entirely in the realm of above-board diplomacy.

But there are some nastily suspicious characters on the American scene charged with unearthing spies and keeping watch over those who might enter into such operations. It is more than a safe assumption that U.S. counteragents already have gone to work.

Under law, the FBI has the responsibility for counterespionage within the U.S., and obviously has a big job in New York trying to keep track of possible illegal activities of the UN delegations from both friendly and unfriendly nations. These days, the latter category appears to be on the increase.

By rule of thumb, a rule based on experience, anywhere from 40% to 80% of a foreign diplomatic delegation can be expected to be involved in intelligence operations of one sort or another. In testimony before a House Appropriations subcommittee last June, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover quoted a Soviet defector as reporting that 70% to 80% of the Russian diplomatic households were intelligence-connected.

## It's Going to Get Cold Along the East River

It follows, then, that the FBI must have been preparing for the advent of the Communist Chinese even before Kao Liang and his advance group got here. It figures that about 25 of the more than 50 members of the Peking UN Mission would be drawing the close attention of the federal agents before winter sets in.

As a sidelight of note, the UN Mission won't be alone in its thirst for illicit information in this country. Hoover told the same House committee that for some time the Chinese Communists have been able to sneak in undercover operatives in the ranks of Chinese immigrants.

It must be recorded that neither the FBI nor the CIA nor the State Department nor the assorted intelligence agencies within the Pentagon would admit to any knowledge of Kao Liang, nor offer any comment on the definitely established word that he was well known for espionage work in addition to his labors as a foreign correspondent for the New China News Agency.

## They're All Experts in Their Fields

In private conversations, we found nothing but the highest respect among concerned U.S. government officials for the caliber and quality of the Peking UN delegation headed by Chiao Kuan-hua and Huang Hua. There will be no underestimating of the Chinese experts, many of them known to be specialists in the international field.


The Chinese intelligence system has been most active in Africa and other underdeveloped parts of the world, but despite all the global listening posts they have and their apparent full knowledge of activities in this country, the Chinese surely will find America of intense interest in their pursuit of all sorts of information.

Our spy experts are inclined to think the Peking agents will take it easy in getting started, and be thorough and careful. It is not believed that they will commit the bobbles and blunders that have come to be commonplace with their fellow Communists from Russia.

The prime fear of counterespionage people is that the potential enemy will be successful in recruiting or planting examples of the long-range sleeper agent who can be a devastating factor in terms of intelligence or sabotage, or both, 20 years later.

Kao Liang, of course, is a marked man. Some of his friends and colleagues aren't so well known—yet. But they will be, eventually. We hope, that is.

## NEXT: CHINESE SPY SHUTTLE?



Editorial cartoon appeared in Oct. 17 issue of THE NEWS.

# U.N.—What Went Wrong?

## U.S. Envoy Failure, Time Lack Cited in Postmortem

By Stanley Karnow  
and Anthony Astrachan  
Washington Post Staff Writers

**Q. Mr. Secretary, why do you think we lost?**

**A. We didn't have the votes. (Laughter)**

**Q. Seriously, I mean . . .**  
Secretary of State William Rogers' News Conference, Oct. 26, 1971

Last Monday night, the United States met a stunning diplomatic defeat as a majority of the General Assembly voted to expel Nationalist China from the United Nations and seat the Chinese Communist regime in the international organization.

The U.S. setback appeared to be devastating because so many American officials in Washington, New York and around the world had worked so hard to prevent that outcome.

Early this month, for example, Secretary of State Rogers talked with a total of 92 foreign ministers and other foreign delegates in an effort to persuade them to support the U.S. position, which favored the entry of Peking without ousting Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists. George Bush, the chief American representative at the U.N., lobbied like a Texas politician to swing votes behind the "dual representation" proposal.

Meanwhile, U.S. envoys in places as familiar as London and as exotic as the Trucial Coast were striving to sway kings, dictators, presidents, premiers and lesser foreign dignitaries into backing the American stance.

What went wrong? Or was the result of the U.N. vote really a failure for the Nixon administration?

In the post mortems that follow such historic episodes, versions of what, how and why the event unfolded inevitably differ according to the viewpoint of the participant involved. In this broad categories.

There are those, particularly inside the official U.S. foreign policy apparatus, who see it largely as a mechanical failure sustained by the bureaucracy. They contend that the day could have been saved had the United States had more time to sell its position and, among other things, had certain American ambassadors abroad performed better.

Many of these officials also argue that the administration's "dual representation" proposal was inherently contradicted by the presence of Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's national security adviser, in Peking just as Washington was urging nations to support a U.N. position virulently opposed by the Chinese Communists.

On the other side, several analysts in and out of the government express the opinion that the entire U.N. exercise was actually a charade staged by the administration for two essential motives—to fend off the President's conservative critics at home and to assure America's conservative allies abroad that the United States does not betray its friends.

Partisans of this thesis consider it significant that the President carefully refrained from deploring the adverse U.N. vote itself but instead denounced delegates who cheered the final score. Informants with access to Kissinger also now recall that he treated the U.N. issue "as if it didn't matter."

Straddling these divergent explanations, some sources point out that the choice facing the administration was never as clearcut as it seemed to be—and that, in reality, the White House preferred to shroud its strategy in ambiguity.

"From the President's perspective, there were risks and gains in either result, and he was prepared to accept both," says one of these sources. Says another, "The White House would have

won either way, since Peking had agreed to the President's visit whatever the outcome at the U.N."

In terms of energy expended for results attained, then, the real American loser at the U.N. seems to have been the State Department. Its setback appears to reinforce the prevailing Washington view that its role in foreign affairs is negligible compared to the power wielded by the President, and Kissinger.

Preparations for the General Assembly vote that occurred on Monday night reach back to the U.N. debate on China that took place nearly a year ago.

For two decades before then, the United States had systematically rejected the idea of bringing the Chinese Communists into the international organization in any shape or form. But on Nov. 12, 1970, there was a hint that the old U.S. line was shifting.

Ambassador Christopher H. Phillips, the deputy chief of the American mission to the U.N., asserted in a speech that day that the United States hoped to see Communist China "play a constructive role among the family of nations."

Phillips implied in the same speech that the United States would invoke Article 6 of the U.N. Charter to block the ouster of Nationalist China. The article stipulates that a member nation can only be expelled by a two-thirds vote.

Although it was not entirely clear at the time, the Phillips statement signalled that the United States was edging towards the "dual representation" position it would later put forth. This new approach was prompted by the 1970 vote on China.

For the first time since the U.N. struggle over Chinese representation had begun, the perennial Albanian appeal calling for Peking's entry and the expulsion of the Nationalists' car-

ried of adoption, however, because the United States had won its motion to make the issue an "important question" requiring a two-thirds margin.

The narrowness of that victory made it plain to the White House that the United States urgently needed a new policy lest it suffer a defeat in the next round on China. On Nov. 19, 1970, consequently, Kissinger sent a National Security Memorandum to Secretary Rogers requesting the creation of a special committee to review the Chinese representation issue and to recommend a fresh strategy.

Headed by Assistant Secretary of State Samuel de Palma, chief of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, the committee comprised about 15 State Department and Central Intelligence Agency specialists. Its task was to draft a paper to be sent to the National Security Council, which in turn would advise which in turn would advise

As it held its deliberations, the committee gradually became polarized between members who favored all-out support for Peking's admission to the U.N. and advocates of both Communist and Nationalist representation in the international body. Nobody believed, in short, that the Communists could be kept out.

In February, after examining a wide assortment of notions, the committee presented the White House with two principal options available.

One of these, favored by those who wanted to see only the Communists in the U.N., became known in State Department jargon as the "sink with the ship" gambit. It recommended that the administration continue to back the Nationalists exclusively—but with a full awareness that they would lose and thus open the door to Peking's entry.

OCT 22 1971

STATINTL

E - 16,317

## Washington report

'Missing' Red China officer  
now in Moscow, but why?

WASHINGTON — A strange new note has been added to the mysterious disappearance of a number of high-ranking Chinese Communist military officers.

One of the most important of this group was spotted in Moscow recently by a highly reliable source for the Central Intelligence Agency whose information has been extremely accurate in the past.

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The "missing" Chinese officer is Gen. Holung, one of China's 10 field marshals before the People's Liberation Army dispensed with ranks during the nation-shaking "Cultural Revolution."

Before his mysterious disappearance several months ago, Holung was the commander of the First Field Army, one of the five in the Chinese People's Liberation Army. It is located in the strategic northwest region of China and consists of a force of more than 350,000 military personnel.

Exactly what Gen. Holung is doing in Moscow or how he got there is still a mystery in intelligence circles here. All the CIA's source in Moscow was able to provide officials here was definite proof that the Chinese officer spotted was Holung, and that he was with a group of high-ranking Russian military officers.

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Still missing and unaccounted for are 73 other senior military Chinese officers of general rank who have been missing since the "Cultural Revolution". Among these officers is Gen. Chen-i, commander of the powerful Third Chinese Communist Field Army, which controls the East China Sea and China.

Known to be friendly to Gen. Holung and toward the

By  
Paul A.  
Scott

Press  
Writer  
Special



Soviet Union, Chen-i is believed to still be alive and also in Moscow although the CIA has not yet been able to confirm this.

Holung's unexpected appearance in Moscow could mean one of several things.

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One group of CIA experts believes Gen. Holung defected to Russia and is now working with the Kremlin for the overthrow of ailing Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese Communist Party chairman, and Lin Piao, the deputy party chairman and defense minister.

The "defector" theory is based on recent information that Russia has set up a Chinese Communist government in exile in Moscow and is now recruiting supporters of deposed head of state Liu Shao Chi to fill its ranks.

Another group within the CIA contends that Holung is on a secret mission to Moscow for the Chinese military leadership. To support this theory, they stress that there has been no official Peking announcement of a replacement for Gen. Holung as the commander of the First Field Army.

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The recent appearance in Peking of Yeh Chien-ying, an area commander under the "missing" Gen. Chen-i, has raised questions about the role that he might be playing in the Chinese Communist capital. Gen. Yeh is a close friend

of Premier Chou En-lai, according to Chinese Nationalist diplomatic sources here. The New China News Agency, official organ of the Chinese Communist government, described Yeh as now being a member of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo and as vice chairman of the Central Military Affairs Commission.

His emergency in Peking, coinciding as it does with the continued "disappearance" of Marshal Lin Piao, the designated heir of Mao, has increased speculation here that he was summoned to the Chinese capital to represent the military in the talks now under way with Dr. Henry Kissinger, the President's chief foreign policy adviser.

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Before departing for Peking, Kissinger was given a CIA briefing on the background of Gen. Yeh and his rising importance within the Chinese military leadership and his close relationship with Chou En-lai.

CIA Director Richard Helms also asked Kissinger to determine, if possible, whether the President's proposed visit had anything to do with the political power struggle now under way in Peking.

The request was the result of a British intelligence estimate passed on the the CIA that the Nixon trip had acted as a catalyst among the leaders of the Peking regime, upsetting the political equilibrium of the government by splitting the military men, who now dominate the power structure, into two camps.

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One group of military men, according to the British, want to go along with the orderly management of China's

economy and bureaucracy, and use Chou's brand of international diplomacy to secure massive trade and aid from the U.S. The other group wants to stick with Mao and Lin Piao. They favor a strict conformity with Mao's thoughts, and the succession of Lin Piao to Mao-like leadership after Mao's death as provided for in the Communist Party Constitution of 1969.

If those supporting Mao and Lin Piao win out in the political struggle, it is the conclusion of the British intelligence estimate that the Nixon trip will be canceled. President Nixon and his intelligence advisers are hopeful Kissinger's visit to Peking will shed some new light on who is really running China.

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In briefing congressional leaders on his upcoming Moscow trip, President Nixon reported that Soviet Foreign Secretary Andrei Gromyko had suggested he visit Russia in July.

In proposing May instead, the President stated: "I told Gromyko that July would be close to the star of the 1972 presidential campaign." The Democrats hold their party's national convention in Miami in July.

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Rallies criticizing Pakistan for the situation in the Eastern part of the country are being held throughout Russia, according to the CIA. This is being taken as a sign at the White House that Russia is planning to step up its military aid to India.




18 OCT 1971

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## THE MAKING OF A NEW CHINA HAND

When he left his book-lined office at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs three years ago, Prof. Henry Alfred Kissinger was already established as one of the nation's foremost foreign-policy analysts. The author of four weighty tomes and numerous scholarly papers, he was well versed on topics ranging from the life of Metternich to the nuances of Gaullism. But although his colleagues regarded Kissinger as a geopolitical theoretician in the classic European mold, no one ever thought of him as "an old Asia hand." Nonetheless, Kissinger had had the prescience to write of the Chinese leadership as early as 1966 that "if its attitudes are modified, policy could probably be altered much more dramatically than in the more institutionalized Communist countries." And the Harvard political scientist set to work in 1968 for a President who was vitally interested in charting new American policies on China. It was against this background that Kissinger recently undertook what might be called his own cram course in Chinese affairs.

Over the past few months, he has met with such eminent China scholars as A. Doak Barnett of the Brookings Institution and Allen Whiting of the University of Michigan. In addition, he has made unpublicized trips back to Harvard for informal skull sessions with John K. Fairbank, James C. Thomson Jr. and other specialists. "At the start," confided one Asian scholar, "Henry knew very little about China in any detail, though he had a command of the big picture." But, added a colleague, "he was reasonably honest about his ignorance—unlike his predecessor, Walt Rostow, who had a completely closed mind on China." Understandably, however, Kissinger was



Wally McNamara—Newsweek

Kissinger with Holdridge, Lord, Jenkins: Cram course for the professor

less candid about the reasons for newfound interest in China. "The political things he keeps close to his chest," said one China specialist who participated in a discussion that, as it turned out, directly preceded Kissinger's secret trip to Peking last summer. "He told us nothing of his plans. He wasn't bouncing any ideas off us but instead listened to what we had to say on a variety of topics."

Sources: Some observers argue that Kissinger's lack of previous expertise on China may have been a help rather than a hindrance, enabling him to approach the problem without preconceptions. And even yet no one is quite sure what conclusions he has drawn from his Chinese studies. Experts in the State Department, Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong—all of whom have been supplying Kissinger with day-to-day details on China—have no idea what weight he gives to his various sources of information. "We have been practicing our trade as usual," said one China watcher in Hong Kong, "and we just assume that a good deal of it ends up in Kissinger's hands."

Similarly, Kissinger's personal China staff, a group of discreet men who conscientiously shun publicity, remains something of a question mark. ("I guess," says

an official of another government department, "you don't get on Kissinger's staff by babbling in public.") Two National Security Council staffers who accompanied Kissinger to Peking last July, John Holdridge and Winston Lord (an accomplished Ping Pong player), are slated to go with him again. And among the new faces added to the traveling party for this month's trip is Alfred le S. Jenkins, director of the State Department's office of Asian Communist affairs, a onetime student in China whom one Asian scholar describes as "a seasoned and able diplomat of just the sort you want along—not top-rate at eliciting information but good at perceiving what behavior is called for."

Ultimately, of course, Professor Kissinger will be graded according to what the China experts in Peking itself think of his performance. And while some Sinologists wonder whether he has mastered the nuances of Chinese political thinking or has a gut feel for negotiating with the Chinese, most expect him to pass his final exams with characteristic aplomb. "He's free of ideological hangups and he looks at reality objectively," one U.S. official summed up. "And that's going to make his dealings with the Chinese a helluva lot easier."

WASHINGTON POST  
16 OCT 1971



Stanley Karnow

# Nixon's Two-Man Policy

STATINTL

PRESIDENT NIXON'S moves in the field of foreign policy, although daring and dramatic, are having a demoralizing effect on the Washington bureaucracy.

For the President's major international initiatives are being shaped and implemented almost entirely by two men—Mr. Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger. As a consequence, several senior State Department, Central Intelligence Agency and Pentagon officials feel that they have been reduced to the role of spear-carriers.

Members of the White

House inner circle contend, however, that this state of affairs has been dictated by the extremely delicate nature of the President's gestures. As they explain it, Mr. Nixon could not have carried out such sensitive ploys as his overture to China had he brought large numbers of government apparatchiks into the act.

On the subject of China, for example, White House staffers point out that domestic and foreign opponents of the President's policy would torpedo it unless he operated with utmost security. Therefore, they submit, Mr. Nixon can only function successfully in an atmosphere of secrecy.

VIEWS FROM the outside, arguments at both ends of this question contain a measure of plausibility.

There is no doubt, as the White House maintains, that the President has been involved in high-risk diplomatic maneuvers that are constantly threatened by the danger of leaks.

In his effort to achieve a rapprochement with Peking, for instance, the President is chronically fearful of a rebuff from the Chinese Communists. Thus he is playing his cards so close to his chest that, apart from Kissinger, not even his White House aides are fully aware of his activities.

Similarly, his attempts to deal with the Soviet Union are shrouded in such secrecy that high-ranking State Department officials did not know of his planned visit to Moscow until the President announced it this week.

Defending the need for tight security, the administration singles out the example of The New York Times

article published this summer, which revealed the bargaining stance to be adopted by the U.S. delegation at the strategic arms limitation talks in Helsinki before the Russians were informed. White House insiders say that they still do not know what impact that disclosure will have on negotiations with the Kremlin.

ON THE OTHER SIDE of this debate, officials assert that the White House's exclusive approach to foreign policy planning and practice is discouraging government specialists from performing effectively.

"There is no exchange of ideas," a State Department official complains. "Making a policy recommendation is like putting a message into a bottle and throwing it out to sea. You never know whether it's been received, and after awhile you just stop trying."

Those who advance this thesis point to the Pentagon papers which, they say highlighted the extent to which Vietnam policies were being formulated without reference to experts. The lesson of the Pentagon papers, they insist, is that expertise cannot be subordinated to security.

In many ways, the gulf between the White House and the bureaucrats has been a perennial problem since the Roosevelt administration. The answer, then, may lie in a re-examination and reform of a system that does not always utilize the best available talent in Washington.

Until then however, government officials are likely to continue grumbling and yearning for a chance to participate in the foreign policy game that, even they admit, is being played by the President in dazzling fashion.



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NEWS  
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## IN SAN FRANCISCO

# Soviet Spy Heads Consulate

By Paul Scott

Washington

THE KREMLIN has assigned one of its top espionage agents to run the new Soviet consulate scheduled to be opened later this month in San Francisco.

The consul general designate is Alexander Zinchuk, formerly deputy chief of the American section of the Soviet foreign ministry, and a high-ranking member of the KGB, the Russian secret espionage and intelligence agency.



Scott

Zinchuk and a staff of six, all associated with the KGB, already are in the U.S. and are preparing for the opening of Russia's new consulate in San Francisco. His residence and the consulate building are located on Pacific Heights, and, in accord with diplomatic reciprocity, will be occupied when the American consulate facilities are ready in Leningrad.

ESTABLISHMENT OF the Soviet consulate in San Francisco has been in the works for several years. A Soviet-American convention setting a legal framework for consular activities was concluded in 1964. The ratification and implementation of the agreement were delayed for several reasons ranging from Russia's invasion of Czechoslovakia to the Vietnam war.

Because of the British government's

recent expose of massive Soviet espionage operations in London, American security officials have sent an alert to top State Department officials concerning Zinchuk's extensive KGB background. The security warning covering Zinchuk points out that the Soviet spy-diplomat, because of his former position as deputy chief of the American section of the Soviet foreign ministry, would be personally acquainted with all of the Kremlin's espionage operations in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico.

Zinchuk's knowledge of Russian espionage in the U.S., it is stressed, would include the names and the location of all the "deep cover" agents including those operating with Soviet bloc personnel at the United Nations.

SINCE THE NEW Russian consulate will have jurisdiction over the states of California, Washington, Oregon, Hawaii, and Alaska, Federal authorities in those states also have received warnings about Zinchuk and his connections with the KGB.

In a move to bar Soviet espionage agents ousted from Great Britain from being assigned to the Russian consulate, American security officials have asked the State Department to refuse to grant these Soviet diplomats visas. So far, the State Department has taken no action on the request.

In contrast to Zinchuk's assignment to San Francisco, the State Department has designated Culver Gleysteen, a career State Department officer who was previously with the U.S. Arms and Control and Disarmament Agency,

as the American consul general in Leningrad. As one government security official sized up the exchange: "The Russians sent one of their top espionage agents to handle their new consulate in San Francisco. In return, we sent one of our experts in disarmament to represent us in Leningrad. The assignments clearly represent the type of thinking that is now going on at the top levels of both governments."

The man to watch in the power struggle now going on inside Communist China is Gen. Huang Yung-sheng, chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army.

As the day to day operational boss of the Chinese Communists' huge military force, Gen. Huang Yung-sheng is now considered to be one of the most powerful men in China. He is now considered by American intelligence authorities as the likely successor to the ailing defense minister, Lin Biao, Mao's designated heir.

LISTED AS FOURTH in the Maoist hierarchy by the Central Intelligence Agency, Gen. Huang Yung-sheng is the only top leader who is young enough (late 50s) to have a chance to last for more than a few more years.

As for the new thaw in U.S.-China relations, no one here knows exactly where Gen. Huang Yung-sheng stands. He is pictured as a loyal follower of Mao Tse-tung although he is known to have a number of friends among the military leadership within the Soviet Union.

News-Intelligence Syndicate

11 OCT 1971

# The Word of Chou En-lai

By ALLEN WHITING

ANN ARBOR, Mich.—It is impossible to conceive of Chou En-lai reversing all of his Government's long-standing, explicit opposition against any form of "dual representation" in the United Nations, yet that is precisely what Secretary Rogers continues to see as a distinct possibility.

Perhaps the sudden willingness to abandon the traditional stereotype of "Chinese face" as a constraint on behavior stems from our own experiences with duplicity and cynical expediency in Government officials. Certainly U.S. policy on Chinese representation in the U.N. has tortuously twisted legal and political logic in repeated reversals over the last 22 years. But to assume from this that a similar opportunism exists in Peking is to misjudge Chou's personal and political position.

Within China, Chou's credibility rating is exceptionally high precisely among those Chinese who have had to calculate the reliability of his word. During the "blossoming and contending" campaign of 1955-57, Chou's personal assurances that the invitation to criticism was not a trap persuaded seasoned intellectual and political figures to voice their views.

Many subsequently suffered in the

"antirightist" reaction. Interestingly enough, however, Chou's personal esteem survived, as dramatically demonstrated by his unique ability to mediate among fiercely contending factions during the Cultural Revolution violence of 1967-68.

Outside of China, Chou's words are the quintessence of Chinese policy as experienced by the many governments and statesmen with whom he has dealt over his years both as Premier and Foreign Minister of the People's Republic. It was confidence in this factor which permitted the U.S. Government to predict the first Chinese nuclear test. On Sept. 26, 1964, we learned that Chou had informed a foreign chief of state that China planned to explode its first atom bomb on Oct. 1. Neither the Atomic Energy Commission nor the Central Intelligence Agency estimated Peking to have the technical capacity to detonate at that time. However, Secretary Rusk was willing, on his own, to accept the reliability of Chou's word and predicted the test at his press conference Sept. 30. When no test occurred the next day, State was chided for having overstepped its bureaucratic bounds. After the test occurred on Oct. 16, delay apparently stemming from problems at the Lop Nor site, C.I.A. director John McCone

was quick to claim credit for "the intelligence community" in forecasting the event. While that "community" produced a wide range of valuable evidence, it was the estimate by political analysis of Chou's stake in credibility which accurately predicted China's entry into the nuclear club.

Obviously it would be fatuous to take every official Chinese statement as an irreversible, literal commitment to one particular course of policy. Flexibility and bargaining are manifest in much of Peking's declaratory and negotiatory behavior. Chou En-lai is deliberately evasive when he chooses to be, as in his reply to a question concerning the genuineness of China's alleged desire to see a total rupture of U.S.-Japanese military relations, with all that this might imply for the future of Japanese military developments.

However, there is no equivocation in his statements, "Should a state of two Chinas or one China, one Taiwan appear in the U.N., or a similar absurd state of affairs take place in the U.N. designed to separate Taiwan from China to create a so-called independent Taiwan, we will firmly oppose it and, under those circumstances, we will absolutely not go into the U.N."

At stake is nothing less than self-esteem, both individual and collective. In Chou's words, "We will not barter away principles." Peking will not accommodate an expelled and defeated civil-war government in exile, in order to win the legitimate right of representing China in the symbolic assemblage of the world community. Moreover Chou's political position in Peking as well as Peking's relationships with Tirana, Hanoi, Pyongyang, Washington and Moscow preclude compromise on this point.

The alternatives are clear: Either the People's Republic is seated as the sole successor to the Government which ruled China from the founding of the U.N. in 1945 to its loss of the mainland in 1949, or there will be no participation by the People's Republic in any United Nations body. However the United States chooses to extricate its prestige from the prospects of defeat raised by last year's majority vote to support the Albanian resolution, no other government should entertain the slightest doubt as to the consequences of following Washington and ignoring Peking.

Allen Whiting was State Department official from 1962-1966, and is chairman, Citizens Committee to Change U.S. China Policy.

AUGUSTA, ME.  
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M - 15,952

## *Something's cooking in China*

Something is going on in Communist China, and experts in the Red camp as well as in the western nations are trying to figure out what it is.

Military and civilian air traffic has been suspended for the past week, and the big National Day parade set for Oct. 1, an event which requires months of preparation, has been called off.

The Russians have been careful not to speculate on the meaning of these events, but authorities in other nations behind the Iron Curtain are guessing that there is political turmoil behind the scenes, probably revolving about Chairman Mao Tsetung and his designated successor, Lin Piao.

Mao is 77, and Lin is in his sixties. The health of both is uncertain, and if both are in danger of dying, or even of becoming incapacitated, there would probably be a struggle to see which of the other leaders would assume power.

The number three man is Premier

Chou En-lai, generally assumed to be moderate in his attitude toward the West. There is some speculation that if Mao and Lin are fading from the picture, dedicated foes of this country may try to block Chou from becoming chairman of the Chinese Communist party, and at the same time withdraw the invitation to President Richard Nixon to visit Peking.

There is, of course, the possibility that relations with Russia along the lengthy Siberian border have worsened, and that the strange moves made in the past few days are all of a security nature.

It is frustrating when drastic changes seem to be taking place in the largest country in the world, and all we can do is guess what they are. This is a situation readymade for the CIA, but if it knows anything it isn't revealing it, except at the highest governmental levels. ✓

OCTOBER 1971

# The Making of America's China Policy

by David Horowitz

STATINTL

IT WAS A FRUSTRATING DAY for James Reston, vice-president of the *New York Times* and minister without portfolio for America's journalistic mandarinat. Landing in Peking on July 12 with the thought of perhaps claiming new diplomatic territory as well as scoring a journalistic coup, he was told by the head of the information service of China's foreign ministry that Henry Kissinger had just left Peking and, it would shortly be announced, President Nixon would visit the People's Republic of China next spring. It was at this moment ("or so it now seems," Reston later wrote) that he experienced the first stab of pain in his side that would land him in the hospital for an emergency appendectomy the next day.

Before leaving New York, Reston had received a letter from Dr. Oliver McCoy, president of the China Medical Board, an institution John D. Rockefeller had created to run the medical college he had built there in 1916 and which was nationalized by the Communist government thirty-five years later. Dr. McCoy told Reston that if he should happen to notice a "large group of buildings with green tiled roofs not far from the southeast corner to inquire what those were." The old medical college had now become the Anti-Imperialist hospital, and it was in this unlikely setting that Reston had the consolation of at least being the first member of the American establishment to receive acupuncture treatments in the new China.

If such ironies dogged Reston's trip, they were also present in the larger drama that had been played out two days earlier amidst sumptuous 17-course dinners. For Henry Kissinger—the man who masterminded Nixon's new diplomacy in China and scooped James Reston—had once been the foreign policy advisor of the President's arch-rival for control of the Republican Party, Nelson Rockefeller. He was a strange *alter ego* to bear the tidings of American "friendship" which was being offered after twenty years of unrelenting official hostility by President Richard Nixon. And Richard Nixon was himself an unlikely president to be

making the offer. For this was the man who, in the words of Reston's *Times*, had "led the political clamor of the China lobby to ostracize the Chinese Communists from the community of 'peace-loving' nations" two decades ago and had earned spurs in the McCarthy purges by baiting the China experts who were then urging no greater accommodation to the revolutionary government than that for which Kissinger's secret mission had now set the stage.

These unexpected juxtapositions and ironic turns at the surface of policy are no mere coincidences. By their very incongruity, they suggest the presence of deeper continuities underlying Nixon's new approach toward the mainland. For despite sharp tactical lurches and even unforeseen veerings off course, there are few areas where the significant patterns of policy and personnel have been more stable in their way than in the field of China affairs. Nixon's new gesture, which looks almost impulsive and shrewdly tied to such political events as the 1972 election, has in fact been a bipartisan strategic planning assumption for a long time now among those who have always determined America's posture toward China. The *Times* itself pinpoints 1966 as the moment when Nixon realized that "no future American policy in Asia could succeed unless it came 'urgently to grips with the reality of China.'" All that was left to the White House quarterback was to choose the right political moment: "And just as his popularity at home dipped to a new low, with the Vietnam controversy swirling anew all around him and the North Vietnamese pressing for a quick and final deal to drive him out of Saigon before the end of 1971, Mr. Nixon lobbed the long one."

## [CHINA AND THE AMERICAN EMPIRE]

SINCE THE CLOSING OF THE CONTINENTAL frontier at the end of the 19th century, China has occupied a special place in the self-conception of an American world role. Many historians have even designated America's subsequent global expansion as the pursuit

# Some Reports Still Undenied by China

By HENRY S. BRADSHAW  
Star Staff Writer

**HONG KONG** -- The government of China was functioning more or less normally today while a cloud of questions remained over the political situation in Peking.

The questions troubled observers from here to the White House, but there were no public answers.

Instead there were denials of some of the speculations which floated around last week at the onset of the obvious abnormality in China.

The Soviet Union denied that it was causing trouble on the Chinese border, reports from Taiwan denied that the Nationalists were up to anything, various people denied that Mao Tse-tung was sick, and Dr. Paul Dudley White denied he knew anything about it.

## Political Struggle

But some things remained un-  
denied, such as the fact of a political struggle or some important political change in China.

Also undenied were reports that Mao's deputy and heir, Lin Biao, who is defense minister, was seriously ill. And top military men remained out of sight.

But the rest of Premier Chou En-Lai's government was in business. The indefatigable premier himself was seeing visitors as usual.

He even saw an Iranian state television team most unusually, "in the small hours" of yesterday, the New China News Agency reported.

The government agency today distributed a report that Deputy Premier and Finance Minister Li Hsien-nien had yesterday in Hanoi signed "the 1972 agreement on China's economic, military and material assistance to Vietnam." As usual, no details of the agreement were given.

Li's visit was accompanied by the usual warm phrases about the closeness of the two countries.

## Worry in Hanoi

Hanoi has been worried lately that the Sino-American rapprochement, epitomized by the planned visit of President Nixon to Peking, might signify an end to support of the North Vietnamese military effort throughout Indochina.

But Li reiterated that China would continue to supply material and moral support for the Indochinese Communists to do their own fighting.

The Nixon visit made American observers of the situation in Peking especially eager to figure out what is going on there.

Analyses of the abnormality were known to be flowing regularly from the U.S. Consulate here, and from the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency in Washington, to the White House.

The basic question for Nixon is whether changes taking place in the Chinese leadership would affect his visit or the ability of China to work out problems with the United States this remained unanswered.

The denials apparently eliminated some possibilities, but only some.

The Soviet Union got angry over the weekend about a Japanese news agency report from Peking last week which blamed the trouble on Soviet border provocations. Moscow radio accused Peking of whipping up a Soviet scare to cover Chinese internal problems.

Then Peking radio, in an indirect reference which seemed to apply to the present situation, criticized "rumor-mongering and fabrication" in journalism.

## Chinese Press Silent

It referred to domestic journalism. The Chinese press has been silent on the current situation, however, not even reporting the cancellation of Friday's traditional National Day parade in Peking.

It was that cancellation which focused attention on unusual events in Peking that began about Sept. 11.

From both Communist and Nationalist sides of the Taiwan Strait came denials of rumors that one of the two Chinas was preparing to invade the other.

Observers in Hong Kong found no substantiation for an American television report last week that special warnings were being sent out for Chinese Communists to prepare for war.

One of the most intriguing denials came from the Hong Kong bureau of the New China News Agency. It is, in fact but not in diplomatic law, the consulate of Peking in this British colony.

Yesterday a number of diplomats and others received printed notices that the agency's National Day reception, to which they had been invited, had been canceled. With the Peking parade canceled, that seemed unsurprising.

But when some persons called the agency to check, they were told the reception was on. It seemed that someone had tried to play a trick on the Communists.

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Thai voters at an election rally: In a volatile area, a new sense of self-assurance

Newsweek

## Asia: How Stand the Dominoes?

So far as outside observers can tell, President Nixon hasn't even set the precise date for his planned visit to Peking. But the very fact that an American President is actively seeking a détente with the rulers of Communist China has wrought fundamental changes in the power balance of Asia. "The Nixon visit," says a Western diplomat there, "means that we are seeing the removal of rigid lines between non-Communists and Communists, between the goodies and the baddies." And with the possible exception of the principals involved—the Americans and the Chinese—no one will be so profoundly and directly affected by this development as the nations of East and Southeast Asia.

All ten of Southeast Asia's countries live in China's shadow. Three of them—North Vietnam, Laos and Burma—have borders with China. Two of them—Singapore and Malaysia—have huge

populations of Chinese descent. Most of the countries have Maoist guerrilla movements, and four—North and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia—are directly positioned in Southeast Asia's war zone. Except for North Vietnam, all have lived directly or tacitly under the American umbrella. And now that this protective umbrella is being at least partially withdrawn, all of them are faced with major political readjustments.

Newsweek's Hong Kong bureau chief Maynard Parker last week completed an extensive tour of all the Southeast Asian lands outside the Indochina peninsula. In the first of the two following articles, he reports on how these countries are adjusting to the new realities. In a companion piece, former U.S. Under Secretary of State George W. Ball discusses the larger implications of the changing U.S. policy in Asia and the special impact of Mr. Nixon's China initiative on Japan.

By Maynard Parker

When I first came to Asia in 1964, Bangkok was a sleepy city with muddy klongs (canals), samlores (motorized rickshas) and women who dressed in sarongs and slumped make-up. Now, just seven years later, the capital of Thailand has been transformed into a flashy, Oriental version of Los Angeles. Many of the klongs are long gone, having been filled in for city streets on which brightly painted Japanese-made cars (replacements for the samlores) are caught in perpetual traffic jams. And Thai women have exchanged their sarongs for miniskirts and lipstick. With certain exceptions and a few variations, the story is much the same throughout the cities of Southeast Asia. An unprecedented prosperity has swept over the region and with it has come a new sense of national resilience and self-assurance that may well usher in the most stable decade that Southeast Asia has expe-

rienced since the end of World War II.

This development comes as an eye-opener because, during the height of the Vietnamese war, these same countries were often described by U.S. officials as tottering dominoes. Some people went so far as to regard them as prime candidates for Communist conquest—whether from within or without. And currently, with the winding down of the American presence in Vietnam, it might be expected that the dominoes would be shaking nervously, if not already toppling, at the prospect of Uncle Sam's imminent leave-taking. Yet, my overriding impression after talking with scores of government leaders, diplomats, scholars and businessmen in this area was the almost total absence of panic. Not that anyone suggested that all of Southeast Asia's problems have vanished. But there is a surprising sense of confidence that these nations have reached a stage at which they can cope with their problems—and largely on their own.

One reason for the new optimism is the changing style of leadership in Southeast Asia. The flamboyant, super-nationalistic leaders of the past have mostly given way to more realistic technocrats dedicated to raising the material standards of their people. If the symbol of the old days was mercurial President Sukarno, the symbol of the new might be the colorless yet methodical General Suharto who replaced Sukarno as the leader of Indonesia. In short, political rhetoric has less appeal than solid economic performance. "Southeast Asia today is a highly secular, acquisitive, consumerist culture," explained Thomas Koh, the young dean of Singapore University's law school. "Everyone wants a new minicar and an air conditioner for his bungalow. They read the news of China with interest, but they don't want any part of it."

Now that prosperity has undercut the appeal of revolutionary Maoism, some Southeast Asians take an almost sanguine

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continued

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## The Spy Business

Soviet spokesmen have predictably insisted that the members of the alleged spy ring broken up by the British were all scholars and gentlemen now being outrageously maligned. But there is nothing spectacular about the news that Russian espionage continues—along with similar activity by every major and even minor power. Not long ago columnist Jack Anderson reported that our CIA has remarkable access to knowledge about the private lives of Chinese Communist leaders.

Unfortunately the timing of the highly advertised British crackdown lends a certain plausibility to the charge that the uproar is designed to under-

mine West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's important moves toward détente. The solemn American overreaction to the British headlines fans those suspicions.

Cynics may also note that the exposure occurred at a moment when Britain's Conservative government was falling fast in the opinion polls and needed diversionary excitement to stimulate a rallying round the flag. The next chapter, it may be assumed, will be Soviet retaliation against British scholars and gentlemen who moonlight in espionage. The only thing really clear is that the road to reason is crowded with booby traps—and boobism.



STATINTL

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

# CIA Eavesdrops on Kremlin Chiefs

By Jack Anderson

The Central Intelligence Agency has been eavesdropping, incredibly, on the most private conversations of Kremlin and other world leaders.

For obvious security reasons, we can't give a clue as to how it's done. But we can state categorically that, for years, the CIA has been able to listen to the kinglypins of the Kremlin banter, bicker and backbite among themselves.

A competent source, with access to the transcripts of the private Kremlin conversations, tells us that the Soviet leaders gossip about one another and complain about their ailments like old maids.

It is evident from the conversations that Leonid Brezhnev, the party chief, sometimes drinks too much vodka and suffers from hangovers. Premier Kosygin, however, is in poor health, and his complaints are more authentic.

One of their favorite pastimes is visiting a private clinic to get their aches soothed. Like fat capitalists at the end of a hard day in their plush suites, the Kremlin chiefs stop by for steam baths, rubdowns and other physical therapy.

Brezhnev, in a typical conversation, might grump about

his back pains and announce he's going to have Olga give him a massage. "Olga Oh ho!" President Nikolai Podgorny might chortle, as if he is quite familiar with the masseuse.

## Mao Close Up

Like the Kremlin crowd, the Red Chinese leaders are far less forbidding in private than they appear to the world. The mighty Mao Tse-tung, his appointed successor Lin Biao and Premier Chou En-lai are tired, old revolutionaries slowed down by the ravages of age.

Mao shares Brezhnev's taste for good food, strong drink and a woman's touch. But he is less grumpy and grim than the Soviet leader. There's an avuncular affability about Mao, and he has an infectious laugh.

But at 77, he walks slowly, though erectly, with his left arm dangling strangely. The CIA concluded from a careful study of film shots that Mao's eyes are dim from age. He seems unable to recognize old comrades until they are face to face.

The CIA has also caught the old fox using a finger to stand in for him at long, dreary public parades. But it was the real Mao who made that publicized plunge in the Yangtze a couple years ago. The picture

of his moon face bobbing above the waves was carefully scrutinized by the CIA, which concluded after measuring his ears and other facial features that the swimmer was no dog-bile.

Pictures of world leaders routinely are blown up and studied by CIA doctors for clues to their health. Their behavior is also analyzed by CIA psychiatrists and psychologists.

Footnote: One of the CIA's greatest triumphs, heretofore untold, was fishing out some of the late Premier Nikita Khrushchev's excrement before it was flushed down the toilet. The great bathroom caper was pulled during his 1959 state visit to the U.S. The filched feces was eagerly analyzed by CIA medics who concluded that Khrushchev then was in excellent health for a man of his age and rotundity.

## Strong-Arm Tactics

One of the most notorious regimes in the American labor movement may be near its end.

Pete Weber, the strongman, \$136,000 a-year boss of the Operating Engineers in New Jersey, has gone to jail for extortion. His brother Ed, who ran for his job, has been beaten by Larry Cahill, an honest, veteran union man.

But there is life in the old Weber machine yet. Cahill's supporters were subjected to bullyboy tactics to coerce them going along with Ed Weber.

Cars with Cahill bumper stickers had their tires slashed and windows broken. Three Cahill men were beaten up. Others were laid off work by pro-Weber union foremen. Even the ballots were deceptively designed so that Cahill supporters would mark their ballots for Ed Weber.

Nevertheless, the challenger squeaked home by 135 votes. The count is official and final under the union constitution. But the Weber men are now trying to arrange a "recount". It would be carried out of course, by pro-Weber incumbent officers.

The man who could stop all this is the Engineer's international union President Hunter Wharton. Reached by telephone while eating lunch at La Chatelaine, a swanky Washington restaurant, Wharton made it clear he is still unwilling to back the Weber crowd.

He claimed he had no official knowledge of Cahill's upset win. "We're not doing anything either way," he said. "We're not in the middle of it one way or another."

B.J. McClure Syndicate



CONFIDENTIAL

# THE ASIA LETTER

AN AUTHORITYATIVE ANALYSIS OF ASIAN AFFAIRS

Published by THE ASIA LETTER Co. Tokyo Hong Kong Washington Los Angeles

10 August 1971

Dear Sir:

THE C.I.A. IN ASIA (III): MODUS OPERANDI (Part 1). Every Friday, at precisely 8:30 A.M., a clean-cut young American assigned to the Combined Studies Group in Saigon leaves the American Embassy and drives to a rendezvous house on Saigon's Tran Hung Dao Street.

There, he picks up a briefcase and a Vietnamese accomplice and begins a drive to Tay Ninh, located northwest of Saigon near the Cambodian border.

Inside the briefcase are bundles of Vietnamese piasters, U.S. dollars and Cambodian riels.

The man carrying the briefcase is a C.I.A. "bag man". The money is the payoff for local agents and tipsters who keep tabs on Communist activities and movements in the important area of eastern Cambodia, southern Laos and the western border of Vietnam.

He is one of a dozen or more C.I.A. "bag men" who make regular trips to various parts of South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos to pay for the services of agents and informants.

The "bag man" never sees what a businessman would call the "end user"--- the men who get the money. He merely turns it over to the C.I.A.'s "control man" in the area. Sometimes he picks up data to take back to the higher-up agents where he works. But more often than not he returns empty-handed.

The "bag man" duty usually goes to junior C.I.A. men in the Indo-China area. It is a colorless, unstimulating assignment that usually leads to frustration and sometimes to resignations.

One day last February, a Chinese cargo junk from Canton sailed down the Pearl River, through the river estuary and tied up alongside Hong Kong's Western waterfront.

It was one of many that made the same trip the same day to the western waterfront of Hong Kong Island and to the waterfront along Macao's ancient Rua das Lorches.

The river junks, which ply between Hong Kong, Macao and Canton daily, carry very ordinary cargo ranging from vegetables to joss sticks.

But the cargo of cabbages carried by that junk last February was no ordinary cargo. Stuffed inside one of the innocent-looking Chinese cabbages was a report giving up-to-date information on China's missile program.

It came from a C.I.A. informant inside China and went through a half dozen intermediaries in Hong Kong before it ended up in the hands of a high-ranking agent, who forwarded it on to Langley, Virginia, for study and analysis.

The C.I.A. frequently receives reports and messages from its agents and informants in China by this method. And it often sends in messages or instructions through the same channels.

The best example of just how effective these channels are came during China's Cultural Revolution (1966-69), which threw the country into turmoil. In addition to a flood of Red Guard documents giving a very accurate picture of the turmoil, the C.I.A. also received hundreds---perhaps thousands---of very valuable documents pilfered during some of the Red Guard rampages against

## U.S. SPY FLIGHTS OVER CHINA ENDED TO AVOID INCIDENT

Missions Suspended to Bar  
Interference With Nixon  
Trip, Officials Assert

U-2 DOWNING RECALLED

Reconnaissance Satellites,  
Termed Not Provocative,  
to Continue Surveillance

By WILLIAM BEECHER  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 28—Administration officials said today that the United States had suspended flights over Communist China by manned SR-71 spy planes and unmanned reconnaissance drones to avoid any incident that might interfere with President Nixon's forthcoming visit to Peking.

But, it was reported, American reconnaissance satellites will continue missions over China. Such missions are considered relatively unprovocative since they are well above the airspace of China.

In 1960, it was recalled, a planned conference between President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev was called off by the Soviet Union after an American U-2 spy plane had been shot down over Soviet territory.

U-2 planes are flown over the Chinese mainland by Chinese Nationalists from Taiwan, an official informant said "the mainland Chinese have good enough radar to distinguish between an overflight by the kind of aircraft we possess and the kind flown by the Chinese Nationalists."

Political Reasons Override  
Informants said the political reasons for the decision to halt American flights were regarded

as much more compelling than continued intelligence from an occasional SR-71 or drone mission. Some sources also noted that the suspension conceivably might be lifted after President Nixon's visit to China, although a similar suspension of flights over the Soviet Union, instituted after the 1960 U-2 incident, remains in effect.

White House officials, in reporting July 16 on Henry A. Kissinger's conversations in Peking with Premier Chou En-lai about the Nixon visit, expressed confidence that neither nation "will knowingly do something that would undermine the prospects of something that it took so long to prepare and that it took such painful decisions to reach."

Satellites Play Key Role

Although officials were reluctant to discuss the specifics of American intelligence-gathering activities in relation to China, the following details have been pieced together from well-informed sources:

The bulk of photographic reconnaissance is done by spy satellites operating at altitudes of about 100 miles. Photos taken from that altitude would allow analysts to determine, say, the type of aircraft sitting on a field but not to read its wing markings or discern details of armament.

If a new type of aircraft was spotted by a satellite, intelligence officials could call for an SR-71 mission to get clearer, more detailed pictures. Cameras carried by the SR-71, which flies at an altitude of about 80,000 feet, reportedly can capture small details.

According to the informants, a handful of SR-71, operated by the Air Force, normally fly from Okinawa. There are additional SR-71's in the Far East, they say, flown by civilian pilots under contract to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Because of its high altitude and great speed—more than 2,000 miles an hour—the SR-71 is not believed vulnerable either to Chinese surface-to-air missiles or interceptor aircraft. It can provide photographic coverage of about 60,000 square miles in an hour.

The U-2, by contrast, has a maximum altitude of roughly 70,000 feet and a top speed of about 500 miles an hour.

The drone, the Ryan Firebee, is also used for some reconnaissance missions. Typically a C-130 "mother ship" carries two drones to a point outside the defenses of mainland China, where it launches them. They fly a predetermined course and return to a safe point over water where they are parachuted down and recovered.

Peking has publicly protested nearly 500 incursions of its airspace by United States aircraft.

The United States also uses SR-71's and drones over North Vietnam and North Korea. Besides cameras, the SR-71's also carry equipment to monitor and record radar and radio transmissions.

STATINTL



MAELHANN MEANS

## Lesson in Distortion

One of the nation's major newspapers has published a charge that President Johnson brushed aside an overture from Chinese Premier Chou En-lai in 1961 that might have resulted in a diplomatic thaw such as that now being encouraged by President Nixon.

It is a dramatic illustration of the way the truth can be distorted by those who try from the distance of time to second-guess important events on the basis of incomplete and unconfirmed information.

In fact, the opposite is true. During that period, the Johnson administration secretly made several proposals to the Chinese aimed at improving relations; all the proposals were ignored.

THE ACCOUNT of the supposed Chinese overture was written by Edward Friedman, a teacher of Chinese policy at the University of Wisconsin, and published in the Washington Post editorial section on July 18. Subsequently this columnist talked by telephone with ex-Secretary of State Dean Rusk, ex-White House national security adviser Walt Rostow, Senate Foreign Relations Committee chief counsel Carl Mares, Sen. J. William Fulbright's press secretary Hoyt Pervis, a high-ranking CIA official, and Friedman.

Friedman, in his article, stated that President Johnson was advised in 1961 that "Chou En-lai would welcome an intimate associate of the President" to discuss ways of improving relations between the U.S. and China. Friedman noted that no emissary was ever sent and concluded that "the Johnson administration did not seek normalization of relations with China."

BOTH RUSK and Rostow emphatically denied that there had ever been such a message from Chou. "It is impossible there would have been something like that and I didn't know about it or forgot it," Rusk said. "No consideration would have stopped us from responding at that time."

Rostow said that he had searched among related records in the LBJ library and could find no reference to a feeler from Chou. "We were in almost constant contact in Warsaw with the Chinese during that period," Rostow said. "Almost everytime we met, we put forth proposals, such as the exchange of journalists and scientists, the exchange of agricultural information, etc. Their response was negative -- they would be delighted to begin normalization after we pulled the Seventh Fleet out of the Taiwan Straits and after we with-

drew our 'occupation' of Taiwan."

Rostow further observed that Chinese leaders were in no mood to make up to the U.S. in 1961. "Everything seemed to be sliding Mao's way in Asia, he was about to explode a nuclear weapon, his economy was improving; China was in a mood of revived confidence in its strength and independence," Rostow said.

A CIA OFFICIAL concurred with Rusk and Rostow. "That has to be a fake," he said. "We made several overtures to the Chinese during that period and there was no response."

Friedman, queried about the article, said the incident had been told to him by Alvin Hamilton, who was then Canadian Minister of Agriculture and spending a considerable amount of time in China negotiating the sale of Canadian wheat. Hamilton, according to Friedman, told Sen. Fulbright that Chou did not understand why the U.S. "has taken so long to realize" that China has more troubles with the USSR than with the U.S. Hamilton added that Chou had said he "can't see why these things (the question of Taiwan primarily) can't be settled" and suggested the President send an emissary to negotiate, possibly Fulbright. Friedman said he did not know whether Fulbright had responded to the message or whether he had related it to President Johnson, although he had written that "Lyndon Johnson in 1961 received an offer."

HOYT PERVIS, speaking for Sen. Fulbright, said the senator did not recall that Hamilton ever claimed he had a message from Chou. Pervis said Hamilton had suggested in March, 1961, that Fulbright try to make contact with Chou and that Fulbright had encouraged Hamilton to act as a go-between to arrange it if he could. Two years later, Pervis said, Fulbright again saw Hamilton and inquired if anything had come of it. Pervis quoted Hamilton as telling Fulbright he was "still looking into it."

According to Pervis, "Fulbright regarded it as just an idea, a possibility, like lots of other ideas and possibilities. He did not view it as an overture, official or unofficial, from the Chinese and he did not report the conversation to the President or the State Department."

Pervis added Fulbright thinks "there is no basis" for Friedman's interpretation of the incident.

Hamilton was unavailable for comment, vacationing in a remote lake region of Canada.

25 JUL 1971

STATINT

# The China Experts: Watching, Waiting

*This is the first of two articles on United States relations with China and on the men who helped to form and are shaping that policy.*

By Stanley Karnow  
Washington Post Staff Writer

As President Nixon prepares for his visit to Peking in the coming months, he can rely for intelligence and analysis about China on an array of top U.S. specialists.

For over the years, despite the freeze in Sino-American relations, an impressive collection of experts has been working tirelessly in government agencies, universities and research centers to keep pace with developments in a land that seems like a vast, remote, incomprehensible blur to most Americans.

But the American experts have a vital credential—personal experience in China. As a result, some specialists concede, there is a somewhat bloodless quality in the U.S. corps of China experts. An older Foreign Service officer who served in Peking in the late 1930s says: "You can't deal with the Chinese without being sensitive to their customs and traditions, and you can only acquire that sensitivity from having been in the country."

Furthermore, the United States suffered a serious rupture in its accumulation of expertise and experience on China because of the purges of China specialists by the late Sen. Joseph McCarthy and others in the early 1950s.

Nevertheless, there is an impressive array of, both older and younger experts on China who form the reservoir of American knowledge about the Asian mainland.

Among these experts are economists familiar with labor problems in Shanghai and agronomists capable of estimating rice production in Kwangtung province,

There are U.S. specialists who can quote Chinese railroad timetables or describe the curricula in Peking high schools or, judging from their record, forecast China's nuclear tests with a fair degree of accuracy.

One American expert on Peking's military establishment has traced virtually every senior Chinese army officer back to the day he joined the Communist ranks. Another U.S. specialist, who monitors Chinese radio broadcasts, can cite from memory nearly every important Peking foreign policy statement made over the past decade.

China experts in and out of government are trying to guess who might be the first U.S. ambassador to Peking should Sino-American diplomatic relations be established.

In the opinion of several of these experts, the logical candidate for the post is Marshall Green, 54, the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs.

Formerly ambassador to Indonesia and consul general in Hong Kong, Green has long advocated a rapprochement with Peking—although, according to reliable sources, he was not involved in the secret operation to arrange the President's trip to China.

Another potential envoy to Peking, the China specialists say, is David Osborn, 50, the U.S. consul general in Hong Kong. Like Green, Osborn originally began his career as a Japan expert but has broadened his scope to include China.

There are roughly 90 China specialists working in the State Department in Washington or assigned to U.S. diplomatic missions

abroad. The Foreign Service Institute, which runs Chinese-language courses in Washington and on Taiwan, feeds three or four young officers into the system annually.

Like an archaeological site, the State Department's China contingent tends to be stratified in time layers. In many ways, an expert's outlook is likely to have been influenced by his experience during the different phases of America's China policy.

Therefore, some analysts say, the specialists who survived the period of U.S. rigidity towards Peking are inclined to be rather conservative, while many younger officials hold more liberal views.

Those in the older generation include men in their 50s like Alfred Jenkins, the head of the State Department's Bureau of Asian Communist Affairs, and Edwin W. Martin, former U.S. consul general in Hong Kong. Both had their Chinese language training in Peking before the Communists took over in 1949.

The Peking experience separates that generation from a group of younger officers, most of whom have never been inside China. Regarded as the most competent among them are Paul H. Kreisberg, deputy chief of the U.S. mission in Tanzania, and David Dean, the No. 2 man in the U.S. consulate general in Hong Kong.

Another officer in that category considered to be outstanding is William H. Gleysteen Jr., who was recently appointed deputy chief of mission in Taiwan. Born in China, Gleysteen is the son-in-law of O. Edmund Clubb, the last U.S. consul general in Peking.

The China-watcher closest to the source of power in Washington is John Holdridge, who has served on Henry Kissinger's White House staff since the summer of 1969. Along with W. Richard Smyser, a Vietnam specialist, Holdridge accompanied Kissinger on his trip to Peking two weeks ago.

A still younger group of State Department China experts includes officials like Morton Abramowitz, Wil-

liam A. Brown, Charles Hill, Burton Levin, Nicholas Platt and John J. Taylor. These officials are serving in assorted posts, some unrelated to China.

Platt, for instance, is assigned to the office of Secretary of State William P. Rogers, while Hill is a special assistant to the U.S. ambassador in Saigon, Ellsworth Bunker.

## The CIA's Experts

Unlike the State Department, which rotates its experts to other jobs to avoid their contracting what Gen. George C. Marshall used to call "localitis," the Central Intelligence Agency seems to keep its China analysts working at their specialty for years.

For that reason, coupled with the fact that it was largely shielded from Sen. McCarthy's probes in the early 1950s, the CIA is said to have the most knowledgeable team of technicians dealing with the military.

Except for a few experts like Philip Bridgman and

Charles Neuhauser, who publish analytical articles on China in academic journals, the CIA specialists mostly are unknown to the public.

But the degree of their expertise is occasionally apparent, as it was two years ago in a far-reaching study of the Chinese economy produced by the CIA for Congress. The study is regarded as a major work on the subject.

According to some sources, the CIA's attitude towards the Chinese Communists loosened up considerably after its former deputy director, Ray Cline, left for other duties. Cline, who served on Taiwan in the early 1960s, was close to Chiang Ching-kuo, the son and heir-apparent of Chinese Nationalist President Chiang Kai-shek.

Now head of the State Department's bureau of intelligence and research, Cline reportedly is slated to become assistant secretary of defense for intelligence, a new post being created in the Defense Department. Pentagon Experts

The upper echelon of the Defense Department's China section is considered to be the most conservative fac-

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STATINTL

## EASIER IN POLICE STATE

*Nixon protection up to Peking*

By TED KNAP

Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

Several weeks before President Nixon is due in Peking, about a dozen U.S. Secret Service agents will go there to co-ordinate security precautions for the visit.

For diplomatic as well as practical reasons, the Americans will depend heavily on the host country police to guarantee the security of the President and his party. A Secret Service spokesman said they expect no difficulties.

Altho the Chinese Communist government has depicted American Presidents as imperialist warmongers during 25 years of hostility between the two countries, a Secret Service spokesman said the Nixon visit to Peking should be no more of a problem than if he were going to a major U. S. city. Crowd control is easier in a police state.

Nevertheless, elaborate precautions will be taken to protect the President's life and avoid any violent incident that would mar the "journey for peace."

The Secret Service advance team will check

in detail the security precautions established by the ministry of public security at Peking's Central Airport, along the routes Mr. Nixon will take and in all the buildings he is expected to enter during his stay of several days.

That would include the official guest villa he probably will occupy, the Great Hall of the People, where meetings will be held, and the old Imperial Palace grounds, where receptions and dinners will take place.

Both Chinese and Americans will check the telephones and rooms for listening devices.

## BULLETPROOF CAR

The \$269,000 bulletproof, bubbletop Lincoln Continental limousine will be flown from Washington to Peking for the President's use. He also may have a helicopter.

While such decisions have not yet been made, Mr. Nixon is less likely to mingle among large groups of private citizens than he did, for example, two years ago in Bucharest. That simplifies security.

The Secret Service advance team will inspect emergency sites such as hospitals and evacuation routes. It will have checked with the Central Intelligence Agency for information on individuals or groups who pose a potential threat.

The Secret Service won't say how many agents will accompany the President on his trip. But obviously it will require more than 100 to provide the necessary around-the-clock protection for Mr. Nixon and those in his immediate party.

## POLICE KITCHEN

What the President eats and drinks is not regarded as a major security problem; nevertheless, Secret Service agents will be in the kitchen checking on food and personnel.

Security for more than 200 newsmen expected to accompany Mr. Nixon on the historic visit will be the responsibility of Chinese police. Hotel and charter flight arrangements for the newsmen are made by the White House, but the communications media pay the bills.

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## Historic Change in Policy

# Red China Would Get UN Seat Even Without U.S., Experts Say

Second of two articles on how President Nixon decided on a new China policy that included abandonment of the traditional American stand against seating Peking in the United Nations.

By RAY MOSELEY

Bulletin Washington Bureau

Washington -- One day last April, President Nixon received on his desk a report from Henry Cabot Lodge, head of a commission which had been holding hearings around the country on Communist Chinese admission to the United Nations.

The report recommended that the United States support a policy of dual representation in the UN for Peking and the Nationalist Chinese regime on Taiwan (Formosa).

Some government officials viewed the report wryly. The presidential Commission on the United Nations was composed of persons who apparently had been selected for their prominence in American life rather than for any expertise about China. In fact, there wasn't a China expert among them.

"WHY SHOULD I CARE what Eugene Ormandy thinks about China policy?" said one official. "He never asked me what I think about it."

But the report was viewed by the President as a sound gauge of public opinion, and it was perhaps no coincidence that it dovetailed with his own thinking on the question.

Mr. Nixon's policy aims had been confirmed and supported a few weeks earlier by a State Department report to him, based on an extensive review of the China question that he ordered last November.

THE REPORT LAID DOWN a number of options that the United States might follow when the China question comes before the UN General Assembly this fall, and provided supporting arguments for each each position.

Its basic conclusion was that the realistic choices before the President were rather limited.

For the last 10 years, the U. S. has blocked Peking's admission by winning General Assembly approval of a resolution making this an "important question."

Under the UN Charter, important questions require a two-thirds majority for adoption, and Peking

had never come close to that.

But State Department experts concluded there was no possibility the important question resolution could pass again. A shift of only seven votes from last fall's outcome could doom it, and it appeared at least that many countries -- possibly more -- would drop support for the U. S. resolution and either vote against it or abstain.

## Arm Twisting

Chinese Nationalist officials refuse to accept this assessment. They and their American supporters insist that the important question resolution can still pass if the U. S. twists enough arms in the UN.

The State Department report, drawn up by teams of experts headed by Assistant Secretaries Marshall Green and Samuel DePalma, laid out these options before Mr. Nixon:

--Follow the old UN policy down to defeat. This would have the advantage of letting Peking into the UN while following the policy favored by Taiwan. It became known as "going down with the ship."

--Shelve the important question resolution and vote against a Communist resolution to admit Peking and expel Taiwan. This would allow Peking into the UN also, but had the drawback of obviously showing less than full support for Taiwan.

--Support a policy of dual representation, according to one of three or four possible formulas.



U. Alexis Johnson



Marshall Green

4 July 1971

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## Professor Denies CIA Link to Falcon Talks

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) suggested inviting a Communist Chinese scientist to a 1935 University of Wisconsin ecology conference, disputed testimony before the House Agriculture Committee shows.

Prof. J.J. Hickey of the UW Wildlife Ecology Dept. told the house panel, according to the just released testimony, that the CIA suggested inviting Cheng Tso-hsin, a Peking ornithologist, to the four-day conference on the population biology of the peregrine falcon.

HICKEY'S REMARKS, which he now disputes, were made last March during hearings on the Federal Pesticide Control Act of 1971. Hickey has been a long-time foe of the controversial pesticide DDT, which he claims is responsible for destruction of many bird species. In testimony before the house panel, Hickey said DDT has a "sublethal" effect on many bird populations. He said research showed DDT caused a decrease in the thickness of many eggshells, indirectly leading to extinction of bird populations.

Hickey, under questioning of Rep. Graham Purcell (D-Tex.), also told the committee the CIA suggested inviting the Red Chinese scientist to see if mail could be obtained from behind the Bamboo Curtain. Hickey told the panel he turned over the scientist's letter to the Milwaukee office of the CIA.

"THEY (THE CIA) wanted to get him over here?" Purcell asked.

"No, sir," Hickey replied. "They just wanted to find out whether or not I could get a letter out of there."

In an interview Friday, Hickey disputed the testimony.

"The CIA," he said, "merely advised me on how to get a letter through to Red China."

Hickey said he asked a CIA acquaintance about U.S. postal regulations and the best way to mail a letter to Communist China. Hickey said he had planned to work through a neutral French scientist, but the CIA told him to address the letter directly to

Hickey told the lawmakers he was "somewhat embarrassed" to get an unsolicited \$3,000 from the Audubon group. He said Friday he wanted the conference to be free of "conversation group" labels.

HICKEY SAID he called the conference after reports came from both the U.S. and Europe of a dramatic decrease in the population of the peregrine falcon. The scientists eventually decided pesticides were at the root of the problem.

Hickey, whose work on peregrine falcons dates back to the early 1950s, told lawmakers that DDT had "completely wiped out one species of bird — the peregrine falcon." He called the pesticide "a compound of chemical extinction."

HICKEY PUBLISHED a 593-page book in 1967 based on the conference. The letter from the Chinese scientist, he said, was not included in the volume.

"He (the Chinese ornithologist) thought the Peregrine Falcon was fine," Hickey disclosed, "and had no information."

Hickey called any attempts to link his work or the conference with the CIA "character assassination."

"Character assassination, though, is part of this business," Hickey mused. "That's why I have a thick skin."

DURING THE Agriculture Committee hearings, Purcell pressed Hickey about the CIA link, asking Hickey if he worked for the intelligence agency "to protect these hawks."

"No," Hickey answered. "I cooperate with my national government, and I have done this for a good many years."

The involvement of the government led to an observation from Rep. W. R. Poege (D-Tex.), committee chairman, that Hickey was "apparently subsidized by the government to carry on these operations."

THE UW CONFERENCE, which attracted 50 scientists from three continents was financed by the Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, (HEW) the National Audubon Society, the American Museum of Natural History, and the Wisconsin Society of Ornithology. HEW funds — about \$10,000 — accounted for half of the conference budget.

STATINTL



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MIAMI, FLA.  
NEWS

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MAY 26 1971

## 5 Communist countries accept Beach sports bid

By DICK HOLLAND  
Miami News Reporter

Neither Red China nor the Soviet Union has yet accepted an invitation to send gymnasts to a championship tournament in Miami Beach next week, but five other Communist nations have.

Sponsors of the tournament said today they hope the athletes will be treated with as much courtesy as the Red Chinese showed U.S. table tennis players recently.

"This is sports, not politics, and they'll be guests in our home — a real people-to-people thing," said David Statton, the Hialeah-Miami Springs banker who heads Florida Sports Meet Inc., the

nonprofit outfit sponsoring the tournament at the Beach Convention Hall June 5.

The Miami Beach City Council unanimously adopted a resolution inviting the Red Chinese to send their top gymnasts, and Statton said he has been in touch personally with Hsu Chung-fu, charge-d'affairs for Red China in Ottawa, Canada.

"We talked yesterday and, while he wasn't entirely encouraging, he didn't say his government had refused the invitation," Statton said. He said the invitation also has been cabled directly to Chinese Premier Chou En-lai.

"We got a nice letter from the (United States) State Department encouraging us in

this type of people-to-people thing," Statton said. He said the FBI and the CIA also have been in touch with him, not to interfere but just to be alerted on the situation.

The top male and female gymnasts are coming from Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany, Statton said, as well as from such nations as Japan, Switzerland, Spain, Norway, Canada and West Germany.

Statton said no invitation was issued to Cuba. There were rumors today that some Cuban exiles in Miami plan to protest the presence of athletes from Communist nations.

The event is to be taped for showing on the American Broadcasting Corp.'s "Wide World of Sports" program. Statton said that if the Red Chinese come, the result probably will be broadcast live.

The athletes will begin arriving Monday and will stay at the Doral Beach Hotel, where a ballroom has been fitted out with gymnastic equipment for their practice.

Tickets to the event are \$1 and \$3 for the afternoon, and \$3 and \$5 for the evening. Results of the competition will be recognized by the International Federation of Gymnasts.

STATINTL

CONFIDENTIAL

## THE ASIA LETTER

AN AUTHORITY ANALYSIS OF ASIAN AFFAIRS

Published by THE ASIA LETTER Co. Tokyo Hong Kong Washington Los Angeles

25 May 1971

Dear Sir:

THE C.I.A. IN ASIA (I): When United States Central Intelligence Agency Director RICHARD HELMS was getting ready to visit Saigon last fall for talks with South Vietnamese President NGUYEN VAN THIEU, he sent ahead an unusual calling card.

It was in the form of a news leak to the New York Times.

A story quoting "government officials" related in considerable detail the C.I.A. finding that there were some 30,000 agents of the Vietcong that had insinuated themselves into the Saigon government apparatus.

The findings revealed Hanoi intentions to increase that number to 60,000 by the end of 1971.

The conclusion was that the Saigon government would not be able to cope with these agents in shaping the country's future.

The information had very little to do with fact.

The figures came out of a hat---Richard Helms' hat.

The story was, frankly, designed to scare the hell out of President Thieu and make Helms' bargaining position a little easier.

What Helms was selling was the C.I.A. line of a need for a tougher security stance internally. Basically, President RICHARD NIXON had asked Helms if there was something he could do about the rampant corruption inside the Thieu government---officers squandering aid funds on luxury cars, wine and women and allowing an unacceptable amount of Uncle Sam's cash to turn up as flight capital to Swiss and French banks.

It was one of the rare (but increasing) instances when Helms and the C.I.A.---generally close-mouthed adherents to the "no comment" school---had ever used the press for leverage.

But it tells a lot about the C.I.A., which often feels frustrated about "not getting its message across" to the people it wants to reach in and out of the administration.

For the last few months, for example, the C.I.A. has been peddling in Washington and elsewhere details of an intensified Communist Chinese road-building effort in northern Laos.

But correspondents involved with Peking ping-pong and other developments have found the story not glamorous enough, nor different enough, from earlier ones on the same subject to get much space.

Helms visited Laos, which has come to be known as "C.I.A. Country", after twisting Thieu's arm and then went on to Tokyo to discuss Red China's nuclear, rocket and submarine developments with officials of Japan's intelligence-defense establishment.

These events were not reported in your daily newspaper and the exact details will never be known.

The C.I.A. is a many tentacled thing.

It operates in many diverse ways.

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Number 361

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## JOURNAL MEMO

CIA STUDY some time back developed likely "scenarios" for thaw in Red China's belligerent stand against U.S. One initial Chinese opening predicted: Reds would invite U.S. ping pong team to tour People's Republic of China. State Department, in written comments, ridiculed the suggestion, JOURNAL has learned from impeccable sources outside of the intelligence community.


# The China Trade: How Big How Fast?

President Nixon's decision to lift the twenty-year-old embargo against trade with Communist China, coming as it did on the heels of friendly overtures from Peking, was clearly more political than economic. "The question of trade with China is so swamped with politics and policy," said one Commerce Department official, "that economics takes a very distant second in guessing what might happen." As if to underline this point, Washington discovered last week that it was the Central Intelligence Agency rather than the Treasury or Commerce Department to which Mr. Nixon turned for a background paper when he first began to give serious consideration to lifting the embargo on trade with China many months ago.

But even though the future of U.S.-China trade will depend more on the balance of power than the balance of payments, a lowering of the barriers could indeed have important economic advantages for both nations. For the Chinese, there could be the immediate benefit of American technology in the form of diesel engines, computers and jet airplanes. For the U.S., there was the long-range prospect of opening new markets in a semi-industrialized country of more than 700 million people.

**Flight Line:** A few U.S. companies have already taken advantage of a relaxation of the rules in 1969 that allowed them to deal with Red China through foreign subsidiaries. General Motors, for instance, has sold engines and parts to the Chinese. Monsanto has sold rubber products; American Optical has sold microscopes and Hercules Rubber has bought resin. And since the President's move to lower the barriers even farther, the Commerce Department says, "hundreds and hundreds" of inquiries have come in from other companies. Among them: United, American and Pan American airlines, all of which want to fly to China; several airlines, in fact, still have permission from the Civil Aeronautics Board to fly the Pacific route, granted as far back as 1946.

Initially, however, there seems little chance of China trade running into large figures. For one thing, mainland China's total foreign trade is only \$4.3 billion, as against \$81.9 billion for the U.S. The U.S. study, according to government officials who have seen it, estimates that if trade resumes, U.S. exports to China would probably amount to no more than \$100 million to \$200 million annually over the next five years, with imports from China totaling considerably less than that. Exports, the report said, would depend on how much U.S. wheat China might buy, diverting orders from Canada and Australia. The import figure could



Gerrin—Cleveland Plain Dealer

rise substantially if Peking were to open its gates to American tourists.

While the Chinese want to buy many things the U.S. offers—including precision instruments, drugs and fertilizers—they lack the foreign currency to make huge purchases, and have refrained almost Calvinistically from borrowing. But according to the U.S. report, China may be on the verge of tapping an important new source of foreign-exchange earnings: oil. Prof. Robert F. Dernberger of the University of Michigan, a leading expert on China trade, asserts that China has a "Middle East-size production and exporting potential." Already, in fact, despite their own great energy needs, the Chinese reportedly have an oil surplus. "Even supplying a few days of Japan's needs," said one government source, "would make a difference of millions on China's exports." On the other hand, such primary Chinese exports as foodstuffs, tobacco, hides, furs and rubber are in no great demand in the U.S.—and textile exports to the U.S. would surely be politically intolerable when Mr. Nixon is already fighting a flood of such imports from other Asian countries.

Changes: Politics, of course, could throw all this out of whack. If U.S. relations with China continue to warm, the Chinese might well divert some of their buying from current trade partners to the U.S. In fact, China has shifted dramatically in the past: a dozen years ago, 70 per cent of its trading was with other Communist countries; today, at loggerheads with Russia and Communist countries that have taken Russia's side, Peking conducts 80 percent of its overseas business with non-Communist nations. The Japanese, whose drive to build up a 20 per cent share of China's foreign trade has led some Japanese traders to wear

Mao badges and denounce their own government when they visit the mainland, are alarmed at the possibility of an economic rapprochement between China and the U.S. And the British, already troubled by an 18 per cent slump in trade with China in 1970, fear their efforts to sell jetliners to the Chinese might now be undercut by U.S. competition.

A major question still outstanding, however, concerned just what U.S. items the President would allow the Chinese to buy. Administration sources said the list should be approved within a month, and it seemed likely that it would be strikingly similar to the one accorded the Soviet Union. Despite Defense Department objections, however, the list may also include such potential military goods as trucks and commercial jetliners. The next move will be Peking's—and though the Chinese officially haven't responded to having the embargo lifted, they obviously haven't been sitting still. Behind the scenes, they have suggested they would like six to eight Boeing commercial jetliners for use in an intercontinental air system that would include a Peking-to-New York flight (Newsweek, April 26). And at the end of last week, word in Washington was that the White House was actively considering selling Peking two or three planes as a starter.

## MOUNT SURIBACHI

The time rolled by and the Marines moved slowly, but determinedly, from their planned-down positions on the beaches to higher ground directly ahead—Motayama Airfield #1 in the center of the island which was the immediate objective. And now the heavier military equipment was being off-loaded on the beaches and moved along the makeshift roads of steel strips of landing mat laid over and up the soft sand terraces of Iwo's littoral. In the bright sunlight of a late afternoon I could see our tanks along the airfield's edge in the saddle and center of the island. Soon the Seabees would be bulldozing away the disabled Japanese aircraft that remained on the field; and their grading and rolling machines would begin to fill and smooth out the bomb-pocked strip for the first landings of our aircraft.

The airfield had been the immediate objective and it became the point of departure for the continuing advances the Marines would make for the ultimate conquest of the island. It was just then, however, that Mount Suribachi beckoned. It became the cynosure of all of us offshore, in the air and on Iwo as efforts were begun to take it. It was the mountain to climb and conquer, the place to plant the American flag. If this would not be symbolic yet of total victory, then it would be of that total victory that would eventually come, bringing with it release from the terrible ordeal they had endured, both Japanese and American, who remained alive after the holocaust—less the legions who already would have been released by death.

I watched the final stages of the flag raising on Mount Suribachi through a gunsight aboard our ship. On the cross hairs of the sight it came out a few ants struggling with a match stick, rag attached, in an effort to raise and place it atop a sand pile; and they finally accomplished it. From such a distance and seen through a gunsight, it appeared a detached and casual ceremony completely devoid of panoply; and so it must have seemed from any vantage point. But of just such things so casual and rugged is history made and remembered.

RED CHINESE MUST RETURN  
AMERICAN SERVICEMEN

HON. JOHN G. SCHMITZ

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, April 27, 1971

Mr. SCHMITZ. Mr. Speaker, the following article by investigative reporter, Paul Scott, should be brought to the attention of all my colleagues. It makes the very valid point that prior to even considering any type of increased U.S. contact with the Chinese Communists the question of the return of the American servicemen being held by the Red Chinese must be settled.

The article follows:

RED CHINESE MUST RETURN AMERICAN  
SERVICEMEN

(By Paul Scott)

WASHINGTON, April 28.—The fate of those "forgotten Americans" languishing in Communist China's dungeons could become the first test of the soundness of President Nixon's policy of trying to improve relations with Peking.

These Americans are U.S. fighting men that Peking is illegally holding from the Korean and Vietnam wars—some of whom have undergone everything from brainwashing to torture for more than 20 years.

The highly explosive prisoner issue is being quietly raised by a group of influential members of Congress headed by Representative Cornelius E. Gallagher (D., N.J.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs' Far East Subcommittee, and Representative H. R. Gross (R., Ia.), a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

The lawmakers have demanded to know what President Nixon is doing, if anything, to free these men before going through with trade concessions to Red China or entertaining Peking's propaganda groups in the White House.

The unpublished demand was made during a private hearing that Gallagher's subcommittee held last week to hear testimony from State Department officials on President Nixon's new open door policy toward Communist China.

In quizzing Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green, Representative Gallagher called on the Nixon Administration to test Communist China's intentions by demanding that American prisoners in China be released immediately.

The lawmaker reminded Green that Peking is known to be holding at least five Americans, and possibly several hundred additional U.S. fighting men from the Korean and Vietnam wars. One of those known to be a prisoner is Capt. Philip E. Smith, son of Mrs. Oscar Smith of Roadhouse, Ill.

Pentagon records list Smith as the first U.S. combatant of the Vietnam war known to have fallen into Chinese Communist hands. His F-105 Starfighter was downed on Sept. 20, 1955 while over the Tonkin Gulf. While American rescue planes stood helplessly by, Smith was picked up by a Chinese patrol boat and taken to the mainland.

Feeble diplomatic efforts by the Nixon and Johnson Administrations to obtain Smith's release so far have produced nothing. All that the State Department has been able to learn from Peking is that Smith is alive and being held in a prison in the Chinese Capital.

Although it isn't saying so in public, the State Department has hard evidence that the Chinese Communists are holding at least four more American fighting men. The Central Intelligence Agency says privately there are many more. Over the years, the CIA has gathered bits and pieces of information about a number of other "missing" U.S. military personnel believed to be prisoners inside China. Most of these are prisoners from the Korean war.

Showing their concern—Representatives Gallagher and Gross made it clear to Green that there is growing concern in Congress that President Nixon wasn't giving the prisoner issue a high enough priority in his new policy toward Peking.

The legislators warned that the President was giving away his bargaining power for the prisoners by making one-way concessions to Peking on trade without first obtaining an agreement to discuss their plight.

One subcommittee member said he couldn't understand how the President could welcome personally a delegation from Communist China without first getting assurances that Peking was ready to discuss the release of American prisoners.

"It looks like the President is conveniently forgetting the fact that the Chinese Reds are holding American prisoners of war," stated the lawmaker. "Some one must remind him that his first responsibility is to free these men; not provide the White House as a propaganda forum for Peking."

Green reportedly agreed to pass the lawmakers' warnings along to Secretary of State William Rogers and to the White House. He assured them that his views were close to theirs but could not speak for either Rogers or the President.

New pressure needed—If past negotiations with the Chinese Communists are any indicator, it will take more than 20 years

changes of plug-pong delegations to free American prisoners.

The State Department announced in August, 1955, that the U.S. had agreed to open the so-called "Prague-Warsaw Talks" with the Chinese Reds to discuss the fate of Americans being held in China.

Those off-and-on talks have dragged on for nearly 16 years. During that time, Peking released an American, a Catholic Bishop, imprisoned after the Communists took over in China. None of the American military men captured during the Korean or Vietnam wars have been freed.

In the U.S. Senate, several members led by Senator Strom Thurmond (R. S.C.), a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, are planning to raise the prisoner issue. They are now seeking information from the Defense Department as to the number of American men still held by the Chinese.

The Thurmond group also wants to know the exact number of Americans (believed to be more than 20) that the North Vietnamese captured during the recent military operation in Laos. Nixon Administration officials will be asked to make known their plans for obtaining the release of these men and the more than 450 Americans known to be prisoners in North Vietnam.

By linking the Vietnam and Chinese prisoners' issue, the Thurmond group hopes to bring new pressure on President Nixon to spell out to the American people how he plans to obtain the freedom of these forgotten heroes. Many members of Congress believe the time is running out for these prisoners and that the U.S. must act soon if they are ever to see freedom again.

NEW ROLE FOR THE ARMY  
ENGINEERS

HON. JOHN B. ANDERSON

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, April 27, 1971

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, last year I introduced legislation to give statutory authority to a five-man, civilian Environmental Advisory Board in the Army Corps of Engineers. The Board would have been charged with the responsibility of conducting environmental reviews of all proposed and ongoing corps projects, and these reviews would be included with the environmental impact statements filed with the Council on Environmental Quality. My legislation would simply have formalized by law an initiative already taken by the corps in establishing such a Board, and would have given the Board more specific responsibilities.

I was pleased to read in the Sunday Star that additional initiatives have been taken by the corps to insure full consideration of environmental factors in the policy and decision process at the corps.

The corps has taken the lead in implementing the licensing scheme under the 1899 Refuse Act which deals with water pollution the corps has been assigned the chore of cleaning up the Nation's dirtiest river, the Cuyahoga; and the corps has upgraded the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors as the "conscience of the corps" when it comes to environmental matters.

At this point in the Record I would like to include the full text of the article

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# Is Love-All a Score in Ping-Pong?

By JERRY GREENE

Washington, April 14—Communist China's bold venture into Ping-Pong diplomacy, an almost ridiculous method of breaking a 21-year freeze in international relations, has brought the Nixon administration the first really happy turn in global affairs in many months. Now the foreign affairs experts here are deep in huddles to figure out what it means, and why.

The Red Chinese invitation to the American table tennis team caught the whole community by surprise, from CIA Director Richard Helms to Secretary of State William Rogers to Henry Kissinger over at the White House.

We are told today that President Nixon had made his decision a couple of weeks ago to proclaim further easing of trade and travel restrictions on Peking, a fortuitous coincidence, for it enabled him to make a prompt friendly gesture in return.

But a relaxed trade restriction will never be able to match an invitation to a table tennis team in the eyes of the common people around the world, and it is frankly admitted here that Premier Chou En-lai scored a propaganda victory of major proportions.

## Is a New Pattern of Relations Bared?

No one here doubts that Chou En-lai has considerably more in mind than Ping-Pong and a few kindly words for the U.S., although that in itself could be called a major diplomatic development the way things have been going for two decades. The way he talked to the 15 members of the table tennis delegation—"You have opened a new page in the relations of the Chinese and American people"—came in dramatic contrast to language used in a Peking radio broadcast on April 8.

Peking carried on that date a dispatch from Hanoi dealing with the Laos invasion which reported that the Communist forces near Khe Sanh "have not only made a great contribution to the complete defeat of the aggressive military action against southern Laos by the U.S. gangsters, but also dealt a severe blow to its war 'Vietnamization' plan."

So it would appear that the generous and cordial welcome extended the table tennis players does not necessarily mean that the new era of sweetness and light has broken upon us yet.

But the friendliness and warmth exhibited by the Chinese premier was most welcome here nevertheless, for President Nixon long before his election set as a goal the improvement of relations with Peking. Indeed, he has had personal charge of the several small gestures the U.S. has made in the last year to pry a crack in the Communist wall.

During the presidential campaign, Nixon said repeatedly, "We simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates, and threaten its neighbors. There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation."

## Not Ready to Desert Taiwan

The President was in 1968 opposed to entry of Red China into the UN at that time, but left the way open for reconsideration later. He has softened his position still further—but not so far as to buy Peking's terms for entry, the requirement that Nationalist China be excluded.

In his foreign policy review sent to Congress in February, Nixon served notice he will continue to oppose any efforts by Peking to oust the Taipei government from the UN, but said that the U.S. "is prepared" to see Communist China "play a constructive role in the family of nations."

"We are prepared to establish a dialogue with Peking," Nixon said in February. "We cannot accept its ideological pre-

cepts, or the notion that Communist China must exercise hegemony over Asia. But neither do we wish to impose on China an international position that denies its legitimate national interests."

## Wants a Constructive Relationship

Nixon said that there will be no more important challenge for the U.S. in the decade of the 1970s than drawing China into "a constructive relationship" with the whole world community, and particularly with the rest of Asia.

The President had an encouraging word for Russia, in connection with his thoughts on Peking: "We . . . see no advantage to us in the hostility between the Soviet Union and Communist China. We do not seek any . . . It is absurd to believe that we could collude with one of the parties against the other."

Due note is taken here that the Russian press has not yet commented directly on the outburst of friendliness in Peking's Ping-Pong diplomacy. It is believed that the Russians were as astonished as was Washington, for the Moscow Literaturnaya Gazeta today carried selected foreign press comments about the American team's visit to China under the headline, "Judge for Yourself — An Unexpected Friendly Gesture."

## Broke the Ice With a Paddle

While there is plenty of welcome here at the White House and the State Department for the spring thaw in Peking, we couldn't find any analysts who were ready to toss aside Nixon's warning in February that we should be "totally realistic about the prospects" of wholly friendly relations on an instant basis.

At that time, the President told Congress: "The People's Republic of China continues to convey to its own people and to the world its determination to cast us in the devil's role. Our modest efforts to prove otherwise have not reduced Peking's doctrinaire enmity toward us. So long as this is true, so long as Peking continues to be adamant for hostility, there is little we can do by ourselves to improve the relationship."

That was written, of course, before Peking broke the ice with a Ping-Pong paddle.

15 MAR 1971

## Henry Taylor // A sound premise?



THE President and Secretary of State William P. Rogers share an undisclosed potential in ordering a secret review of our atomic capability.

The basic conception of U. S. foreign policy has been that the split between the Soviet Union and Red China is so deep and irredeemable that, behind the scenes, Moscow will side with us for world stabilization against Peking.

This accounts for numerous concessions to Moscow, over a long period, that mystify the public. All decisions are invariably the prisoner of basic conceptions that may be right or wrong and now the President and Mr. Rogers are driven to ask: Is this premise sound?

They concur, of course, with the general observation that Russia and China have had fundamental conflicts of interest for countless years in spite of all internal changes. This is elementary. But Mr. Nixon and Mr. Rogers have become convinced this reliance can put our policy's foundation on quicksand. For they also recognize that, at bottom, the current arguments between Moscow and Peking really are only concerned with the problem: Which is the best way to bury the western world and erect a Red world?

THE target of diplomacy and propaganda is the same: To strengthen your influence among friends and contain the inroads made by adversaries. All Kremlin propaganda media use every possible device to distinguish between Red China and Mao. The only thing wrong with Red China is Mao. This is the main line of Soviet policy.

Chinese anti-Soviet provocations are invariably blamed on the "Mao group," "maniacal Mao," etc. Pravda and Izvestia consistently insist all China is not "infected by the cancer

of Mao." Soviet radio broadcasts, beamed thruout the Red world, endlessly charge Mao (never Red China) with anti-Soviet crimes, including the Heilongjiang Province incidents on the Soviet-China 4,100-mile border.

The Kremlin leaves the door wide open for a rapprochement with Red China — except for Mao.

MOREOVER, Mr. Nixon and Mr. Rogers note suspiciously that even the Soviet anti-Mao propaganda has softened, and the Heilongjiang border clashes have largely dissolved, since the time of Kosygin's visit with Mao in Peking after Ho Chi Minh's funeral in Hanoi.

As long ago as 1952 Red Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi told a CIA infiltrator: "The Chinese people may not have enough trousers, but we will surely have the nuclear bomb." On March 3 Red China launched its second earth satellite from the Shuangchengzi space facility in the Gobi Desert, 435 miles northwest of Lanchow — itself a Russian-installed atomic production center. The first satellite was orbited from there on April 24, 1970. Then Peking exploded a three-megaton device — the equivalent to three million tons of TNT — in the atmosphere on Oct. 14, 1970.

The CIA has informed Mr. Nixon that the rocket used for the March 3 satellite might already be capable of delivering on us a small "blackmail" warhead, altho not the three-megaton warhead Peking is clearly developing for an intercontinental ballistic missile.

This explains the President's Peking atomic reference in his State of the World message. But a Moscow-Peking rapprochement, with or without Mao's death, looms even heavier. Not only would the absolute keystone of U. S. foreign policy disappear but the credibility of our atomic deterrent would face the joint capability of the Soviet Union and Red China in utterly alarming tandem.

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## Warnings from Red China

WILL Communist China intervene in Laos as a counter to the U.S.-supported South Vietnamese thrust into the southern part of that country?

President Nixon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency and other authorities would like to know the answer, and we don't presume to have it.

But the fact that the question is being worriedly asked in Washington should remind the American people: As long as we are embroiled in a land war in Asia, there is a risk of a wider conflict with Peking.

The conventional wisdom in Washington is that China will not send troops or "volunteers" so long as South Vietnamese forces do not strike northward in Laos or North Vietnam. We hope this reading of Chinese intentions is accurate.

Last week the White House and State Department spokesmen sought to reassure Peking that it had nothing to fear from the allied strikes against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos, far from the Chinese border.

Peking, however, chose to denounce the move as "a grave menace" to China. It has staged mass anti-American rallies with veterans of the Korean fighting against the United States prominently present.

This could be a genuine threat, a warning, or a bluff. Mr. Nixon would do well to proceed cautiously, for the last thing this country wants or needs is another Korean-style bloodletting against Communist China.

The White House states that the Vietnam War is going well, that the enemy is hurting from the loss of his Cambodian sanctuaries and now from the cutting of his Laos supply lines. Again, we hope this is so.

But the administration must not let the headlines of success change its goal in Vietnam. That is to withdraw U.S. troops in such a way as to keep a non-Communist South Vietnam — if possible — not to overthrow the Communist regime in North Vietnam.

Mr. Nixon must not let the illusion of victory or military ambition outrun good sense. When Gen. MacArthur drove northward in Korea, the Chinese showed how sensitive they were to threats near their borders. They probably would react the same way today.

Recently, South Vietnamese Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky spoke of perhaps invading North Vietnam to destroy supply dumps there. Marshal Ky is a flamboyant character and may not have been serious.

But if he was, the proper response of this country should be the classic line of the late movie producer Sam Goldwyn: "Include me out."